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INTRODUCTION 
The avoidable consequences doctrine, sometimes called the duty to 
mitigate damages, precludes plaintiffs from recovering damages for 
losses they could have prevented by reasonable efforts. 1 Legal 
authorities generally treat the doctrine as an exception to or a limitation 
on the expectation interest.2 The expectation interest normally permits 
the nonbreaching plaintiff to recover damages sufficient to put the 
I. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 I 8 ( 1977). This Article will frequently rely on these 
Restatements to summarize state law, rather than producing long and unnecessary string 
citations of case law. 
2. The headings for the Restatement sections in the preceding footnote reveal the 
general view: "Avoidability as a Limitation on Damages," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS§ 350, and "Diminution of Damages," RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 918. (Technically, "Diminution of Damages" is the title of Topic 2 in Chapter 47 
(Damages). Section 918 is the first section of Topic 2). Section titles in contracts 
treatises and contracts and remedies casebooks reveal the degree to which scholars share 
this conception of the avoidable consequences doctrine. See, e.g., E. ALLAN 
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.12 (2d ed. I 990) ("Avoidability as a Limitation"); JOHN 
E. MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 122 (3d ed. 1990) ("The Mitigation 
Limitation"); JOHN P. DAWSON ET AL., CASES AND COMMENT ON CONTRACTS 37 (5th 
ed. 1987) ("Limitations on Expectation Damages," a section that begins with avoidable 
consequences cases); CHARLES L. KNAPP & NATHAN M. CRYSTAL, PROBLEMS IN 
CONTRACT LAW: CASES AND MATERJALS 940 (3d ed. 1993) ("Restrictions on the 
Recovery of Expectation Damages: Mitigation of Damages"); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
MODERN AMERJCAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MA TERJALS 13 1 (I 985) ("Limits on the 
Basic Principle," which begins with a subsection on "Avoidable Consequences"); 
ROBERT S. THOMPSON & JOHN A. SEBERT, JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND 
RESTITUTION § 2.03 (2d ed. I 989) ("The Major Limitations on Damages Recoveries," 
which includes subsection [C] labelled "Avoidable Consequences"). 
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plaintiff in the position she would have occupied if the defendant had 
performed the contract.3 Application of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine may leave the plaintiff short of that position,4 If the plaintiff 
failed to avoid some part of the loss because she failed to act reasonably, 
the damage award will not compensate her for the avoidable portion of 
the loss. This apparently leaves her worse off than if the contract had 
been performed.5 The avoidable consequences doctrine imposes a 
portion of the loss on the plaintiff rather than on the breaching 
defendant. 
This Article challenges the traditional approach to the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. The avoidable consequences doctrine produces 
results entirely consistent with the expectation interest. In every contract 
case where the avoidable consequences doctrine reduces a damage 
award, the breach appears to bestow some benefit on the plaintiff for 
which the expectation interest must account. The expectation interest 
insists that courts not make the plaintiff better off than if the contract 
had been performed.6 If the breach left the plaintiff with some benefit, 
then the damage award must subtract the value of that benefit from the 
amount that the plaintiff may recover. The avoidable consequences 
doctrine serves this function, estimating the value of benefits that courts 
might have difficulty recognizing or valuing directly. 
3. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 cmt. a (1979); 
FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, §§ 12.1, 12.6, at 840,871. 
4. See, e.g., DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, TEACHER'S MANUAL: MODERN AMERICAN 
REMEDIES 84 ( 1985). 
5. For example, if a discharged employee refuses to take a comparable job when 
available, the court should reduce the award by the amount that the employee could have 
earned by accepting the job. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c, 
illus. 8; see, e.g., Sutherland v. Wyer, 67 Me. 64 (1877) (employee took substitute 
employment, but quit before expiration of contract term with defendant). Reducing the 
recovery in these circumstances leaves the plaintiff with less money than she would have 
received if she had continued to work for the defendant. 
6. See, e.g., Thorne v. White, I 03 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1954). Without this insistence, 
the award would miss the target: the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if 
the defendant had performed. Indeed, even the reliance interest, as applied by courts, 
cannot place the plaintiff in a better position than if the contract had been performed. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 349 ( I 979). The theoretical justifications of 
this limitation to the reliance interest have been explored elsewhere. See Lon L. Fuller 
& William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 
79 (1936); Michael B. Kelly, The Phantom Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 1992 
WIS. L. REV. 1755, 1783-1811; Mark Pettit, Jr., Private Advantage and Public Power: 
Reexamining the Expectation and Reliance Interests in Contract Damages, 38 HASTINGS 
L.J. 417, 445-52 (1987), 
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Part I develops this theme in several contexts. Basically, when a 
plaintiff chooses not to avoid losses, her choice implies a judgment that 
she would be better off to incur those losses rather than to avoid them. 
That judgment suggests that she expects to benefit from the breach, 
either directly (such as leisure to a discharged worker) or indirectly (such 
as by redirecting productive capacity to projects she could not have 
pursued if the defendant had performed the contract). If courts 
compensate the plaintiff for the full loss, without accounting for the 
benefit of the breach, they leave the plaintiff in a better position than she 
could have occupied if the defendant had performed. Since the 
expectation interest cannot justify this result, it must create an offset for 
the benefits. Because the decision not to avoid the loss implies that the 
value of the benefit to the plaintiff at least equals the loss she could have 
avoided by reasonable efforts, the amount of avoidable loss becomes a 
reasonable estimate of the amount to subtract when accounting for the 
benefit. Thus, rather than reducing damage awards below what the 
expectation interest normally would require, the avoidable consequences 
doctrine simply implements a limitation inherent in the expectation 
interest. 
Standing alone, Part I deserves attention. It identifies a previously 
unrecognized purpose served by the subtraction of avoidable losses from 
contract damage awards. Future discussions of the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine need to take this function into account, along with 
other goals the avoidable consequences doctrine serves. In addition, Part 
I reconciles the avoidable consequences doctrine with the expectation 
interest. We no longer need to explain why the law accepts 
undercompensation in the name of mitigation. Mitigation is necessary 
to avoid overcompensation. 
Part II advances a more extreme implication of the arguments 
presented here: the law could live without the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. Even if courts never again mentioned the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine or a duty to mitigate damages, proper implementation 
of the expectation interest would produce the same damage awards. 
That extension, however, confronts an obstacle. Part I rests upon a 
critical inference: the failure to minimize losses reveals the plaintiff's 
valuation of the benefits of the breach. That inference, however, 
arguably assumes the existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine, 
making the argument circular. Part II addresses the independence of the 
analysis here in two ways. First, continued reference to the avoidable 
consequences doctrine is superfluous. Even if its existence was 
necessary to create the inference, from now on that inference can 
displace the avoidable consequences doctrine. Second and more 
importantly, common-law judges concerned with proper implementation 
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of the expectation interest would have needed to create an offset for the 
benefits of breach even if the avoidable consequences doctrine never 
existed. In so doing, they could have drawn the inference proposed here 
independently of any concerns for avoidable consequences. 
In explaining how common-law courts could have derived the offset, 
this Article stumbles upon a concept that may have considerable 
significance in other areas: the idea of natural harm, or the amount of 
harm that would have occurred if no remedy was available. Some losses 
a plaintiff incurs may exist as much because of the remedies the law 
makes available as because of the defendant's misconduct. Recognizing 
this fact may shed light on other remedial issues far removed from the 
narrow question discussed here. Part III, however, focuses on the 
narrower issues that motivated this work. It identifies the significance 
of viewing the avoidable consequences doctrine as a corollary to the 
expectation interest. 
Part I does not propose any change in the rules courts apply. Whether 
viewed as a separate avoidable consequences doctrine or as an intrinsic 
part of the expectation interest, courts must reduce awards by the 
amounts that plaintiffs could have avoided by reasonable conduct. 
Nonetheless, at least three advantages seem likely to flow from the 
analysis presented here--one theoretical, two more practical. 
First, understanding the avoidable consequences doctrine may 
illuminate our theories of contract remedies--and, more generally, of 
contract law. Recent efforts to explain contract remedies as including 
fault principles start by criticizing the expectation interest's ability to 
explain limitations on remedies. 7 If the expectation interest can in fact 
explain these limitations on recovery, these theories may require 
additional thought.8 At the very least, our understanding of contract 
remedies will be richer once it accounts for the consistency between the 
avoidable consequences doctrine and the expectation interest. 
Second, court decisions occasionally deviate from the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, apparently because they place undue emphasis on 
7. George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 
1225, 1229 (1994). 
8. This Article does not attempt to rebut Professor Cohen's excellent work, which 
presents ideas I find quite appealing. In fact, the initial working title for this Article (in 
1991) was Contributory Negligence in Contract Law. That project began with the 
argument that the avoidable consequences doctrine incorporated fault notions--,m idea 
I gave up because I could not overcome the argument presented below. 
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the existence or nonexistence of a duty to mitigate damages.9 Scholars 
have long argued that the avoidable consequences doctrine does not 
really involve a duty to mitigate damages10 and is not a manifestation 
of contributory negligence. 11 Nonetheless, the language of duty persists 
in legal decisions. That persistence flows, at least in part, from the 
weakness of efforts to explain why the avoidable consequences doctrine 
is not a manifestation of contributory negligence. The explanation 
offered here cuts the link to duty-based concepts such as contributory 
negligence. Thus, it may help prevent misapplication of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine in the future. 
Third, recognizing the harmony between the avoidable consequences 
doctrine and the expectation interest may help courts apply the avoidable 
consequences doctrine more appropriately. The avoidable consequences 
doctrine can arise in some intricate situations, when an appreciation of 
its harmony with the expectation interest can help the court approach the 
problem in a productive way. 
9. The language used to discuss the avoidable consequences doctrine may not 
have much significance. Dobbs, for one, believes "no one is likely to be misled" by 
imprecise usage such as the duty to mitigate damages. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF 
REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTIT\JTION § 3.9 n.5 (2d ed. I 993). Shortly after the 
treatise's appearance, however, Riffer and Barrowman reported significant confusion 
over the existence of a duty to mitigate. See Jeffrey K. Riffer & Elizabeth Barrowman, 
Recent Misinterpretations of the Avoidable Consequences Rule: The "Duty"' To Mitigate 
and Other Fictions, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 411 (1993). 
10. See. e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES§ 3.7, at 188 
(1973); CHARLES T. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES 128 (1935); 
ARTHUR G. SEDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 73 (2d ed. 1909). 
11. Scholars generally agree that the doctrine is not a manifestation of either 
contributory or comparative negligence. DOBBS, supra note I 0, § 3. 7, at I 88; 
MCCORMICK, supra note 10, at 128. But see SEDGWICK, supra note 10, at 73-74. 
While neither proposition has achieved universal support, each has achieved a breadth 
of support that most principles of black letter law would covet. The support extends far 
beyond the authors of scholarly treatises. The American Law Institute's Restatements, 
on which practitioners and judges frequently rely, endorse the propositions. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. a (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. b (1979) (relating only to duty, perhaps because contributory 
negligence plays no obvious role in contract law). Legal encyclopedias, designed 
primarily as practice aids, reiterate the points, citing case authority for them. See 22 
AM. JUR. 2D Damages §§ 497, 499 (1988); 15 AM. JuR. Damages § 27 (1938) 
(distinguishing contributory negligence, though otherwise using language of duty); 25 
C.J.S. Damages § 32 ( 1966) ( distinguishing comparative negligence, but otherwise using 
language of duty). Articles by practitioners indicate the propositions have penetrated law 
offices, a fate that gives them effect beyond that of many scholarly exhortations. See 
Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9. 
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I. A VOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES AS A COROLLARY OF THE 
EXPECTATION INTEREST 
This section seeks to explain how the avoidable consequences doctrine 
is completely consistent with the expectation interest. That explanation 
is complicated somewhat by the existence of several different rules that 
use the same moniker. 12 At the same time, the law avoids identifying 
several very similar results as applications of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine by incorporating the limitations on damages into basic damage 
calculations. The expectation interest explains the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine's peripheral and core aspects. Readers may find the 
discussion of the peripheral aspects too elementary. Nonetheless, the 
discussion of the periphery lays the groundwork for the more controver-
sial argument that follows. In addition, the Article can claim success 
only by explaining all aspects of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
Thus, a brief explanation of two collateral aspects of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine follows. 
A. Peripheral Aspects of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine 
1. Affirmative Uses of the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine 
A fundamental division within the avoidable consequences doctrine 
comes from its affirmative and negative applications. 13 Most people 
think of the doctrine as a limitation on damages: plaintiff cannot recover 
damages for losses she could have avoided by reasonable conduct.14 
But the avoidable consequences doctrine includes a corollary: plaintiff 
can recover the cost of any reasonable effort to avoid the losses inflicted 
by the defendant's wrongful conduct. 15 
Affirmative application of the avoidable consequences doctrine adds 
virtually nothing to the law of damages. It simply duplicates the result 
achieved by the fundamental principle of damages: putting the plaintiff 
12. Dobbs identifies "four rules of avoidable consequences." DOBBS, supra note 
9, § 3.9, at 271 (emphasis in original). 
13. See DOBBS, supra note IO, § 3.7, at 187. 
14. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979); RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918 (1977). 
15. See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 187; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, 
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as nearly as possible in the position she would have occupied if the 
wrong had not occurred. 16 If the wrong had not occurred, the injured 
party would incur no expense to minimize the harm caused by the 
wrong. Compensation for such losses, thus, seems inescapable. 
Consider how the affirmative use of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine might arise in a simple contract case. A seller breaches, forcing 
a buyer, in order to avoid consequential losses, to purchase substitute 
goods (or land or services). As long as the buyer makes reasonable 
efforts to obtain substitute goods, the affirmative application of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine would permit the buyer to recover these 
incidental expenses. Similarly, if a buyer breaches, the seller incurs the 
cost of arranging to sell the goods to another person. The affirmative 
aspect of the avoidable consequences doctrine would entitle the seller to 
recover the cost of resale. 
Contract law does not need the avoidable consequences doctrine to 
explain why a nonbreaching seller may recover the cost of reselling the 
goods to another or why a nonbreaching buyer may recover the cost of 
effectuating cover. The expectation interest explains the law perfectly 
without any embellishment from the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
If the contract had been performed, the plaintiff would not have incurred 
the costs of reselling or covering. 17 Thus, the plaintiff should recover 
16. See, e.g., Hatahley v. United States, 257 F.2d 920, 923 (10th Cir. 1958); 
LAYCOCK, supra note 2, at 14 ("Hatah/ey's rule----that the fundamental principle of 
damages is to restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the position he would 
have been in but for the wrong-is the essence of compensatory damages."). This 
Article occasionally follows Laycock's shorthand of referring to this as the plaintiffs 
"rightful position." 
17. For those who prefer the reliance interest, we might adapt the sentence in the 
text. If the contract had not been made, the plaintiff still would have incurred the cost 
of buying or selling the goods (or land or services) in the cover transaction, but might 
not have incurred the cost of buying the goods from or selling the goods to the 
defendant. By forcing the plaintiff to incur these transaction costs twice, the breach left 
the plaintiff worse off than if the contract had not been made. The reliance interest 
refocuses our attention on recovering the cost of dealing with the defendant, not the cost 
of the cover or resale transaction. The net effect is much the same. 
This transformation assumes that the reliance interest would hypothesize no dealing 
between the plaintiff and the defendant. Arguably, we could assume that the parties 
would have incurred all of the expenses of dealing with each other, but at the last 
possible moment would have stopped short of entering the agreement. Under that 
assumption, the reliance interest might reject recovery of incidental expenses incurred 
in the process of making either sale. The reliance interest does not compel any 
particular assumption concerning the hypothetical bargaining that might have occurred 
if the contract had not been made. It dictates the general question ("What if the contract 
had not been made?"), but leaves the answer open to several alternatives, including lost 
opportunities to deal with others in addition to the two possibilities already identified in 
this footnote. See Fuller & Perdue, supra note 6, at 55, 60-61; Pettit, supra note 6, at 
420-21. As long as the resale or cover generates actual out-of-pocket expenses, recovery 
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any such costs incurred in finding a substitute transaction. To the extent 
that we need a name for this portion of the award, "incidental damages" 
should serve the purpose quite well. 18 No embellishment of the basic 
damage rule is necessary to generate this result. 
The point extends beyond contract law. In every case where a plaintiff 
must incur expenses to minimize the losses caused by the defendant's 
wrong (regardless of the nature of the wrong),19 the plaintiff would not 
have incurred those expenditures but for the wrong. Any effort to put 
her into the position she would have occupied but for the wrong 
necessarily must include expenses incurred to ~inimize the harm. Both 
the damage formula (the position but for the wrong) and the definition 
of the expenses recoverable under the affirmative use of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine ( expenses to reduce the harm caused by the 
wrong) focus on damages caused by the wrong. Under these circum-
stances, the affirmative application of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine remains a subset of the damages recoverable under the 
expectation interest, requiring no separate explanation. 
2. Avoided Consequences 
The negative application of the avoidable consequences doctrine 
presents three further possibilities: the plaintiff may fail to make 
of those expenditures would serve the principle advantages of the reliance interest: 
certainty and measurability. Thus, one might anticipate courts choosing to allow 
recovery of these expenses under the reliance interest. Since contract law generally 
prefers the expectation interest, any additional discussion of whether the reliance interest 
would adopt a stingier view of incidental damages seems unnecessary here. 
18. U.C.C. §§ 2-710, 2-715 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 347 
cmt. c (1979). 
19. The superfluous nature of affirmative avoidable consequences applies even in 
tort. Medical expenses minimize harm: rather than suffer through life without the use 
of one leg, the plaintiff should have the bone set, allowing her to use the leg again 
within a few months. Since those expenses are reasonable, the affirmative use of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine justifies their recovery. Medical expenses in tort may 
be the archetypical affirmative use of the avoidable consequences doctrine. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. d ( 1977). But tort law does not need the 
avoidable consequences doctrine to explain why an injured party may recover medical 
expenses. If the tort had not occurred, the plaintiff would not have incurred medical 
expenses. Causing the plaintiff to incur medical expenses fits comfortably within 
compensation for "the creation of liabilities." Id. § 906( c ). Thus, basic damage 
principles justify awarding medical expenses without reference to the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. 
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reasonable efforts to avoid the loss; the plaintiff may make reasonable 
efforts that nonetheless fail to avoid the loss; or the plaintiff may make 
successful efforts to avoid the loss. The avoidable consequences 
doctrine usually addresses only the first two situations. The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts deals with only the first two situations.20 The 
Restatement (Second) of Torts leaves a similar gap in the definition of 
the avoidable consequences doctrine.21 Unless the law prefers to 
encourage futile efforts to avoid the loss, omitting the treatment of 
successful efforts seems odd.22 At least superficially, the avoidable 
consequences doctrine seems designed primarily to encourage successful 
efforts to minimize the loss. 23 
The law does not need the avoidable consequences doctrine in order 
to decide how to treat successful efforts to avoid the loss. The 
expectation interest addresses the issue by limiting recovery to damages 
caused by the breach. Damages aim to put the plaintiff in the position 
she would have occupied if the defendant had performed the contract, 
but not a better position.24 If the plaintiff avoids some portion of the 
loss, allowing recovery for the avoided loss would leave her in a 
position better than the one she would have occupied if the contract had 
been performed. This general rule finds specific manifestation in several 
provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. For example, a 
nonbreaching seller may recover contract price minus the amount she 
realized by reselling the goods to a new buyer (net of resale expenses, 
of course).25 The defendant deprived the seller of the full price, but the 
seller avoided part of the loss by selling to another, leaving only part of 
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 ( I 979): 
(I) Except as stated in Subsection (2), damages are not recoverable for loss 
that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or 
humiliation. 
(2) The injured party is not precluded from recovery by the rule stated in 
Subsection (!) to the extent that he has made reasonable but unsuccessful 
efforts to avoid loss. 
While the language explicitly discusses unsuccessful efforts to avoid the loss, it does not 
explain how to treat successful efforts. 
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 ( 1977). By including the benefits 
rule in another section, the Restatement (Second) a/Torts fills the gap left by§ 918. See 
id.§ 920. 
22. This may explain why Dobbs includes losses actually avoided as the first of 
his "four rules of avoidable consequences." See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9. 
23. One purpose for the avoidable consequences doctrine is to prevent waste. See 
McCORMICK, supra note JO, at 127; DOBBS, supra note IO, at 188. Successful efforts 
prevent waste far better than unsuccessful efforts. 
24. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12.1, at 840; MURRAY, supra note 2, § 117; 
JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 14-4 (3d ed. 
I 987). 
25. u.c.c. § 2-706 (1995). 
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the price unsatisfied. Similarly, the nonbreaching buyer may not collect 
the full cost of the substitute goods, only the cost minus the price she 
would have paid under the contract with the breaching seller.26 
Although everything in this section seems obvious, the conclusion may 
not be as apparent. The avoidable consequences doctrine does not 
address losses actually avoided. That treatment, like the affirmative 
applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine, stems entirely from 
the expectation interest. Even if the law never examined the adequacy 
of the plaintiff's efforts to avoid the loss, the law nonetheless would not 
permit recovery of losses actually avoided. 
B. Unsuccessful Efforts To Avoid the Loss 
The core of the avoidable consequences doctrine involves its treatment 
of unavoided losses. In this area, the avoidable consequences doctrine 
augments the expectation interest by providing a limitation that the 
general rules do not appear to include.27 It limits recovery by exclud-
ing amounts the plaintiff could have avoided losing even if those 
amounts are necessary to put the plaintiff in the position she would have 
occupied if the contract had been performed. Thus, an employee 
discharged in breach of contract may receive less than her full salary 
even if she does not find other employment, if she could have found 
other employment by reasonable efforts.28 A company that cannot 
resell goods because the seller failed to deliver them in breach of 
contract may not recover the profits lost on the resale if they could have 
avoided the loss by reasonable efforts to cover.29 In each case, if the 
contract had been performed, the plaintiff would have received more 
money---the full salary or the profits on the lost resale. But the 
avoidable consequences doctrine precludes recovery of those losses 
despite the basic damage principle.30 The avoidable consequences 
doctrine dictates results that seem to diverge from the expectation 
interest. 
26. Id. § 2-712(2). 
27. Despite this appearence, this Article argues that the expectation interest does 
include a limitation on a plaintiff's ability to recover unavoided losses. See infra Part 
J.C. 
28. See, e.g., Gulf Consol. Int'! v. Murphy, 658 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. 1983). 
29. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1995). 
30. Kelly, supra note 6, at 1765 n.39; LAYCOCK, supra note 4, at 84. 
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To a large extent, the need for the avoidable consequences doctrine 
stems from the treatment of losses actually avoided. If the plaintiff 
could recover for losses even though she had avoided them, one would 
not need to limit damages in order to encourage mitigation efforts. The 
gain from such efforts would accrue to the plaintiff, providing her with 
ample incentive to keep losses to a minimum. The expectation interest, 
however, permits the defendant to capture the benefit of any loss 
reduction the plaintiff actually achieves. Thus, moral hazard might lead 
some plaintiffs to allow avoidable losses to mount.31 The buyer might 
not cover, no matter how easily she could find substitute goods and 
resell them at a profit. The employee might remain idle no matter how 
easily she could find other work. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine combats this moral hazard by 
imposing the cost of avoidable losses on the plaintiff, despite the 
defendant's wrongful conduct that caused the losses. When appropriate-
ly applied, it eliminates the difference between avoided losses and 
avoidable losses by allowing the plaintiff the same recovery regardless 
of whether she actually avoided the losses.32 The plaintiff cannot 
externalize the cost of idleness; it will fall on her, not on the defendant. 
Thus, the plaintiff again has an incentive to make efforts to minimize the 
losses. Efforts to avoid the loss will accrue to her benefit, by providing 
her money she cannot obtain in a damage award. In fact, efforts to 
3 I. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Abstract Character of Contract Law, 22 
CONN. L. REV. 437, 493-94 (1990). Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 
301 (4th Cir. I 929), provides a vivid example. The county hired the plaintiff to build 
a bridge. When the county decided not to build a road up to the bridge, it notified the 
plaintiff to stop work. The plaintiff could have minimized the loss by doing noth-
ing--about as easy a task as the avoidable consequences doctrine will ever require. The 
plaintiff finished the bridge anyway and sued for the price. The plaintiff must have 
assumed that any additional expenditures it incurred would come out of the defendant's 
pocket, not its own---a classic example of moral hazard. The court, of course, refused 
to allow recovery of expenses incurred after the county's repudiation. 
32. Unlike the possibility raised in the preceding section, the avoidable 
consequences doctrine eliminates the difference between avoided and avoidable losses 
by denying recovery for both rather than by granting recovery for both. Either approach 
would reduce moral hazard following the wrong. Allowing recovery for both avoided 
losses and avoidable losses violates the basic stricture prohibiting recoveries in excess 
of the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed. In 
addition, recoveries in excess of losses create a different kind of hazard: an incentive 
to provoke the other party into breach, since the plaintiff might receive more money 
from a damage award than she could have obtained if the other party had performed. 
See Andrew Kull, Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1465, 1506-11 (1994); Kelly, supra note 6, at 1768-69 & n.48 (discussing situations 
where a party can obtain a substantial recovery in restitution even though the expectation 
interest might be small or even negative because the plaintiff would have incurred large 
losses under the contract if the defendant had performed). 
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minimize the loss will increase the damage award slightly because the 
award will include the cost of reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. 
C. The Benefits of Breach of Contract 
The preceding sections demonstrate how the expectation interest 
explains portions of the avoidable consequences doctrine. If the 
defendant had performed as promised, the plaintiff would not have 
incurred any expenses attempting to minimize the consequences of the 
defendant's breach. Thus, the expectation interest compels the recovery 
provided by affirmative application of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. Similarly, if the plaintiff actually avoided a portion of the 
losses, recovery for avoided losses would defy the expectation interest 
by putting the plaintiff in a position better than she would have achieved 
if the defendant had performed. Thus, the expectation interest compels 
denying recovery of losses actually avoided. These peripheral aspects 
of the avoidable consequences doctrine pose no inconsistencies with the 
expectation interest at all. 
The core of the avoidable consequences doctrine, however, appears to 
conflict with the expectation interest. By denying recovery of some 
damages that the breach caused and that the plaintiff did not avoid, the 
avoidable consequences doctrine leaves the plaintiff in a position worse 
than the one she would have occupied if the defendant had performed. 
This section will attempt to explain how the expectation interest can 
account for this apparent inconsistency. 
I. Identifying the Benefits of Breach 
The explanation depends on a fundamental premise: every time the 
avoidable consequences doctrine comes into play, breach of the contract 
provides the nonbreaching party with benefits for which the expectation 
interest must account.33 When a seller breaches before the buyer has 
33. The proposal to offset contract recoveries to account for benefits of breach 
resembles the offset for benefits in tort law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 918 (1977). The proposal differs in several particulars, however, notably in the 
mechanics of evaluation. The benefit rule in tort limits the offset to injury to the same 
interest benefitted. While that limitation has been questioned, see LAYCOCK, supra note 
2, at 141, it may serve some purpose where either the benefits or the losses cannot be 
measured with much confidence or accuracy. Thus, when pecuniary harm can be proven 
with certainty, allowing an offset for emotional benefits that cannot be calculated by 
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paid in full for the goods ( or services or land), 34 the buyer benefits 
from the breach by retaining money that she would not have retained if 
the contract had been performed.35 If a buyer breaches before the seller 
has delivered all of the goods ( or services or land), the seller benefits by 
retaining goods ( or time or land) that she would not have if the contract 
had been performed. 
Contract remedies often account for these benefits without any 
reference to the avoidable consequences doctrine or the benefits rule. 
The basic damage formulae in the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 
subtract these benefits from the award without comment. Section 2-712 
allows the buyer to recover the difference between the cover price and 
the contract price, in effect offsetting the amount that the buyer did not 
pay the seller as a benefit.36 Section 2-706 allows the seller to resell 
the goods and recover the difference between the resale price and the 
contract price.37 Each section allows further offset for other benefits 
reference to any market may make little sense. See Kelly, infra note 53, at 520-21 
(discussing genetic counselling torts). Whatever the merits of this distinction, the 
discussion of contract damages proceeds without any effort to ascertain or distinguish 
among the various interests that the plaintiff may have ( except, of course, to keep the 
expectation interest distinct from the reliance interest). Laycock points out that contract 
law has avoided the distinction drawn by the benefit rule in tort. See LAYCOCK, supra 
note 2, at 142. That may result from the reluctance to allow recovery for emotional 
distress and other intangible losses in contract cases. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS, §§ 352-53 (1979). Rather than rely on these doctrines, this Article 
proposes relatively ascertainable market measures of the benefits involved. The measure 
of these benefits will be indirect, depending upon inferences. In each case, however, the 
measure relies upon a market transaction (or decision by an actor in the market) rather 
than a jury judgment about the relative dollar value of emotion or pain, divorced from 
any objective criteria. Thus, even if differentiating the interests under the benefit rule 
makes sense in tort, perhaps the rationale will not apply to the approach advanced here. 
34. Initially I will focus on breaches that occur before full performance by the 
nonbreaching party, since these provide the clearest examples of benefits from the 
breach. As the Article progresses, the application to nonbreaching parties who have 
fully performed the contract should become apparent. 
35. This sentence assumes that if the seller had performed, the buyer also would 
have performed. While the buyer could have retained the benefit of money not paid 
even after full performance by the seller, presumably the law would remove that benefit 
via a damage award against the buyer in favor of the seller. Thus, I refer to the situation 
if both parties had performed fully. 
36. U.C.C. § 2-712 (I 995). The U.C.C. treats the entire contract price as a benefit 
because another section allows the buyer to recover amounts paid to the seller in 
addition to the remedy under § 2-7 I 2. Id. § 2-711. 
37. Id. § 2-706. A lost volume seller-one who could have sold goods both to the 
breaching buyer and to the customer who purchased the goods on resale-may recover 
lost profit on the original sale and keep the profit on the resale. See, e.g., Neri v. Retail 
Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 311 (N.Y. 1972); U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1995). The avoidable 
consequences doctrine does not reduce the recovery by lost volume sellers because the 
resale does not avoid losing the profit on the original sale. Rather, breach of the original 
contract leaves the seller with the profit on one sale (the resale) instead of the profit on 
two sales (the original sale and the resale). See DOBBS, supra note 10, § 12.19, at 889. 
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of the breach by subtracting "expenses saved in consequence of the ... 
breach."38 
The benefits noted in the preceding paragraph represent avoided 
losses, not avoidable losses. The U.C.C., however, treats avoidable 
losses in exactly the same manner. If a seller does not resell the goods, 
she still cannot claim the entire price without regard to the benefit of 
retaining the goods. Instead, the U.C.C. looks to the amount the plaintiff 
could have received by reselling the goods (the market price) and values 
the benefit to the seller at that amount as if it was the resale price.39 
In effect, this treats the goods as having been resold to the seller at the 
market price. This income is fictional, attributed to the seller and 
subtracted from the award even though the seller does not possess the 
money she would have received from the contract or from an actual 
38. u.c.c. §§ 2-706, -712 (1995). 
39. Id. § 2-708. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and at least one court 
have recognized that the contract/market differential amounts to application of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. See Autonumerics v. Bayer Indus., 696 P.2d 1330, 
1341 (Ariz. Ct. App. I 985); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. C. 
( l 979). Dobbs recognizes that this market measure serves the purpose of minimizing 
damages, but suggests procedural differences remove it from the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9 & n.4 (identifying the specified date and the 
willingness to ignore potential transactions above the market price as differences between 
the avoidable consequences doctrine and market measures). To the extent that Dobbs 
seeks to identify mechanical differences in the way the avoidable consequences doctrine 
operates within market measures, I concur in his distinction. But the procedural 
differences he isolates do not negate the manifestation of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine within market measures. The focus on a specific date (such as the date of 
breach, of notice of repudiation, or of an actual cover or resale transaction) limits 
litigation costs by precluding lengthy argument, based on 20-20 hindsight, concerning 
when to assess the market price. But the market price remains an estimate of how much 
the plaintiff could have obtained by reasonable efforts. Similarly, the decision to ignore 
opportunities to deal above the market price merely reflects the avoidable consequences 
doctrine's limitation to reasonable efforts. The avoidable consequences doctrine does 
not insist that a plaintiff make the best possible transaction. As long as the plaintiff 
enters a reasonable transaction, the avoidable consequences doctrine will not reduce the 
award. Thus, the U.C.C. formula need not impute the best possible transaction to a 
plaintiff who does not cover or resell. Market price----0r, more accurately, the average 
price at which transactions in the market occurred at that time (see infra note 
73}-seems presumptively reasonable. Some commercial actors entered transactions for 
less; the plaintiff hardly could be faulted for not getting more. That the market measures 
produce this result mechanically rather than insisting upon case-specific evidence 
represents a procedural compromise of a sort Dobbs recognizes. See DOBBS, supra note 
9, § 3.1, at 213-24. That compromise, however, does not negate the fundamental role 
the avoidable consequences doctrine plays in the formula embodying the market 
measure. 
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resale. Similarly, a buyer who does not cover nonetheless finds the 
unpaid portion of the contract price subtracted from the recovery.40 In 
each case, other expenses saved remain an offset against the award. 
I anticipate the objection that I am still dealing with avoided losses, 
not with avoidable losses. But that is precisely the point, not an 
objection at all. The law attributes the market price to the seller not 
because she could have realized that value by reasonable efforts to sell 
the goods, but because she did realize that value by retaining the goods. 
The goods are valuable; retaining them is a benefit. The plaintiff, thus, 
has received an actual benefit from the breach, not merely an opportuni-
ty to reduce the loss. The expectation interest requires an offset for the 
value of that benefit. 
The seller of services presents an even clearer example. An employee 
discharged in breach of a contract with a specified duration receives a 
benefit: the time she can devote to other pursuits. She may devote this 
time to another job, in which case she receives the benefit of the wages 
earned in the other job. She may devote this time to leisure activities, 
eschewing other employment for the remainder of her contract term. In 
that case, she receives the benefit of the leisure time she would not have 
enjoyed if her employer had performed the contract. In either case, she 
has received an actual benefit from the discharge.41 
2. Quantifying the Benefits 
In order to offset the value of these benefits against the damage award, 
the law needs a mechanism for measuring the benefit. The market 
price-----the amount the seller could have realized in a reasonable sale of 
the goods (or land or services)-offers an acceptable proxy for, or 
estimate of, the amount of that benefit. The subjective benefit to the 
seller might exceed the market price. The seller may have a use for the 
goods ( or land or time) that she values more highly than other market 
participants. But the seller must value the goods ( or land or time) at 
least as highly as the market price. Otherwise she would resell them. 
Thus, attributing to the seller a benefit valued at the market price fixes 
the lowest reasonable offset for benefits bestowed.42 
40. u.c.c. § 2-713 (1995). 
41. A third possibility-that she devotes the time to an unsuccessful search for 
substitute employmen!--will be discussed shortly. See infra Part I.D. l. 
42. The analysis does not rest on the assumption that the seller has not fully 
performed, see supra note 34, but applies with equal force to cases where the buyer 
breaches after full performance by the seller. Following full performance, however, 
neither the avoidable consequences doctrine nor the expectation interest suggests any 
offset against the seller's recovery. The seller has no apparent way to reduce the loss. 
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While the expectation interest compels some reduction for the benefits 
of a breach, it may not compel the specific measure urged here. The 
benefit to the nonbreaching party consists of the subjective value she 
attaches to whatever she retained by not completing performance. For 
various reasons, that subjective value might differ from the amount she 
could have saved by reasonable efforts to minimize the loss.43 Argu-
She retains no goods to resell; full performance implies that she has delivered all of the 
goods to the buyer. All expenses she normally would incur have been incurred. 
Retaining no goods, the seller has no apparent benefit from the breach and, thus, no 
offset arises under either U.C.C. § 2-706 or § 2-708. The same applies to the employee 
discharged after full performance. The principal remaining duty is the employer's duty 
to pay. The employee cannot find someone else willing to pay for the time already 
spent working for the breaching employer. The time the employee retains is time she 
would have retained despite the breach--time to which the employer had no claim. Full 
performance by the employee removes the issue of avoidable consequences from the 
table under any theory. 
Despite delivery of the goods, the seller may have additional duties, such as service 
obligations under a warranty. When the buyer breaches before full performance of the 
warranty by the seller, a different portion of the rules applies. The buyer's breach 
benefits the seller, but not in ways the U.C.C. accounts for by subtracting resale price 
or market price. Instead, the seller's benefit falls within the provisions subtracting 
"expenses saved in consequence of the buyer's breach." See U.C.C. §§ 2-706, -708 
(I 995). Nonetheless, the expenses represent actual savings---expenses not incurred to 
repair the product. (I assume here that the buyer's breach is material, thus excusing the 
seller's performance of the warranty obligations. If the buyer's breach is not material, 
the seller may need to perform under the warranty and seek damages against the 
breaching party. In this case, the avoidable consequences doctrine will not come into 
play, since the seller has no way to reduce the loss and receives no savings.) These 
savings exist immediately upon the buyer's rejection; the seller need not expend any 
effort to obtain them. Thus, we again face avoided, not avoidable, losses. The savings 
do not accrue to the seller who actually resells, since she incurs the same warranty 
obligations to the new, different buyer. They will apply, however, to the lost volume 
seller, who incurs only one set of warranty obligations where she would have incurred 
two but for the breach. See Laycock, supra note 4, at 71 (discussing Neri v. Retail 
Marine Corp., 285 N.E.2d 31 I (N.Y. 1972)). 
43. One difference, already noted in text, arises because the amount of loss the 
plaintiff could have avoided offers only a minimum estimate of the value to the plaintiff. 
We know she values the benefit more than the amount of loss she could prevent, but we 
do not know how much more. Unconstrained by the avoidable consequences doctrine, 
defendants might urge courts to subtract more than the amount of avoidable loss rather 
than settle for a minimum estimate. Another difference arises if the plaintiff mistakes 
the amount of loss she could avoid. If she overestimates the amount of loss she could 
prevent and still does not avoid the loss, defendants again might urge reducing the 
damages by more to reflect the true value to the plaintiff. On the other hand, if the 
plaintiff underestimates the amount of loss she could prevent, she may retain the benefit 
even though she values it less than she values the savings she actually could have 
obtained. In this case, plaintiff might object that subtracting the full amount she could 
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ably, the expectation interest dictates subtracting the entire subjective 
value of the benefit retained. 44 
The avoidable consequences doctrine attaches no significance to 
subjective values. It rests entirely on the objective value of the portion 
of the loss that the plaintiff should have avoided. Arguably, the 
difference between these two methods of calculating the offset reveals 
an inconsistency between the expectation interest and the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. 
The inconsistency is more apparent than real. If a reasonable 
lawmaker set out to devise a method of evaluating the subjective benefits 
of the breach to the nonbreaching party, she easily might choose the 
amount ofloss the nonbreaching party could have avoided by reasonable 
efforts.45 The lawmaker understandably might prefer to draw inferenc-
es of value from objectively verifiable facts, rather than resort to a 
subjective inquiry into value to the plaintiff. Efforts to measure the 
value of benefits apart from the market confront serious problems that 
might justify recourse to proxies, such as the amount of avoidable 
loss.46 Direct evidence of the subjective value of the benefit will be 
difficult to adduce. In most cases, it will come entirely from the seller, 
have prevented would overestimate the benefit and provide too little relief. 
44. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 1.9, at 37-38. 
45. Some may feel that I have skewed the inquiry by positing a lawmaker in 
search of a way to measure subjective benefits. That, however, is entirely consistent 
with my thesis. This inquiry will not answer any historical questions about the origins 
of these rules. That the law could have generated them without the avoidable 
consequences doctrine does not prove that the law did generate them without that 
doctrine. But I do not contend that the avoidable consequences doctrine does not exist, 
only that it produces results already required by the expectation interest and, thus, need 
not exist. If a lawmaker concerned with measuring benefits to the plaintiff would 
produce the same measure of offset, then logically my thesis holds: the avoidable 
consequences doctrine is consistent with the expectation interest (since they produce the 
same measure of offset). In fact, we could live without the avoidable consequences 
doctrine, since the offset need not change at all in its absence. 
Nor would it be any objection to these hypotheses that the avoidable consequences 
doctrine presents a more elegant explanation of these damage rules. That either theory 
explains them better does not destroy the consistency of the two theories, since each 
produces the same result. Thus, I will spend no time discussing the relative merits of 
explaining the existing rules as an aspect of the avoidable consequences doctrine or the 
expectation interest-except in Part lll, where I suggest that recognizing the expectation 
interest as at least part of the basis for this offset may clarify the appropriate amount of 
offset in some situations. 
46. I will frequently abbreviate the phrase "the amount of the loss that the plaintiff 
could have avoided by reasonable efforts" to "the avoidable loss." Where it is necessary 
to differentiate the entire amount of the avoidable loss from the portion of the loss 
avoidable by reasonable efforts, I will try to use the full phrases, avoiding the condensed 
version for either component. 
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with inevitable concerns for distortion ( conscious or otherwise ).47 
Problems increase if the benefits consist of additional utility rather than 
additional monetary gain--as, for example, when an employee gains 
47. Courts are familiar with the phenomena of selective perception and selective 
retention, which help explain how an individual may quite honestly come to believe facts 
that do not accord with reality-or, at least, with the reality perceived and recalled by 
other observers. See, e.g., In re Kreps, 700 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 1987). The 
problems take on particular significance when the facts sought to be adduced involve the 
subjective state of mind of the individual. The Kreps case involved reliance, in effect 
seeking to determine whether a bank officer renewed a loan because of a financial 
statement that contained material misrepresentations or whether the officer would have 
renewed the loan for other reasons even with an accurate financial statement. The 
bankruptcy court noted: 
Rynberk, who personally handled the loan transaction for the plaintiff, 
testified that he relied on the financial statement on the second renewal of the 
loan. Now, if the trial court was bound by the testimony of loan officers about 
reliance, trials would end at that point and lending institutions would win 
I 00% of the cases because in the court's considerable experience with such 
cases it has never heard a loan officer testify that he did not rely upon a 
financial statement and does not expect to hear one do so. Looking at the 
evidence as a whole, the court believes Rynberk was induced to allow the loan 
renewal by reason of his bank's loan experience with the debtor dating back 
I 5 years. The court is not convinced that Rynberk would not have approved 
the renewal if the financial statement had not been given .... 
What has been said about loan officers in trials always testifying that they 
relied on financial statements is not intended to imply that they intentionally 
gave false testimony. There seems to be something in the make-up of human 
beings which enables them, by the processes of hindsight, self-deception, 
rationalization, forgetfulness and whatever else comes into play, to convince 
themselves that events of the past were different than what actually took place 
. . . . In the field of psychology, these processes are known by the following 
terms: selective perception, selective retention and selective forgetfulness. 
Id. at 375. Subjective value seems equally susceptible to these phenomena---and equally 
difficult to discern without reference to external indicators, such as market forces. 
The holding of Kreps, which reversed the bankruptcy court's finding that the bank 
officer did not rely on the financial statement, establishes the need for presumptions like 
the one noted in the text. If courts engage in a specific inquiry into subjective factors, 
knowing that phenomena like selective perception and selective retention exist may not 
produce appropriate outcomes in a given case. One may not prove that these forces have 
distorted the testimony of a specific witness. Even a credibility judgment may not 
withstand appeal in the absence of contrary evidence. Thus, a lawmaker may prefer a 
manageable standard to one that relies too heavily upon the vagaries of individual 
factfinding. Heriot has pointed out how rules, by minimizing the problems of 
administration (including factfinding), may produce more appropriate results than case-
by-case adjudication. See Gail Heriot, A Study in the Choice of Form: Statutes of 
Limitation and the Doctrine ofLaches, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 935-41. 
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leisure rather than substitute wages.48 "[N]o one knows how to 
measure utility, "49 let alone how to translate a measurement into 
monetary terms.50 Even when the goods produce a monetary benefit 
for the seller, courts may have trouble allocating the benefit between the 
goods and the other productive inputs of the seller that helped generate 
the monetary gain.51 Problems with certainty may doom efforts to 
measure the benefit directly.52 If the breaching party bore the burden 
of proof on the amount of the benefit,53 the problems with certainty 
48. I use the economic meaning of utility: consumer satisfaction. See MILTON H. 
SPENCER, CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 341, 706 (1971). 
49. Id. at 341. 
50. We could attempt to zero in on the amount of utility the goods have for the 
seller by using the contract price as the highest possible value of the goods to the seller. 
The plaintiff seller was ready and willing to part with the goods for that amount, giving 
rise to the inference that she did not value the goods more than she valued the contract 
price. At best, however, this merely prevents estimates of utility that exceed contract 
price; it does not help decide how much utility, if any, the goods had between the 
contract price and the price for which they could have been resold on the market. More 
important, inferences about the ceiling will not always be true. The defendant's breach 
bestowed the value the seller attached to the goods on the date of the breach, which may 
exceed the value she attached to the goods on the date of contract formation. While 
there are reasons to believe that problem will not affect many cases, an effort to 
determine utility directly still faces problems that make this approach less practical than 
the proxy based on market price. 
51. Where the monetary gain stems from a simple resale, we confront actual 
avoided losses, not avoidable losses, thus permitting measurement without a proxy. Any 
time the seller's benefit (in excess of avoidable loss) stems from more than a simple 
resale, the seller will have employed other productive resources with the good----say, by 
using it as a component part of another good or putting it into an attractive package. 
The defendant provided only the amount of the benefit attributable to the original good; 
amounts attributable to the other productive resources belong to the plaintiff and should 
not be subtracted from the damage award. Cf, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures 
Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (discussing how much of the profit from a movie was 
attributable to a stolen script and how much attributable to the defendant's other 
contributions to the movie). 
52. See, e.g., id. 
53. The defendant bears the burden of proof under the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 272. Whether the courts would allocate the 
burden of proof in the same way if pursuing the expectation interest remains an open 
question. Once the plaintiff has proven the amount of the loss caused by the defendant, 
it would make some sense to insist that the defendant prove any assertions that the 
breach benefitted the plaintiff. That seems to be the allocation of burdens under the 
benefit rule in tort law. See Michael B. Kelly, The Rightful Position in "Wrongful Life" 
Actions, 42 HASTINGS L. REv. 505,520 (1991). At the same time, at least some offsets 
arguably related to the avoidable consequences doctrine are treated as part of the 
plaintiffs burden to prove damages. See, e.g., O'Brien Bros. v. Helen B. Moran, 160 
F.2d 502 (2d Cir. 1947). As long as the law treats the market price as the amount of 
the offset, it may continue to insist that the plaintiff prove the market price as part of the 
measure of damages. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 189. 
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might make any reduction in the award impossible.54 
Faced with these difficulties, a lawmaker might indulge in the 
presumption that the subjective value to the plaintiff equalled the 
objective amount she could have obtained by reasonable efforts to sell 
the benefit to others.55 The law often tolerates---or even pre-
fers---objective presumptions, Sometimes the law presumes that the 
parties' subjective state of mind matches their objective actions.56 
Sometimes it declares that the subjective state of mind does not matter 
because only objective manifestations have legal significance.57 Thus, 
the use of objective values as an estimate of subjective values poses no 
serious obstacle to considering the merits of this theory. A lawmaker 
implementing the expectation interest might reproduce the results of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine without reference to the doctrine itself. 
Our lawmaker, however, might also have found the amount of 
avoidable loss a relatively accurate measure of the subjective benefit to 
the plaintiff.58 The market price of the goods accurately measures the 
54. This concern echoes the concern in Kreps that taking a bank officer's statement 
as dispositive might permit banks to win every case. See supra note 47. In fact, 
certainty problems could prove dispositive either way, since the subjective nature of the 
inquiry might prevent either party from producing evidence that would satisfy the 
requirement. A requirement that systematically underestimates or overestimates the 
amount of damages (depending on the party with the burden) will not satisfy the 
expectation interest. The expectation interest seeks to take the benefit into account, not 
to ignore it, as would occur if the benefit could not be proven with satisfactory certainty, 
or to assume its greatest credible value, as would occur if testimony by an individual 
became dispositive absent certainty that another figure was correct. 
55. In fact, the reasonable lawmaker might choose to make that presumption 
conclusive, without regard to efforts of either party to prove a greater or lesser benefit 
in a particular case. 
56. Tort law often assumes that parties intend the natural consequences of their 
actions, without regard to whether they actually entertained that subjective intent. See, 
e.g., Cummings v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 202 Cal. App. 3d 1407, 1416, 249 Cal. Rptr. 568, 
573 (1988); see a/so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1977) (party intends 
consequences "substantially certain" to result from an action). 
57. The objective theory of contract law purports to ignore subjective intent when 
it differs from the manifestation of intent. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.13 
& n.2. Constant references to "manifestations" of intent throughout the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts embody the objective theory. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF CONTRACTS§§ 24, 27, 29, 33, 38, 164, ]75 (1979). 
58. This portion of the argument will claim accuracy, but not precision. The 
difficulties noted earlier, see supra note 43, will not disappear, but their significance may 
diminish. 
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benefit to the nonbreaching seller of retaining the goods.59 Neither 
party seems likely to raise a successful objection to the decision to 
subtract the market value of the goods from the plaintiff's recovery. 
Consider first the defendant's argument that market price underesti-
mates the subjective benefit to the seller. One certainly can infer that 
the seller kept the goods rather than reselling them because she valued 
them more than the market price. But whatever subjective value the 
plaintiff may attach to the goods, she could obtain that subjective value 
by delivering the contract ioods to the defendant and buying substitute 
goods at the market price. The defendant, by not taking delivery of 
the goods, can claim responsibility for bestowing no more value than the 
amount for which the plaintiff could have obtained the goods from 
another.61 Thus, the market price not only represents the minimum 
value of the benefit to the plaintiff, but also represents the most that the 
plaintiff would have paid to obtain that benefit.62 The breaching buyer 
59. For now, it will be simpler to deal with the example of a seller of goods suing 
a buyer for breach. As shown later, the analysis applies more broadly. See infra Part 
I.D. 
60. This proposition assumes that the goods are not unique. If they are unique, the 
market price will equal the plaintiff's subjective value. She will not sell for less. No 
one else can sell for less because, by definition, no one else has these unique goods. 
While it may be difficult to determine either plaintiff's subjective value or the market 
price, they will be the same. 
6 I. Where the plaintiff is a manufacturer or wholesaler, the amount of the benefit 
arguably could be measured by her cost to replace the goods. This might be less than 
the price for which she could sell the goods. A manufacturer could replace the goods 
for the cost of the inputs to production, often less than the price for which it could sell 
the goods (except in a perfectly competitive market). A wholesaler could replace the 
goods at the wholesale price, but could resell them at the retail price. Once replaced, 
the seller could enjoy the benefit as much as she could after the buyer's breach. The 
plaintiff's decision not to resell, however, justifies inferring that she values the goods 
more than the amount for which she could sell them, not just more than the cost to 
obtain them. 
62. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts confronts the same issue when 
prescribing the measure of restitution recoveries. The discussion focuses on services, 
since restitution of goods often can be accomplished by returning the goods themselves, 
rather than assessing their value and awarding restitution in money. The analogy, 
nonetheless, is instructive. The Restatement measures the benefit bestowed on one party 
by the amount for which that party could have obtained the benefit from someone else, 
apparently on the theory that the other party saved the beneficiary the cost of obtaining 
the benefit elsewhere. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 37l(a) (1979). The 
Restatement includes an alternative measure--the increase in wealth to the beneficia-
ry--that may seem closer to the subjective value to the plaintiff. Id. § 371(b). The 
comments, however, make it clear that the American Law Institute believed the 
beneficiary's wealth often would increase less than the fair market value of the services 
performed, not more, as the breaching buyer argues in this example. Nor do they 
endorse a subjective measure of benefit, focusing instead on the increase in the market 
value of the beneficiary's property attributable to the other party's serviceir-for 
example, the increase in the value of the beneficiary's land because the other party built 
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has little equity in claiming the right to sell to the nonbreaching seller 
at a price above market, thus capturing the nonbreaching party's 
consumer surplus!63 
The seller's argument that market price overestimates the benefit to 
her seems equally unpersuasive. The seller must contend that she values 
the goods less than she values the market price, even though she did not 
sell them at the market price. Unless the seller is irrational, this 
argument necessarily implies that she underestimated the amount for 
which she could sell the goods on the market. In that case, market price 
may overestimate the actual benefit the seller received by keeping the 
goods.64 Neither irrationality nor mistake seems likely to arise often, 
at least not with any credibility.65 When they do arise, these errors 
probably will be relatively small. Sellers, especially merchants, 
generally know the value of their wares within a reasonable margin. 
While any given merchant may misjudge the amount that a particular 
resale would yield, the errors seem likely to be so small or so infrequent 
that they do not pose a substantial objection to the theory. Even 
nonmerchants seem likely to have some idea of the market value of 
goods before they enter into a contract to sell them. Thus, our 
reasonable lawmaker might entertain relatively little concern that market 
a house ( or part of a house) on it. In addition, the Restatement limits breaching parties 
to the lesser of the two measures, precluding a breaching party from capturing the 
nonbreaching party's consumer surplus, if any. Id. § 371 cmts. a & b. In short, 
restitutionary measures, focussed directly on measuring benefits to one party, endorse 
market price as a measure of that benefit. A lawmaker reasonably could apply the same 
technique for measuring benefits here and in restitution. 
63. The buyer has the opportunity to sell her right to receive the goods back to the 
seller instead of breaching. The seller would not agree to pay more than the market 
price of the goods. Breach, which accomplishes the same transaction without the seller's 
consent, should not impose on the nonbreaching seller a worse deal than she could have 
made for herself. 
64. We can infer that the seller valued the goods more than she valued the price 
she expected to obtain for them. But where her expected price was below the market 
price, the value to her might have been below the actual market price. 
65. Claims of irrationality seem particularly doubtful. Strategic behavior seems 
more likely than irrationality: a seller who valued the goods more than the market price, 
but hoped to keep the goods and recover a larger than necessary damage award ( or 
settlement) from the defendant. A lawmaker might trust juries to sort out these 
incredible claims. Alternatively, a lawmaker could trust perjury statutes and Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure 11 to deter false claims. Or a lawmaker reasonably could 
avoid these problems and simplify factfinding by presuming that the market value 
actually estimates the subjective value to the plaintiff, with an occasional small error that 
undercompensates an irrational plaintiff. 
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price would reduce recovery by more than the subjective value of the 
benefit. Both the frequency and magnitude of any errors probably would 
seem too small to require notice. Combined with concerns for the 
accuracy and cost of the alternative ( direct inquiry into subjective 
value),66 the lawmaker easily might prefer to estimate subjective value 
by reference to avoidable losses. 
Equally important, any errors affect sellers only if they assume that 
efforts to resell (for more than their subjective value) will be futile 
without testing the market. Sellers can protect themselves from 
undercompensation by making reasonable efforts to resell.67 Reason-
able efforts to resell should reveal the actual market value and allow the 
seller to make an informed choice. The seller who elects to keep goods 
without making any effort to resell seems oddly placed to object that the 
law undercompensated her by subtracting more than the actual benefit 
from the award.68 Her own mistaken estimate of the market value, 
perpetuated by her own inaction by not trying to resell, created the error 
in the first place.69 In short, the proposed presumption probably comes 
66. Epstein suggests that the entire effort to litigate issues concerning the avoidable 
consequences doctrine should be avoided by fixing contract damages below full 
compensation. This will encourage plaintiffs to minimize their losses even if no 
avoidable consequences doctrine applies at trial. Since damages will not cover their full 
loss, plaintiffs will benefit by keeping the loss as small as reasonably possible. See 
Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of 
Contract, I 8 J. LEGAL STUD. I 05 ( 1989). One may share the desire not to adopt rules 
that require unnecessarily large litigation costs, even if one disagrees with Epstein's 
proposal to make contract damages even more seriously undercompensatory than those 
provided today. 
67. Sellers can recover the cost of resale efforts as incidental damages. See U.C.C. 
§ 2-710 (1995). 
68. The point does not challenge existing law regarding the need to make efforts 
the plaintiff knows will be futile. If the plaintiff correctly judges that reasonable efforts 
will not reduce the loss, the failure to make futile efforts should not affect the award. 
When reasonable efforts would not have produced any reduction in the loss, the amount 
of loss avoidable by reasonable efforts is zero and, therefore, the offset demanded by the 
avoidable consequences doctrine is zero, whether the plaintiff actually took those efforts 
or not The text concerns a plaintiff who incorrectly believes that the efforts would be 
futile------or, more precisely, underestimates the benefit she can obtain by making 
reasonable efforts. (In effect, the plaintiff believes reasonable efforts to resell at an 
amount greater than the value she attaches to the goods would be futile.) The law has 
no desire to encourage futile efforts----which actually increase the damage recovery, since 
incidental damages rise without any reduction in the loss. The existing law, however, 
displays little sympathy for the person who fails to make efforts in the mistaken belief 
that they would be futile. By using the standard of reasonable efforts, rather than a good 
faith efforts test, the law reduces the recovery for one who honestly fails to make 
reasonable efforts if the factfinder concludes that those efforts would have been 
successful. 
69. The point here is not that the seller has a duty to attempt resale or even a duty 
to investigate the market price, but merely that the seller is not entitled to relief from the 
effects of her own mistake about the market price of the goods. The failure to attempt 
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very close to the actual value to the plaintiff by using market price as an 
estimate of subjective value. 
The analysis here will produce rules identical to the avoidable 
consequences doctrine only if the lawmaker would adopt a conclusive 
presumption. If the lawmaker exhibits sufficient concern for errors the 
presumption creates, she might choose to create an evidentiary presump-
tion. This would allow the parties to introduce evidence that, in a 
particular case, the value of the benefit differed from the presumed 
value. The finder of fact could then determine how much to subtract 
from the award in order to offset the benefit. Much of the preceding 
argument has been directed at this latter possibility. The concern for 
certainty and objectivity in part explain why the lawmaker might choose 
not to consider evidence about the subjective value on a case-by-case 
basis.70 Strategic behavior designed to encourage or to take advantage 
of errors in the factfinding process presents another concern that 
mitigates toward a conclusive presumption.71 The cost-benefit analysis, 
comparing the ability to reach better results with the cost of that 
process--both in judicial resources consumed by the task and the cost 
of attorney time to the parties---suggests that the evidence should not be 
admitted.72 In short, the argument above is intended to demonstrate 
why the lawmaker would choose a conclusive presumption-a presump-
tion that matches the existing rules generated by the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine. 
The arguments here do not demonstrate that the expectation interest 
provides a better explanation of the results than the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine. One can posit reasons why the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine produces these results with more elegance. For example, one 
might contend that the avoidable consequences doctrine explains the case 
law directly because market price precisely measures the amount of loss 
that could have been avoided.73 That may seem preferable to a theory 
resale does not alter the presumption; the same presumption (that seller values the goods 
at least as much as she values the market price) applies whether she makes efforts or 
not. Neither the seller nor the buyer, however, can challenge the presumption. 
70. See supra text accompanying notes 45-47. 
71. See supra note 65. 
72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
73. Market price, if we ascertain it with precision, arguably offers an exact 
measure of the amount that the seller could have obtained if she had sold the goods to 
minimize the loss. Market price, however, lacks the precision necessary to support the 
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that relies on indirect analysis, using market price as an imprecise 
estimate of some unknowable benefit. 74 If accepted, these arguments 
might suggest that the avoidable consequences doctrine better explains 
the origin of these results and the reasoning judges consciously used to 
achieve them. Neither advantage, however, undermines the project here 
for two reasons.75 
First, the measure employed in court need not perfectly match the 
motive for employing the measure. Fuller and Perdue alerted lawyers 
and scholars alike to the danger of assuming that the motive and 
measure necessarily correspond, particularly in dealing with remedies.76 
I have expressed concern about their conclusion that measuring 
claim. The advantage of an exact measure as opposed to an estimate fails if the so-
called exact measure turns out to be nothing more than an estimate itself. Yet the very 
fact that the seller did not resell (or did so in an unreasonable manner) deprives us of 
any precise determination of market price in most cases. Except in a perfect market, 
with perfect information and no product differentiation, market transactions may not 
occur at a uniform price. Prices of identical goods vary from dealer to dealer even 
within a relatively small market area. Alternative goods may not be identical to the 
seller's and may come from other places, adding further variations to the price of 
substitute goods. The U.C.C. recognizes and attempts to deal with other factors that 
produce variation in market price, such as the date of purchase and place of the market 
in question. See U.C.C. § 2-723 (1995). Even so, disputes about the appropriate time 
can emerge. Depending upon whether the court decides the buyer repudiated, market 
price could be calculated at the time and place of tender or the time the aggrieved party 
learned of the repudiation. Compare id. § 2-708(1) with id. § 2-723(1). Neither time 
seems well designed to produce precisely what the seller would have obtained on resale, 
since a resale would occur sometime after the repudiation or rejection, subject to the 
limitation that it occur within a commercially reasonable time. Id. § 2-706(2). As a 
result, market price is an estimate that reflects a price in the middle of a range of market 
transactions. 
Variations in market price prevent it from measuring exactly what the seller would 
have obtained in a reasonable resale. She may bave obtained the lowest price in the 
market or the highest. Market price, viewed as a point somewhere in between, offers 
an estimate of what the seller would have received. To attribute precision to this 
estimate grants it qualities it does not really possess. Market price offers a perfectly 
reasonable estimate of the amount the seller could have obtained with reasonable efforts, 
not a precise measure of the amount that resale would have provided. See DOBBS, supra 
note 9, § 3.9 n.5 (suggesting that indifference to the actual amount seller could have 
obtained demonstrates that market measures differ from the avoidable consequences 
doctrine). Thus, each explanation must resort to an estimate of the proper amount to 
subtract. The correspondence between the measurement technique and the item to be 
measured does not favor either explanation. 
74. Ockham's razor urges us to prefer simpler, more direct explanations of 
observable phenomena------a principle I noted while addressing the controversy between 
the expectation interest and the reliance interest as guiding principles in contract 
damages. See Kelly, supra note 6, at 1762 n.31. One should not resort to Ockham's 
razor too quickly, lest one also act too simplistically. Id. Having heeded that 
admonition in discussing the work of Fuller and Perdue, I hope others will grant me the 
same latitude here. 
75. That is, two reasons in addition to the discussion supra note 73. 
76. Fuller & Perdue, supra note 6, at 66-67. 
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expectation merely serves as a proxy for the reliance interest. 77 But 
their approach, their realization that unstated principles may guide results 
even if not identified as the rationale, remains important. The expecta-
tion measure is, at best, an imprecise proxy for the reliance interest. Yet 
for more than fifty years that imprecise match has not caused scholars 
to reject their work.78 Nor did their need to assume a perfect market 
in order to demonstrate the similarities rob their work of its power. The 
two explanations of avoidable consequences offered here correspond at 
least as closely as expectation and reliance. 
Second, this Article contends only that the avoidable consequences 
doctrine and the expectation interest are consistent. The law can abolish 
the avoidable consequences doctrine without changing the results of 
cases. As long as each theory adequately explains the results, the 
relative elegance of each makes no difference. I do not argue that the 
avoidable consequences doctrine does not exist; that thesis might require 
an explanation of how the expectation interest explains results better than 
the avoidable consequences doctrine. I argue only that the avoidable 
consequences doctrine need not exist.79 That thesis is not challenged 
by arguments that the avoidable consequences doctrine provides a better 
explanation of the result. As long as the expectation interest gets there, 
we need not think of the avoidable consequences doctrine as an 
exception to the expectation interest. That reconciliation will suffice. 
3. The Effect of Transaction Costs 
If all applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine exhibit the 
same susceptibility to the explanation presented here, then the expecta-
tion interest can produce the same results as the avoidable consequences 
77. Kelly, supra note 6. 
78. In fact, the work has been heralded as "our most significant article on contract 
law." Robert Birmingham, Notes on the Reliance Interest, 60 WASH. L. REV. 217,217 
(1985). Other accolades for the work are gathered in Kelly, supra note 6, at 1757 & 
n.10. 
79. Perhaps I should press a more forceful argument. The ability of the new 
explanation to support assertions that scholars and courts have announced for decades 
may give it some advantage. Similarly, the practical guidance it provides, as discussed 
in Part III, infra, might support claims that we should abandon the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. I will be satisfied, however, if the theory proposed here 
improves our understanding of the offset for amounts the plaintiff could have avoided 
losing. 
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doctrine. Instead of denying recovery for losses the plaintiff actually 
suffered, we can deny recovery for losses the plaintiff did not suffer by 
taking into account the offsetting benefit. This Article shortly will 
consider other applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine and 
will show how similar analysis seems plausible in other settings. Before 
embarking on that endeavor, however, I want to address some complicat-
ing factors that probe the basic assumption: that the amount the plaintiff 
could have obtained by reasonable efforts represents the minimum 
estimate of the value of the benefit she received from the breach.80 
Arguably, transaction costs complicate the picture. The cost of 
reselling the goods would reduce the amount the seller would realize on 
resale. Perhaps the seller does not value the goods as much as she 
values the market price, but does value the goods more than the market 
price minus the cost of reselling them. If so, the theory presented here 
may overestimate the benefit the seller received by keeping the goods. 
The seller, however, does not bear the transaction costs in any case 
that comes to court. The transaction costs ofresale are recoverable from 
the breaching buyer--either under the expectation interest (incidental 
damages) or under the avoidable consequences doctrine (affirmatively 
applied).81 Thus, the seller's calculation of benefits of resale should 
not include the cost of resale; that cost will be borne by the defendant. 
The decision not to resell, therefore, reflects a direct comparison between 
the benefits of keeping the goods and the benefits of reselling them.82 
Arguably, the timing of the transaction costs complicates the picture. 
Even if recoverable in litigation, the recovery will occur years later, 
while the costs of resale must be incurred today. Given that a benefit 
80. I devote considerable attention to this topic because the appeal of the 
explanation turns heavily on the similarity between the benefit and the offset. If the 
amount the plaintiff could have received offers a fairly close approximation of the 
benefit the plaintiff actually received, then it seems reasonable to suggest that the latter 
may explain the calculation. If, however, the benefit to the nonbreaching party differs 
substantially from the amount she could have obtained by reasonable efforts to avoid the 
loss in a significant number of cases, then the assertion that the latter serves as a proxy 
for the former loses much of its appeal. 
8 I. U.C.C. § 2-710 (I 995) (defining incidental damages allowable under§§ 2-706 
and 2-708 to include costs of resale and most other transaction costs one can imagine). 
82. In a case where courts do not hear the matter because the cost of litigation 
leads the seller not to bring suit in the first place, the decision not to resell would not 
support the inference suggested here. But the law will not draw that inference (or 
impose its equivalent via the avoidable consequences doctrine) in any case that does not 
come to court. In cases that come to court--that is, in cases where the avoidable 
consequences doctrine will be applied--the transaction costs become part of the recovery 
and, thus, net out. (In cases that do not produce litigation, the nonbreaching party 
almost certainly will minimize the loss, since without litigation the entire loss will fall 
on her.) 
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today is more valuable to most people than the same benefit next year, 
the eventual recovery of transaction costs may not fully offset the 
expenditure, If so, the seller may value the goods less than the market 
price, but refuse to resell them because she values the goods more than 
the market price minus the time value of the cost to resell the goods, 
Again, however, the time value should be recoverable in litigation. 
Most states permit recovery of prejudgment interest on ascertainable 
claims.83 Once the resale costs have been incurred, they seem fully 
liquidated-at least to a sufficient extent to permit the award of 
prejudgment interest.84 Arguably, interest should be recoverable on 
incidental damages without regard to ascertainability.85 Thus, the time 
value of money should not pose a serious obstacle to the presumption 
suggested here. In addition, the time value of money may not amount 
to a very large sum. Barring exceptionally long delays in recovery, the 
interest would be less than the resale expenses themselves, which seem 
likely to be a relatively small portion of the value of the goods. Thus, 
the objection may dwindle into insignificance. The market price may be 
a fair approximation of the value of the goods to the seller, even if it 
slightly overestimates that value, thus reducing the award a little too 
much.86 
One final complication arises from the uncertainty of litigation. 
83. DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.5, at 165-66; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.6(1), at 247. 
84. In contract actions, where damages commonly are ascertainable, some courts 
permit recovery of prejudgment interest as a matter of course. LAYCOCK, supra note 2, 
at 195. Even if courts insist that incidental damages must be ascertainable in order to 
qualify for prejudgment interest, see, e.g., Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, 
S.A., 772 F.2d 1358, 1370-71 (7th Cir. 1985) (dicta concerning Wisconsin law), many 
costs of resale will consist of out-of-pocket expenditures capable of clear proof. 
85. The Restatement suggests that interest on expenditures made arranging 
substitute performance is not subject to the normal rules on ascertainability. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 354 cmt. a (1979) (implying that interest on incidental 
expenditures is itself an element of incidental damages, independent of rule limiting 
prejudgment interest). The trend to liberalized views of ascertainability may improve 
plaintiffs' ability to receive interest on the transaction costs necessary to minimize the 
loss. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.6(2). 
86. The errors in the calculation may offset. The decision not to resell implies that 
the seller values the goods at least as much as, and perhaps more than, the market price. 
Thus, market price arguably represents slightly too small an offset. If denying interest 
slightly decreases the plaintiff's recovery, perhaps that will move the award closer to the 
mark, rather than further from it. While two wrongs do not make a right, perhaps two 
almost rights will not be so far wrong that a reasonable lawmaker would abandon 
avoidable loss as an estimate of the benefits of breach. 
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Incidental damages and interest will eliminate the preceding objections 
only if the seller recovers them. Perhaps the seller does not value the 
goods as much as she values the market price, but values the goods 
more than she values the market price minus the transaction costs plus 
interest discounted by the chance of recovering them in the suit. 87 
Even a case that seems like a sure-fire winner to· lawyers presents at 
least some possibility of jury prejudice, passion, or misunderstanding.88 
Again, this possibility represents only a portion of the resale costs, 
minimizing the magnitude of the error.89 The market price thus 
remains at least a reasonable proxy for the benefit to the plain-
tiff--especially in cases where the chance of prevailing seems relatively 
high (which, we might hope, describes the vast majority of contract 
cases brought before the courts).90 Sellers who expect to win will 
prefer to sell under these circumstances, since that will maximize their 
benefit more often than not.91 Only sellers who actually expect to lose 
87. Lest the words prove confusing, let me lay the premise out with the 
parentheses in the right place: Market Price > Value of Goods > Market Price - ((Cost 
To Resell + Interest on Cost To Resell) X Probability of Losing Suit). 
88. One rule of thumb from practicing attorneys holds that even a sure winner has 
a 15% chance of losing in front of a jury. 
89. In a case that seems like a toss-up, the market price would be discounted by 
half of the transaction costs; in a very strong case, by only 15% of the transaction costs. 
90. Gross and Syverud reported that plaintiffs recovered more than the highest 
settlement offer in about 75% of the commercial transaction cases that proceeded to 
judgment. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No.· A Study of 
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH, L. REv. 319,339 
(1991) (sampling California Superior Court jury trial cases). Plaintiffs succeeded 
somewhat more often ( about 80%) for a broader range of contract actions, including 
employment and real estate disputes. Id For our purposes, these results are merely 
suggestive. Recovering more than the highest settlement offer does not necessarily mean 
recovering all damages, including incidental costs and interest thereon. In addition, 
cases that proceed to trial probably do not represent all cases filed. They may, however, 
represent a fair approximation of cases in which the court or the jury must apply the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. A seller considering whether to minimize the loss by 
resale probably would look to these figures to decide how to act. A seller who looks 
instead to settlement almost certainly will minimize the loss. Since settlement generally 
requires a compromise, the plaintiff probably will recover less than her actual losses and, 
thus, she has ample incentive to minimize the loss. 
91. If seller wins the suit, she keeps the market price undiminished by the 
transaction costs and interest, since she recovers them. Thus, she will be better off if 
she has sold the goods for market price. If seller loses, she retains the market price 
diminished by the transaction costs (which she did not recover), a worse situation than 
retaining the goods. But since she expects to win more often than not, she should sell 
the goods. 
One can imagine exceptions. If Market price - Value of goods < Value of goods -
Transaction costs, then even though the seller expects to win most of the time (realizing 
full market price), the magnitude of the downside might outweigh the likelihood of its 
occurring. That is: (Value of goods - (Market price - Transaction costs)) X Chance of 
losing> (Market price- Value of goods) X (1 - Chance of losing), even though chance 
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will keep the goods ( despite a preference for the market price), since that 
will maximize their expected benefits.92 
Would a reasonable lawmaker seeking an appropriate measure of the 
benefits of breach reject avoidable losses as a suitable proxy on this 
basis? The estimate seems to work well in that vast majority of cases. 
It seems odd to reject it because it may make small errors that disadvan-
tage plaintiffs who fear they may lose their lawsuits. Those plaintiffs 
receive less than full compensation due to their pessimistic lack of 
confidence in the legal system. That this approach might 
undercompensate slightly those whose suits seemed weakest (to them) 
ex ante by attributing to them too high a benefit might serve the 
desirable end of discouraging the weakest of suit&--if the difference is 
large enough to matter at all. If undercompensation occurs primarily in 
these circumstances, the lawmaker might tolerate that 
undercompensation. One can understand why a rule designed to subtract 
actual benefit might risk undercompensation in these cases. 
D. The Benefits in Other Contract Contexts 
The preceding discussion focuses heavily on the benefits to sellers of 
goods. Other contexts, however, raise different issues that require 
specific discussion. In order to establish a comprehensive theory of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine, this section attempts to demonstrate 
that benefits of breach apply in other typical settings where the doctrine 
arises. Ideally, this section would demonstrate that every application of 
of losing is less than 50%. This situation arises, however, only where the value of the 
goods and the market price are relatively close--where a large percentage of the 
difference between them is smaller than a small percentage of the transaction costs. 
Thus, the objection arises in situations where the market price presents the closest proxy 
for the value of the goods. Under these circumstances, while the inference that the 
plaintiff valued the goods more than she valued the market price may fail, it fails 
because she valued them at very nearly the same amount, making any error in attributing 
the benefit estimated by the market price quite small. 
92. Since she expects to lose more often than not, she should keep the goods 
unless the market price exceeds the value of the goods by significantly more than the 
value of the goods exceeds the market price minus transaction costs. The decision to 
keep the goods, therefore, suggests that the market price and value of the goods do not 
differ by enough to justify sale--again, suggesting that the market price remains a 
relatively good proxy for the value of the goods, even though the normal inference from 
plaintiffs decision to keep the goods does not exactly describe the relative values. Thus, 
the cases where this approach seems likely to overestimate the plaintiffs benefit will be 
those cases where the magnitude of the error in the estimate seems likely to be smallest. 
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the avoidable consequences doctrine is susceptible to the same type of 
explanation, that every breach creates a benefit roughly equal to the 
amount the plaintiff could have realized from reasonable efforts to 
minimize the loss. This section cannot establish that no exceptions exist. 
By discussing examples typical of the contexts in which the avoidable 
consequences doctrine becomes important, however, this section hopes 
to demonstrate the plausibility of the claim. 
1. Discharged Employees 
Discharged employees present the same issues discussed regarding 
sellers of goods. The preceding sections often refer to sellers of services 
( employees, for example) as well as sellers of goods. Most of the 
analysis above applies with equal force to employees without any need 
for additional comment. Discharged employees, however, illustrate some 
useful elaborations upon the theory developed above. These elaborations 
respond to two questions the reader already may have considered. First, 
why should reasonable but unsuccessful efforts to minimize the loss 
affect the estimate of the value of the benefit to the plaintiff? Second, 
why is the value of the benefit to the plaintiff limited to the amount of 
loss that could have been avoided by reasonable efforts, instead of 
including the amount of the loss that could have been avoided by any 
efforts, however extraordinary? The employment context offers an 
opportunity to explore these issues. 
a. To what extent does the plaintiff benefit despite reasonable but 
unsuccessful efforts to minimize the loss? 
The benefit of leisure to a discharged employee, while a benefit not 
sought by the employee, presents a fairly clear example of the need for 
an offset. The breaching employer deprives the employee of wages. 
But the employee could not have received those wages without working. 
The benefit of not working requires some offset.93 Perhaps one 
93. Throughout this Article I refer to the benefit of leisure. This benefit can break 
down into two subparts: the benefit of not working and the benefit of having time for 
enjoyable pursuits. Avoiding the disutility of work is not necessarily the same as 
receiving the utility of spare time. But both are inextricably bound up in a single 
decision regarding employment. In taking a job, the employee accepts both the loss of 
leisure and the disutility of labor. In discharging the employee, the employer bestows 
both the freedom from labor and the freedom to do other things. While it may be useful 
to recognize these theoretically distinct components of the benefit, no useful purpose 
would be served by burdening the text with a lengthy and repetitive phrase that explicitly 
mentioned both each time the benefit required mention. In the one place where 
disaggregation is useful, I will more carefully distinguish these two aspects; otherwise, 
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mystery of damage awards calculated under the expectation interest is 
their consistent failure to mention the need to offset the leisure received 
by the employee. A person who receives wages without working for 
them clearly has been made better off than if the person had needed to 
work for the same wages--the position the employee would have 
occupied but for the breach. 
In discussing sales of goods, the issue of reasonable but unsuccessful 
mitigation efforts does not arise. The seller either kept the goods or 
resold them. Either way, she obtained a benefit. For discharged 
employees, this equates with assuming that they are either re-employed 
or idle (that is, enjoying their leisure). Many employees fit neither 
category. They engage in unsuccessful efforts to find a new job, at least 
during part of the time they would have been employed under the 
contract. That situation hardly qualifies as leisure. At the same time, 
it does not qualify as alternative employment. In short, the employee 
has neither pay nor time to devote to enjoyable pursuits. The job search 
deprives the employee of the benefit of leisure without immediately 
providing any substitute income. 
In this regard, employees differ from sellers of goods. The time and 
effort spent to seek out a new buyer for ~oods does not reduce the 
benefit of the good retained by the seller. 4 Thus, a reasonable but 
unsuccessful search for a new buyer leaves the seller with some 
incidental damages ( to cover the cost of efforts to resell), but does not 
diminish the value of the good retained.95 Employees, however, sell 
I will use "leisure" to include them both. 
94. Perishable goods may deteriorate while the seller seeks a new buyer, but their 
value diminishes over time independently of the seller's efforts to resell. The goods will 
perish even if the seller makes no effort to resell, or the seller might recover full value 
for the goods following extensive efforts to resell. The efforts do not consume the value 
of the goods the way an employee's efforts to find work consume the leisure time the 
employer gave her. 
95. If a seller attached zero value to goods and made diligent efforts to resell them 
without success, arguably no subtraction would be appropriate under the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(2) (1977). 
At first glance, the U.C.C. appears to attribute the market value of the goods to the seller 
even if the seller cannot resell the goods after Herculean efforts. At least § 2-708 
includes no exception to the rule attributing market value to the seller. Section 2-709, 
however, allows the seller to recover the full price of the goods if reasonable efforts fail 
to produce a buyer willing to pay a reasonable price. U.C.C. § 2-709(l)(b) (1995). That 
result recognizes the paradox of concluding that goods have a market value greater than 
zero despite the fact that the seller's efforts could not produce a buyer willing to pay 
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their time and effort. When they expend that time and effort in a job 
search, they consume the very thing they retain in a way the seller of 
goods does not.96 Thus, the benefit retained by the employee decreases 
as she attempts to find new employment.97 
Assuming for a moment that the employee conducts a reasonable job 
search, the avoidable consequences doctrine produces fairly intuitive 
results. The avoidable consequences doctrine permits recovery of full 
wages during any period the employee makes a reasonable effort to find 
substitute work. The avoidable consequences doctrine does not require 
successful efforts to find new work, only reasonable efforts.98 Thus, 
no subtraction from the normal recovery ( of full wages) would apply to 
the period of the reasonable job search. In effect, the law assumes that 
the amount the employee could have earned with a reasonable job search 
equals $0. After all, she made reasonable efforts to find a new job, but 
earned nothing despite those reasonable efforts. Apparently, reasonable 
efforts would produce no income, leaving nothing to subtract from 
wages.99 
The expectation interest can produce the same result. At the risk of 
oversimplifying the problem, a job search is not leisure. Few people 
undertake a job search as a way to spend a vacation or relax on the 
weekend. A job search is work, just as much as the labor performed for 
an employer. In effect, the employee who undertakes a job search 
more than zero. Even under § 2-708, the absence of a market for the goods suggests 
they have a market price of zero, allowing the seller full recovery without any offset for 
the value of retaining the goods. 
96. An employee who can relax while an agent finds substitute employment for 
her resembles the seller of goods more closely. The discussion here deals with the more 
common situation of employees who must find jobs for themselves. 
97. Courts could prevent this result by including the value of the employee's time 
spent in the job search as an item of the employee's incidental damages. Generally, 
however, incidental damages include only the employee's out-of-pocket costs incurred 
in the job search. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9 ("If the plaintiff actually expends 
funds in a reasonable effort to minimize damages, the expenditures are recoverable . 
. . . ") (emphasis added). This approach reasonably prevents double compensation, which 
would occur if the employee recovered both the wages lost and the value of the time 
spent looking for a job, unless the award included an offset for the benefit of leisure. 
Rather than conceptualize the recovery as wages lost minus the benefit of not working 
plus the value of the time spent looking for a new job (plus any other incidental and 
consequential damages), the avoidable consequences doctrine as now applied cancels out 
(by ignoring) the benefit of not working and the value of the time spent looking for a 
job. 
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(2) (1979). 
99. This resembles concluding that some goods have zero market value. See supra 
note 95. In this case, part of the goods (the services for the weeks spent looking for 
work) have zero market value to offset against the loss, even though later weeks might 
have a greater market value (because the employee either did find work or would have 
found work if the job search had been reasonable). 
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receives no leisure, and thus receives no benefit to offset against the 
award. She receives full wages because she works for them, just as if 
she continued to report to her former workplace and put in a full 
day.roo 
With very little effort, we can characterize discharge in breach of 
contract as an implicit modification of the contract between the 
employee and the employer. 101 When an employer breaches a contract 
by firing an employee, the employer implicitly requests the employee to 
spend her time conducting a reasonable search for a new job instead of 
working at the employer's business. 102 In exchange, the employer 
agrees to pay the employee the promised salary until such time as the 
contract expires or the employee obtains an equal or better job. 103 
Normally, a modification would require the agreement of both parties. 
Inferring assent by the employee may pose more difficulty. Her assent 
to the original employment agreement may suffice, depending upon the 
I 00. Allow me to defer, briefly, the issue of whether the disutility of working for 
the former employer equalled the disutility of the job search. If either involved more 
cost than the other, we might consider an adjustment to the award: an increase if the 
job search was more laborious than the job duties; a decrease if the job search was less 
laborious. This Article addresses that issue shortly. See infra text following note I 07. 
10 I. I do not mean to imply that either the employer or the employee actually 
agrees to the terms outlined in this paragraph. Nor do I contend that anyone actually 
thinks of discharge as a modification of the employment contract. The law, however, 
and particularly the avoidable consequences doctrine, arguably creates mutual obligations 
between the breaching employer and the discharged employee that resemble a contract. 
Identifying the similarities may illuminate some aspects of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine and its harmony with the expectation interest. 
102. Often employers make no explicit request. But every employer who pleads the 
avoidable consequences doctrine as a defense to the employee's claim for lost income 
affirms its desire that the employee conduct a reasonable job search following discharge. 
Such post hoc ratification by the employer provides some indication that the employer 
expected or desired such efforts by the employee from the start. Thus, the law fairly can 
infer the employer's assent to this term. 
I 03. The promise to pay wages following discharge is only partially fictional. The 
entire discussion of remedies for breach assumes a valid contract that obligates the 
employer to pay the employee for a specific period of time. That promise is quite real; 
the law need not imply any obligation to pay wages, but can impose it based on an 
actual, explicit promise by the employer. Employers who fire employees may feel they 
have the right to do so or, at least, may hope that they will not have to pay the employee 
even if the discharge is wrongful. But the employer's mistake about the effect of the 
promise or the likelihood of a successful suit by the employee should not obscure the 
promissory nature of the obligation to pay wages. While the bargain in the text presents 
an obligation the employer hopes never to perform, it arises from a real promise by the 
employer. 
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terms of that contract. The employer might have the prerogative to 
assign the employee to look for new work as her daily job assign-
ment.104 If so, an implied agreement by the employee to use good 
faith efforts105 to look for new work poses no enigma; it inheres in her 
agreement to perform the work the employer assigns. Absent express 
provisions to the contrary, courts might be willing to find an implied 
term in employment agreements that would allow an employer, who no 
longer desired the services of an employee, to assign her to look for a 
l 04. Contracts providing that the employee "work as directed" by the employer 
seem broad enough to include that prerogative. 
l 05. I use the phrase "good faith efforts" here because, within a contract, the 
employee has an inherent obligation to act in good faith to do the tasks assigned by the 
employer. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 205 (1979). Arguably, good 
faith demands less of the employee than the "reasonable efforts" required by the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. A person, in good faith, might make efforts that, when 
viewed objectively, seem unreasonable. See, e.g., Mattei v. Hopper, 51 Cal. 2d 119, 
123-24, 330 P.2d 625, 626-27 ( 1958) (distinguishing reasonable efforts from good faith 
efforts). Reasonable efforts arguably involve a greater burden, insisting upon efforts that 
a reasonable person would take without allowance for persons subjectively (but not 
vindictively) unreasonable. Within an ongoing contractual relationship-especially an 
employment relationship--good faith efforts seem sufficient. The employer's ability to 
specify the employee's tasks and to supervise performance permit the employer to ensure 
that the employee makes reasonable efforts, as long as the employee follows the 
employer's direction in good faith. The avoidable consequences doctrine demands more 
of employees, perhaps because the employer has no opportunity to specify how the 
employee should look for work or to supervise her compliance with those specifications. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine may require both reasonable efforts and good 
faith efforts. See Smith-Wolf Constr., Inc. v. Hood, 756 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1988) (announcing but not applying the rule that U.C.C. § 2-715 "will not prevent 
or reduce recovery if the buyer's actions are reasonable and undertaken in good faith" 
( emphasis added), a requirement that may flow from the universal requirement of good 
faith in U.C.C. § 1-203). An employee could go through the motions of a reasonable 
job search, but could do so in bad faith. An employee who hoped not to find a job 
might communicate that preference to prospective employers subtly but effectively. 
Under these circumstances, the absence of a bona fide job search might induce a court 
to subtract wages the employee could have earned if she had conducted the search in 
good faith. Cf Brady v. Thurston Motor Lines, 753 F.2d 1269, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985) 
( equating willful misconduct that led to plaintiffs' discharge from substitute work with 
failure to use "reasonable and good faith efforts to maintain that job once accepted"). 
Dicta in other cases suggest an employee must use good faith in the job search. See 
Edgecomb v. Traverse City Sch. Dist., 67 N.W.2d 87, 90 (Mich. 1954); Tosti v. Ayik, 
508 N.E.2d 1368, 1370 (Mass. 1987), cert. denied sub nom., United Auto Workers v. 
Tosti, 484 U.S. 964 (1987); Furno v. Pignona, 522 A.2d 746, 752 n.6 (Vt. 1986) 
(quoting jury instruction); cf Department of Civil Rights v. Horizon Tube Fabricating, 
385 N.W.2d 685,688 (1986) (apparently equating good faith with reasonableness). The 
difficulty in proving the employee's lack of good faith and the expense necessary just 
to investigate her good faith probably will keep this issue from arising in very many 
cases. Thus, the avoidable consequences doctrine understandably focuses on the 
reasonableness of the employee's efforts. 
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new job.106 Thus, the employee looking for work does not enjoy 
leisure, but simply continues to perform her duties to the employer, 
though those duties have changed somewhat in their nature. 
Recharacterizing the contract in this way may illuminate a possible 
inconsistency between the avoidable consequences doctrine as now 
applied and the explanation proposed here based on the expectation 
interest. Not every reasonable job search will consume the same amount 
of time that the employee's original job would have consumed. 107 
While employment may require a forty-hour week (plus commuting 
time), a reasonable job search may consume only thirty hours per week 
(or less), leaving the employee with an apparent gain often leisure hours 
per week. Arguably, the expectation interest would urge an offset for 
the benefit to the employee of these ten additional leisure hours. 108 
I 06. The law might want to encourage employers to pay employees while they seek 
new work (and even to supervise the adequacy of the job search efforts) rather than to 
fire them outright, at least when discharge would breach a contract. Employers might 
continue to discharge employees, perhaps fearing that employees who continue to receive 
weekly paychecks would not make good faith efforts to find new work. (That possibility 
has not prevented some law firms from continuing to pay attorneys while they seek new 
employment, thus helping them with the transition to a new job.) The law seems likely 
to tolerate employers who prefer to assign a job search as the employee's daily 
workload. That tolerance could take the form of inferring an employee's agreement to 
perform job search duties as an implicit element (or modification upon discharge) of the 
contractual employment relationship that existed. 
l 07. The text could as easily discuss effort instead of time-----the qualitative disutility 
of work (vs. the job search) rather than the quantity of time spent in each pursuit. Some 
jobs may demand activities far more draining than those required to conduct a reasonable 
job search. If so, the employee arguably benefits by expending less energy (on the job 
search) than she would have needed to expend (on the job) if the contract had been 
performed. For simplicity, the text will continue to address only the difference in time. 
Differences in energy present the same issues. They do not justify repeating the points 
with different terminology. 
l 08. To the extent that the theory requires this result, it fails to explain existing law. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine permits no reduction in the award as long as the 
employee conducts a reasonable search for a new job. A reasonable job search might 
or might not require the employee to spend as much time looking for work as she would 
have spent working if the breach had not occurred. See Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire 
Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 756-57 (7th Cir. 1983) (during two years, plaintiff "secured one 
part-time job and applied for another, full-time position ... [and] placed his name on 
file with the Wisconsin Job Service in an effort to seek whatever employment was 
available"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 992 ( I 983); Sprogis v. United Airlines, 517 F.2d 387, 
392 (7th Cir. 1975) (applying for one job and obtaining another temporary job 
constituted reasonable diligence); cf Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 
149, 158-60 (7th Cir. 1981) (upholding reduction of award where plaintiff testified he 
spent 24 hours per week seeking work, in part based on concerns for the plaintiff's 
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If, however, the discharge amounts to an implicit request that the 
employee conduct a reasonable job search, the additional leisure time 
does not require offset. In effect, the leisure is a gift from the employer 
to the employee, just as if the employer had told the employee to take 
the rest of the day off or to read a novel at the workplace that afternoon. 
An employer who gives such release time to employees cannot offset the 
pay without the employee's consent. 109 The employee, by doing all 
that the employer asks, becomes entitled to the pay the employer 
promised. Similarly, an employee who conducts a reasonable job search 
does all that the breaching employer implicitly asks (via the legally 
imposed avoidable consequences doctrine), thus becoming entitled to full 
compensation as the employer promised (via the legally imposed damage 
remedy for breach of contract). 110 
credibility), overroled by Coston v. Plitt Theatres, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. l 988) 
(overruling Syvock's standard for willful age discrimination under 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) 
but not modifying Syvock's avoidable consequences rule). 
Some may applaud the expectation interest theory for having unearthed a flaw in the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. I am not convinced that correcting this flaw (that is, 
reducing recoveries when employees spend less than full time looking for work) would 
produce better results. Thus, the text considers ways in which the expectation interest 
might explain the results reached under the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
I 09. That conclusion may depend on the contract. In the construction trades, for 
example, employers often pay only for time worked by employees. When conditions 
make work impractical, employers may send employees home or not call them in (a near 
equivalent of the text's "take the rest of the day off') without any obligation to pay for 
the time the employees could have worked. An employer with that amount of discretion 
under the contract, however, rarely will face a claim for breach of contract such as the 
one envisioned in text. How could-or, equally telling, why would-an employer 
discharge an employee (in breach of a contract) if the employer had the power to pay 
the employee nothing (by not calling the employee to work on a job) without 
discharging her? Answers exist, particularly if the employer's ability to avoid paying 
for the employee's time depends on external conditions (such as weather conditions at 
the worksite) or is limited by the obligation to act in good faith. Perhaps fringe benefits 
or worker's compensation insurance premiums would motivate discharge in breach of 
contract instead of simply not calling the employee to work. The variety of factual 
settings that might give rise to discharge here evince the futility of attempting to address 
every possible contract setting in which the avoidable consequences doctrine might arise. 
For now, the text will continue to address the more common situation where an 
employer must pay the employee a certain amount each week, even if the employer 
cannot find enough work to keep the employee busy for the entire week. 
110. We could infer the same implicit contract between the buyer and seller of 
goods, but it serves no useful purpose in that setting. The benefit retained by the seller 
exists independent of efforts to resell it. The law does not care at all whether the seller 
keeps the goods or resells them, as long as the value of the goods to the seller offsets 
the recovery. In fact, a buyer might prefer for the seller to keep the goods; incidental 
damages will be lower if the seller makes use of the goods instead of conducting 
expensive efforts to resell them. Presumably, the seller has no incentive to devote the 
goods to an inefficient use (that is, a use less valuable than the use other buyers could 
make of the goods). 
The same arguments apply to discharged employees if we recognize the benefit of 
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Efforts to measure the value of leisure to the employee produce the 
same result without recourse to fictional post-discharge duties. The 
employee's decision to spend her time looking for a new job reveals a 
subjective assessment that she prefers wages to leisure-that she values 
the money she expects or hopes to make from a new job more than she 
values the leisure time. A good faith job search implies the employee 
will accept a job reasonably similar to her prior job-presumably 
including similar time and effort requirements. Thus, the employee's 
search, if in good faith, indicates a willingness to part with all of the 
spare time the employer so generously bestowed upon her, not just the 
spare time she actually spends looking for work. 111 The decision to 
look for work, therefore, undercuts the inference about the value of the 
benefit (the leisure) the employee received. While it may have some 
value, that value may not equal the amount she could have earned by 
reasonable efforts. As long as the employee conducts a reasonable job 
search in good faith, we cannot infer how much value she attached to 
the leisure she received. 112 
These same arguments could apply to a bad faith job search, but with 
leisure. But the more complicated setting-where the efforts to mitigate consume the 
assets to be sold--makes that recognition more difficult and requires more intricate 
analysis to work out the ramifications. See supra note 97. The discussion of a modified 
contract is not meant to supplant the notion of actual benefits conferred on the employee, 
but to help illustrate the ways to evaluate the benefit. 
111. The time required to look for work may differ from the time required to 
perform work for reasons outside the employee's control, such as the scheduling 
constraints of interviewing personnel managers or the number of ads for suitable 
positions published in a given region. The employee's decision not to spend 40 hours 
per week actively pursuing work may reflect the futility of additional hours rather than 
some preference for leisure. 
112. In this respect, the expectation interest does not reject subtracting the value of 
the leisure in theory, but despairs of measuring it. If we could measure and evaluate the 
utility of leisure directly, the expectation interest might justify an offset. The 
impossibility of such measurement, see SPENCER, supra note 48, at 341, makes offset 
impracticable without some objective indication of the value of leisure to the plaintiff. 
The lack of an adequate measure explains an even more extreme case: the employee 
who does not look for work because the search would be futile. This employee certainly 
receives leisure as a result of the breach. But courts cannot estimate the value of that 
leisure. The amount she could have earned if she had conducted a reasonable job search 
equals zero since, by hypothesis, the job search would have been futile. Thus, while we 
know she values her leisure at least at zero, we have no evidence concerning whether 
(or by how much) she values leisure more than zero. In this respect, expectation 
analysis again duplicates the result dictated by the avoidable consequences doctrine. See 
DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 272. 
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somewhat different results. The employee who conducts a job search 
with no desire to find new work fails to satisfy either prong of the 
analysis. She breaches the implicit contract suggested above by failing 
to perform her duty (to seek work) in good faith. 113 Damages for that 
breach presumably would be measured by the amount the employee 
could have earned if she had looked for work in good faith. Alternative-
ly, one could simply ask whether the employee's bad faith search 
supports the inference that she valued work more than the leisure. Her 
failure to seek work in good faith implies that she prefers not to find 
work. The unwillingness to find new work suggests the employee 
actually values leisure----even that portion of leisure remaining after 
going through the motions of a job search--more than she values the 
wages she could obtain by working. The motions of looking for work 
show a preference to obtain both leisure and wages. 114 But that 
preference looks very much like the employer's hope to discharge the 
employee and not pay wages, despite the employment contract. Neither 
hope deserves much weight in legal decisions determining the effect of 
the parties' conduct. Once a court determines that the employee failed 
to seek work in good faith, the expectation interest demands an offset of 
the wages the employee could have earned (as an estimate of the value 
of the leisure }--the same result dictated by the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. 115 
113. Because the employee did not act in good faith, her breach of duty occurs 
regardless of whether her efforts may be reasonable. See supra note I 05. Every 
contract includes the obligation to perform in good faith. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 205 (1979). Failure to act in good faith is a breach of that obligation. 
The nonbreaching party (a paradoxical way to refer to the breaching employer) can 
recover damages caused by the employee's breach of good faith. This approach equates 
the avoidable consequences doctrine with a counterclaim by the employer, much as any 
claim for breach of the "duty to mitigate damages" resembles an implicit counterclaim, 
though not generally so treated for purposes of the rules of civil procedure. See infra 
text following note 261. 
114. An allusion to "having one's cake and eating it, too," seems in order here. At 
least one plaintiff showed unusual candor by testifying that he treated the first few 
months following discharge as a vacation, "enjoying [his] lay-off." See Syvock v. 
Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., 665 F.2d 149, 159 (7th Cir. 1981), overruled on other 
grounds by Coston v. Plitt Theaters, Inc., 860 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1988). The court 
ultimately disbelieved his testimony concerning the diligence of his job search efforts, 
concluding that "[w]hat the plaintiff did, in essence, was take a sabbatical and collect 
unemployment compensation." 665 F.2d at 160 n.14. 
115. I may be too hasty in assuming the avoidable consequences doctrine produces 
this result. Certainly it will if courts interpret it to require both reasonable and good 
faith efforts, as suggested earlier. See supra note 105. The conclusion will also apply 
if courts treat lack of good faith as inherently unreasonable. Good faith may impose a 
less demanding standard; honest but unreasonable conduct may meet a good faith test. 
Some courts may treat unreasonableness as a lesser included offense inherent in the 
finding of lack of good faith. Only if courts recognize the possibility of reasonable 
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The two approaches arguably could differ if we conclude that the 
employee conducted an unreasonable job search, but did so in good 
faith. In these circumstances, the avoidable consequences doctrine 
allows an offset for wages the employee could have earned if she had 
made an objectively reasonable search. 116 The expectation interest, 
however, might not compel an offset. The employee did not breach the 
implied obligation to look for work, since she did so in good faith. Nor 
did she evince a preference for leisure over work, since her good faith 
search evinced a willingness to relinquish all of the leisure. Thus, a 
focus on the benefit might conclude that the employee subjectively 
valued the leisure received less than she valued the wages she could 
have earned if she had made a reasonable job search. As such, she 
received a benefit that we cannot measure. 
The problem resembles one confronted in the preceding section, that 
subjective mistakes by the plaintiff may not fit the presumptions implicit 
in the evaluation ofbenefits. 117 Like the seller who underestimates the 
market value of goods, the employee who conducts an unreasonable 
search may find the court subtracting more than her subjective value of 
efforts conducted in bad faith, and hold that the avoidable consequences doctrine does 
not permit reducing the award by the amount of the loss the plaintiff could have avoided 
if she had conducted the reasonable efforts in good faith, will the two approaches 
diverge here. In any situation in which the former seems plausible, the latter seems too 
remote to deserve extended attention. 
116. Dobbs suggests that courts may apply a somewhat subjective standard in 
assessing the reasonableness of the victim's efforts to minimize the loss. See DOBBS, 
supra note IO,§ 3.7, at 188. He may mean only that the assessment of reasonableness 
takes into account the plaintiff's individual circumstances, much as tort law considers 
(for example) the reasonably prudent five-year-old. If, however, courts take into account 
the plaintiff's subjective state of mind, then the avoidable consequences doctrine and the 
expectation interest may not differ here. The avoidable consequences doctrine might 
allow recovery when the job search seemed reasonable from the plaintiff's point of view. 
That seems like a minimum description of a good faith job search. The plaintiff can 
hardly claim good faith when performing a job search that she did not think was 
reasonable at the time. Thus, any efforts that satisfy this subjective version of 
reasonableness also satisfy a good faith requirement. This suggests that the reasonable-
ness requirement serves largely as a proxy for a good faith requirement, perhaps because 
lack of good faith is so difficult to prove. Because the subjective nature of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine is not clear, the text addresses the alternative possibility: that the 
avoidable consequences doctrine requires objectively reasonable efforts. Cf RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 9 I 8 cmt. c ( I 977) ("The factors determining whether an 
injured person has used care to avert the consequences of a tort are in general the same 
as those that determine whether a person has been guilty of negligent conduct .... "). 
117. See supra Part I.C.2. 
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the benefit. Again we can ask how a reasonable lawmaker seeking to 
offset the value of the benefit would choose to quantify that benefit. 
A reasonable lawmaker plausibly could subtract the amount ofloss the 
plaintiff could have avoided by good faith efforts to minimize the loss. 
Dobbs even suggests that the avoidable consequences doctrine, as 
applied, varies the definition of reasonable efforts to accommodate 
individual traits, bordering on a subjective good faith test. 118 Indeed, 
we probably would see very little change in the avoidable consequences 
doctrine or case results if the law changed today to incorporate a good 
faith test in place of the existing reasonableness test. 
For several reasons, however, a lawmaker trying to measure the value 
of the benefit might prefer the amount of loss avoidable by reasonable 
efforts. Several of these reasons have already been discussed in a 
different context. The law may infer subjective good faith from 
objective evidence--just as courts sometimes infer bad faith from 
evidence that the acts of one party were unreasonable. 119 A finder of 
fact should have less difficulty determining whether the plaintiff acted 
reasonably than it would have determining whether the plaintiff acted in 
good faith. 120 Good faith and reasonableness seem likely to correlate 
rather highly, producing few cases where an accurate determination of 
reasonableness will differ from the more difficult determination of good 
faith. The cost of determining subjective good faith may exceed the 
benefit of better results in those cases where reasonableness and good 
faith do not correlate. 121 But in this context a new reason seems 
particularly important. 
The decision to subtract the amount that could have been avoided by 
118. See supra note 116. 
119. Some courts seem to equate good faith with reasonable conduct as a matter of 
law. See. e.g., Bushmiller v. Schiller, 368 A.2d 1044 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Roger 
C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First Party Insurance Transactions: Refining 
the Standard of Culpability and Reformulating the Remedies by Statute, 26 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. I, 40-41 & n.167 (1992). But see Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Gatoil 
(U.S.A.), Inc., 607 F. Supp. 1422, 1425 (D.D.C. 1985) (granting summary judgment 
against defendant on ground that failure to make reasonable efforts breached the 
obligation to make good faith efforts), rev'd, 801 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (in cases 
governed by U.C.C., good faith requires honesty in fact, not necessarily reasonable 
efforts). Even where courts hold to the definition of good faith as "honesty in fact," 
U.C.C. § 1-201(19) (1995), it may be impossible to demonstrate bad faith without 
recourse to evidence of unreasonableness. Good faith requires a determination of the 
party's subjective state of mind. Only the party has first hand knowledge of that state 
of mind. To litigate the issue of good faith at all, the unreasonableness of the party's 
conduct must be admitted into evidence, if only to challenge the credibility of the party's 
claim that she honestly held an unreasonable belief. 
120. See supra text accompanying note 47. 
121. See supra note 66. 
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reasonable efforts has two uses: it provides no subtraction if the plaintiff 
makes reasonable efforts to avoid the loss, and it provides a measure for 
the subtraction when the plaintiff fails to make reasonable efforts. While 
a good faith test seems fairly well suited to the first of these uses, it 
seems virtually unmanageable in the second. Determining whether the 
plaintiff's efforts were made in good faith seems within the capability 
of a jury, but we may expect some errors. On the other hand, determin-
ing the amount of loss that could have been avoided by good faith 
efforts seems horribly speculative in a case where the plaintiff did not 
make good faith efforts. If the plaintiff had sought a new job in good 
faith, what efforts would she have made? Can the finder of fact presume 
that the plaintiff would have acted reasonably if she had made good faith 
efforts? Since the plaintiff could have achieved a zero offset without 
acting reasonably, that presumption is not, theoretically, required. Good 
faith can describe a range of efforts, from extraordinary to unreasonable. 
Can the plaintiff contend that, even if she had acted in good faith, she 
would not have acted reasonably? 122 If so, can she claim that she 
would not have found a new job or would have found one that would 
have paid less than the job that she could have located with reasonable 
efforts? How can the fact finder identify efforts that would have 
satisfied good faith even though the efforts were unreasonable? What 
evidence would be probative on that issue? 
A reasonable lawmaker might decide to avoid these issues by 
presuming conclusively that the plaintiff valued leisure at least as much 
as the amount she could have earned by reasonable efforts to find new 
work. Perhaps the law could surmount these obstacles; the rhetorical 
questions can be answered, though the answers may not inspire 
confidence. A reasonable lawmaker, therefore, could choose a good 
faith standard despite these difficulties. But the choice seems a toss-up 
at best. The difference between good faith efforts and reasonable efforts 
does not seem dispositive evidence that the law pursues a goal other than 
evaluating benefits of breach. Rather, the expectation interest could 
produce the same rule now followed by the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. 
122. The image of a plaintiff trying to look as dumb as possible while testifying, 
"Gee, I never would have thought to try that while looking for work," probably 
exaggerates the picture, at least slightly. The plaintiff, after all, does not want to seem 
so dumb that the jury decides the discharge was justified. 
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In short, the normal damage rules can explain the inference that the 
employee received a benefit she valued more than a new job from the 
fact that she made insufficient efforts to find new work. In a few cases 
that inference may not match the subjective values of the specific 
plaintiff-just as the objective theory of contracts may find agreements 
in some cases where the parties (or one of them) subjectively never 
intended to make a binding commitment. 123 But on balance, the errors 
involved in this presumption seem likely to be small. 124 
b. Why limit the value of the benefit to the amount of loss that could 
have been avoided by reasonable efforts? 
An attack might emerge from the other direction. Even if persuaded 
that the reasonableness standard does not overestimate the value of the 
benefit, one might argue that it underestimates the value. Arguably, the 
plaintiff values the benefits of the breach more than she values the 
amount of loss she could avoid by any means, no matter how burden-
some. Otherwise she would have taken the burdensome measures and 
avoided the loss. At least as long as the burden of the measures is 
compensable in the damage award, the decision not to take those 
measures seems to reflect a preference to retain the benefits rather than 
relinquish them by finding a substitute transaction. 
In the context of employment contracts, this objection presents a most 
unpalatable alternative. It suggests that a discharged employee may not 
recover wages if she could have avoided the loss by taking employment 
in another state; the burden of relocating plays no role in the inference, 
only in the calculation of incidental damages. It suggests that the award 
to a discharged professional should be reduced by the amount that could 
have been earned dancing naked or cleaning bedpans because the 
humiliation of other employment does not impede the inference. It 
suggests that the employee cannot recover amounts she could have 
earned working in a coal mine because the risk of the alternative 
employment does not alter the inference. The avoidable consequences 
doctrine explicitly negates an offset for actions that involve undue risk, 
burden, or humiliation. 125 If we focus instead on evaluating the 
I 23. See, e.g., Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S. W. 777 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1907); FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 3.13. 
124. The presumption suggested here is the opposite of the presumption Dobbs 
suggests applies to the avoidable consequences doctrine. See supra note I I 6. Just as 
courts may soften the requirement of reasonable efforts in light of a plaintiff's subjective 
circumstances, a court may impose results that do not exactly match the plaintiff's 
subjective state of mind based on the objective evidence. 
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND} OF CONTRACTS§ 350 (1979). 
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benefit, we must examine why risk, burden, or humiliation-----or any other 
factors that make a decision not to pursue alternative employment 
reasonable-defeat the inference that the employee preferred leisure. 
Intuitively, the results achieved by the avoidable consequences 
doctrine seem explainable in terms of the benefits. When an employee 
decides to refuse work in another locale, that decision may not reveal a 
preference for leisure. The preference revealed may relate more to the 
benefit of living in this community-a benefit that the employer did not 
bestow by breaching the contract--rather than to the benefit of idleness. 
The same intuition seems to apply when the characteristics of the other 
job are at stake. Whether the alternative employment involves substan-
tially greater labor, substantially greater risk, or substantial costs to 
reputation or self-esteem, a decision to reject the job seems more related 
to those factors than to any preference to remain idle. We can 
understand why a reasonable person who truly preferred wages to 
leisure, nonetheless, might refuse the jobs involved. 
Perhaps we can clarify that intuitive point if we separate the two 
components of leisure: the utility of play and the disutility of work. 126 
When we infer that the employee values leisure more than earnings, we 
actually infer that she values play more than the net value of earnings 
less the disutility of working. 127 The benefit bestowed by the employ-
126. I use the word "play" simply to contrast the utility of time for one's own 
pursuits with the disutility of work. Leisure may generate utility from a number of 
activities that we would not trivialize as play. 
127. We might express the formula as Play ;,: Earnings - Work. The equivalent 
expression, Play + Work ;,: Earnings, is also true. Note that Work, in these formulae, 
is a positive number--perhaps better called the benefit of not working-rather than a 
negative number, as one might assume from the rhetorical formulation "the disutility of 
work." Anyone who prefers to picture the disutility as a negative number may do so by 
simply changing the operators(+ and-) in the formulae. (Since Work reduces the value 
of earnings, it would be misleading to subtract a negative value of work from a positive 
value of earnings, since that would increase the total rather than decrease it. Only if job 
satisfaction exceeds the disutility of work, such that the employee might work even 
without pay, would it be accurate for the right side of the first formula to be greater than 
earnings. Let me assume that, for the vast majority of employees discharged in breach 
of contract, work involves some net disutility.) 
The different rhetorical formulations do not affect the basic identity of the value Work. 
Whether viewed as the benefit of not working or the disutility of work, the value will 
be the same distance from the zero point, but in a positive or negative direction 
(respectively). The disutility of work takes not working as the base line, assigning it 
zero value. (Any positive value of free time has been included in the separate element 
Play.) Working moves one's position in a negative direction. The benefit of not 
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er, however, is limited to the disutility of working at the original job 
(plus play). Relieving the employee of that disutility, which she would 
have endured if the employer had performed, is a benefit to the 
employee. As long as the disutility of any alternative employment does 
not exceed the disutility of the original job, rejection of the new job 
supports the inference that the employee preferred leisure to the 
earnings. 128 But if the disutility of the new job exceeds the disutility 
of the original job, the inference no longer follows logically. Even if the 
employee would have preferred the earnings of the new job to her 
leisure if it involved the same disutility as the original job, she might 
refuse the job because the disutility of the new job reduces the net 
earnings below the value of her leisure. 129 
"Undue risk, burden, or humiliation" seems an apt attempt to capture 
those cases where the new job involves substantially greater disutility 
than the old job. Risk of bodily harm ( or other injury) and the indignity 
or humiliation of a new job are among the disutilities of that job. Some 
burdens, such as significantly more taxing job duties, also constitute 
disutilities of the job. The burden of moving to a new city often will 
involve disutilities attributable, at least indirectly, to the new job.130 
At least some burdens, however, may raise a different concern. 
Burdens may refer to the burden of the job search or the transition to the 
new job. For instance, an employee might be able to find work in a 
working takes the labor as the base line. Not working relieves one of the disutility, 
moving in a positive direction. But, for any given job, the gap between working and not 
working covers exactly the same distance regardless of whether we move from not 
working to working or from working to not working. 
128. Rejecting a job (or failing to include that job in a search) establishes that Play 
+ WorkN ;;, EarningsN. (The subscript N indicates the new job; the subscript O will 
designate the original job.) Where WorkN .s: Work0 , we also can infer that the benefit 
from the breach equals or exceeds the earnings of the new job: that is, that Play + 
Work0 ;;, EarningsN. 
In this respect, the relative disutility of the two jobs does not differ in principle from 
the role fringe benefits play in the calculation. Throughout, I have taken earnings here 
to include the entire compensation package, including health benefits, retirement benefits, 
and the like. Sometimes non-salary aspects of the compensation can play a critical role 
in an employee's decision to accept a position. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 
U.S. 219, 222 (1982) (employees refused job with former employer because offer did 
not include seniority to original hire date). While calculations may become more 
difficult as we move from health insurance packages to seniority, to amenities (for 
example, an office with a view), to more burdensome work requirements, the differences 
have the same effect on the net benefit of employment by raising or lowering either the 
earnings or the disutility of work. 
129. In short, knowing that Play+ WorkN;;, EarningsN, does not allow the inference 
that Play + Work0 ;;, EarningsN, if WorkN > Work0 • Since the benefit of the breach is 
Play + Work0 , no inference about the value of the benefit is available from the decision 
to reject the new job. 
130. The disutility of the new location would count as a disutility of the new job. 
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better city. The burden of moving. to a new city---or even the burden of 
a longer commute--may be "undue" within the meaning of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine,131 even though no disutility attaches to the new 
location. The avoidable consequences doctrine generally does not 
subtract amounts the employee could have earned in other loca-
tions-anq reaches that result without expressly comparing the relative 
attractiveness of the two living environments. 132 This suggests that the 
burden of the transition, rather than the disutility of the new location, 
explains the existing rule. 
The expectation interest might require an offset for losses the plaintiff 
could have avoided by incurring substantial transitional burdens. The 
expense of the move seems entirely an issue of transaction costs. If the 
law will compensate the employee for the transaction costs, then the 
employee's decision not to incur them arguably implicates the value the 
employee attaches to leisure itself. 133 Part I.C.3 attempts to demon-
strate that, at least with regard to the cost of resale, transaction costs do 
not undermine the inference that the plaintiff valued the benefit more 
than she valued the amount she could have gained in a substitute 
transaction. 134 Other job search expenses also might seem undue to a 
jury-for example, the cost to dress for success. Where those burdens 
are large enough to be unreasonable, but tangible enough to permit 
131. The general rule that a discharged employee need not accept employment "in 
another community" may overstate the issue slightly. The definition of the community, 
like geographic market in antitrust cases, may turn on the reasonableness of seeking 
employment in a place rather than on city or county lines drawn for different purposes. 
Dobbs suggests that for some professions, mobility may be the norm, thus making a 
willingness to relocate reasonable under the circumstances. DOBBS, supra note I 0, 
§ 12.25, at 926. Nonetheless, some cases imply a very limited search may suffice to 
avoid an offset. For instance, public school teachers may contend that "their former 
employer is the only employer in town." Shiffer v. Board of Educ., 224 N.W.2d 255, 
258 (Mich. 1974). 
132. See, e.g., Byrne v. Independent Sch. Dist., 117 N.W. 983 (Iowa 1908); DOBBS, 
supra note 10, § 12.25, at 926. While this might reflect a conclusive presumption that 
every employee lives in the city they love better than any other in the world, it seems 
better not to assume that the law embodies such an unrealistic presumption. More likely, 
the rule presumes that the relocation costs themselves are an undue burden that makes 
rejection of jobs in other locations reasonable. The same rule need not apply where the 
cities are close. The burden of a longer commute may or may not make reasonable a 
decision to reject (or not to look for) a job in a nearby city. 
133. The preceding paragraph sought to remove the relative utility of the two 
locations by hypothesizing a job in a better city. 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 80-92. 
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calculation, the law could choose to compensate the plaintiff for them 
and preserve the inference that she prefers leisure if she does not incur 
them. Since the avoidable consequences doctrine does not take this 
approach, some reconciliation remains. 135 
The preceding discussion of transaction costs, however, relies in part 
on the relatively small amount involved. 136 Neither the transaction 
costs themselves nor the interest on them seems likely to be very large, 
either as an absolute amount, as a percentage of the harm the costs 
would avoid, or as a percentage of the plaintiff's resources. Thus, when 
recoverable, the plaintiff's need to wait until trial to recover them seems 
unlikely to influence the decision about whether to avoid the loss. That 
confidence diminishes when the transition costs refer to extraordinary 
efforts rather than reasonable efforts. The cost of moving to a new city 
may not be small in any sense of the word. Indeed, the burdens under 
discussion are by definition undue, implying that they represent a fairly 
large amount, at least in proportion to the amount of loss they will 
prevent. 137 In these circumstances, the plaintiff's concern over these 
costs may enter the decision concerning whether to minimize the loss by 
extraordinary efforts. If these elements enter into the calculation, then 
the inference that the decision not to act reflects a preference for leisure 
becomes uncertain. Once we cannot assert that the decision not to act 
reflects the value the plaintiff attaches to leisure, the expectation interest 
need not (and perhaps cannot) assume that the amount of loss the 
plaintiff could have prevented by taking those measures equals the 
benefit of the breach. Thus, the expectation interest, like the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, can treat extraordinary efforts to minimize the 
loss differently from reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. 
Another practical constraint stems from the resources available to the 
plaintiff. If the law begins to reduce recoveries where employees failed 
135. We might attempt the reconciliation by modernizing the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine. A blanket rule that negates a duty to move to another city, appropriate in 
an era when the population was more static, may be obsolete in the era of the global 
village. The reasonableness of decisions not to move may have changed; courts may 
need to catch up. Yet at some point the avoidable consequences doctrine tolerates the 
conclusion that the burdens of transition are undue, a conclusion that the expectation 
interest must explain. 
I 36. See supra text following note 85. 
137. Thus, the argument in text is not limited to the example of moving to a new 
city. Any undue burden seems likely to involve amounts sufficiently significant to 
implicate the arguments concerning transaction costs. If the expenses involved are 
reasonable rather than undue, then they do not fall into the category now under 
discussion. The avoidable consequences doctrine and the expectation interest treat 
reasonable expenses alike, by expecting the plaintiff to incur them and by compensating 
her for them if she does. 
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to incur substantial (previously "undue") expense in the job search, the 
employee with limited savings may be caught in a vice. The employer 
has deprived the employee of regular pay, which might have been used 
to meet the expenses involved (in addition to the employee's living 
expenses). Yet the employer complains that the employee did not incur 
significant expenses during a job search. The law's normal presumption 
that everyone has easy access to capital markets--that is, that the 
employee could borrow money to cover the expenses-----seems singularly 
ill-adapted to cases involving discharge from employment. 138 It would 
be extremely unrealistic for the law to assume unemployed people can 
borrow money at will. Thus, an employee's limited means impede the 
inference that the decision not to incur substantial expense in the job 
search reveals a preference for leisure. 
Third, employers again seem unlikely to raise the issue very of-
ten---especially when the costs involved are large-because employers 
would need to pay them as an element of damages. If the employee did 
incur the costs, however large, they become incidental damages the 
employer must pay. 139 The employer will benefit from this argument 
I 38. In fact, some avoidable consequences cases do not require plaintiffs to incur 
expenditures beyond their means. See. e.g., Valencia v. Shell Oil Co., 23 Cal. 2d 840, 
147 P.2d 558 (1944) (defendant damaged plaintiff's truck; plaintiff, who did not have 
$222 in order to pay mechanic for repairs to the truck, recovered $4,416 for loss of use 
of a truck while it sat in a shop subject to a mechanic's lien); DOBBS, supra note 9, 
§ 3.9. 
139. If the law does not permit the employee to recover incidental damages that are 
unreasonably large, then the inference (that failure to incur them reflects a preference 
for leisure) fails from the outset. The lawmaker faces two choices: (!) to allow 
recovery of the substantial burdens and to subtract the earnings that would have followed 
those efforts; or (2) to reject the inference that leisure motivated the decision not to incur 
the burdens during the job search, thus rejecting the inference that the employee valued 
leisure more than she valued the wages she could have earned if she had made a more 
burdensome job search. 
Arguably, the employee should not recover for unreasonably large expenses incurred 
in the process of minimizing the loss because the employer could not foresee that the 
employee would incur such large damages. See Wonnell, supra note 31, at 490. One 
might quibble over whether foreseeability requires that the magnitude of the loss be 
foreseeable at the time of contract formation or merely that the type of loss be 
foreseeable. One also might quibble that since job search expenses arise naturally from 
the breach, the requirement of special notice at the time of contract formation should not 
apply to them. The issue does not affect the substance of the argument here. If the 
extra expenses are not recoverable, for whatever reason, the law cannot infer that the 
employee who failed to incur them preferred leisure to the amount she could have earned 
if she had incurred them. At best, the law can infer that she valued leisure more than 
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only if the amount the employee could have earned following a 
burdensome search would have exceeded the burdens by more than the 
difference between the original salary and the amount the employee 
could have earned following a limited search. While such cases may 
exist, they seem unlikely to outnumber the cases where the employer 
loses because the employee fails to find work (or sufficiently valuable 
work) after incurring the unduly large expenses. On the whole, 
employers and employees both seem likely to prefer the predictability of 
the more limited rule. A reasonable lawmaker concerned with benefits, 
therefore, might never be asked to choose to include consideration of 
jobs that the employee could have obtained only by unduly expensive 
efforts. Rather than include the undue burdens in the recovery, the 
lawmaker might prefer to reject the inference of a preference for leisure 
in cases where the alternative employment or the job search involve 
undue risk, burden, or humiliation. 
A final set of practical difficulties may doom the argument for 
compelling plaintiffs to incur unduly large transition expenses. 
Sometimes, the law will not be able to tell whether the decision not to 
move to a different city represented concern for transitional costs or 
concern for the disutility of living in the new city. If the argument 
concerning the latter, disutility, has been persuasive, the expectation 
interest cannot infer that the decision not to relocate reflected the value 
the plaintiff attached to leisure. The inability to distinguish decisions 
based on the disutility of the new location ( or new job) from decisions 
based on the cost of the move or a mixture of the two motives might 
induce our lawmaker to prefer a single rule governing both problems. 
A single rule would help an employee to know how much the law 
expects of her in a job search. 140 Wonnell provides the usual answer 
under the avoidable consequences doctrine: the law expects the 
employee to do as much as she would if she were acting (reasonably) on 
her own account--that is, if she were not able to claim damages from 
her employer. 141 If the demands of the law may differ depending on 
the earnings less the unrecoverable costs that would have been necessary in order to 
obtain the earnings. Since that implementation still requires that the amount of the offset 
be reduced by the amount of the extra expenses, the theory advanced here neither 
requires nor permits an offset of potential earnings divorced from recovery of the 
expenses necessary to obtain them. 
140. Heriot comments on the usefulness of rules (as opposed to standards) as 
devices for guiding individual behavior in cases where litigation may not occur. See 
Heriot, supra note 4 7. 
141. Wonnell, supra note 31, at 494. Wonnell here focuses on the concern for 
moral hazard, which he terms the extortion value of a contract and the desire to reduce 
waste. These rationales underlie the traditional formulation of the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine, but are not as obviously related to the concern for benefits of the breach. 
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whether the burdens involve disutilities or transaction costs, the 
employee-even after consulting a lawyer-may have little ability to 
know what she must do in order to protect her recovery in the event that 
her job search proves unsuccessful. 
The expectation interest does not compel courts to reduce an 
employee's recovery because she failed to take extraordinary measures 
to find new work. No one seems likely to propose that result in any 
event. Even if proposed, the permissible inferences from the plaintiff's 
decision not to incur substantial burdens, either in the transition or in the 
new job, do not justify the conclusion that the employee's inaction 
reveals a preference for leisure over the wages she could have earned by 
those efforts. The rules generated under the avoidable consequences 
doctrine, therefore, are completely consistent with the results courts 
could achieve pursuing the expectation interest. The harmony between 
the expectation interest and the avoidable consequences doctrine remains 
intact. 
2. Buyers of Goods 
Buyers require another elaboration of the theory. A buyer who has 
not fully performed retains money---the epitome of an avoided conse-
quence, not an avoidable consequence. We do not need the theory 
expounded here to explain why the value of money retained is a fair 
approximation of the value of the benefit bestowed by the breach; 142 
it is as exact a measure as the law of damages (which measures 
everything in terms of money) can achieve. Neither do we need the 
avoidable consequences doctrine to explain this result. We are not 
subtracting the amount of loss that the buyer could have avoided by 
reasonable action, but the amount that she did avoid by not paying the 
balance of the price. The expectation interest explains this subtraction 
quite satisfactorily. 
Part III will take up the consistency (and perhaps the identity) of the two sets of 
concerns. 
142. Since the savings involved here do not consist of the unpaid portion of the 
price, the analysis that follows applies regardless of whether the buyer has fully 
performed (by paying the price). The benefits hypothesized reflect subsequent savings 
or gains which will or will not accrue regardless of how much of the price the plaintiff 
has paid. Naturally, the portion of the price paid to the seller will figure into damage 
calculations, but does not affect the analysis of benefits pursued here. 
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Benefit analysis can explain why a buyer who covers with better 
goods than those the seller promised should not recover the full 
difference between cover price and market price. When the plaintiff 
receives better goods, she receives benefits that she would not have 
received if the seller had performed. But this has very little to do with 
the project at hand; the law does not treat cover with superior goods 
under the avoidable consequences doctrine. Rather, the law relies 
directly on normal damage rules, the desire not to put the plaintiff in a 
better position than she would have occupied if the defendant had 
performed. 143 While calling this difference a benefit of breach might 
alter the vocabulary slightly, it would not alter the rationale for this 
result. 
For buyers, however, the avoidable consequences doctrine often enters 
the picture when considering consequential damages, such as the profit 
lost on resale of the goods or losses caused by delayed production or 
construction when a critical component did not arrive on time.144 The 
buyer who promptly covers with substitute goods may avoid or minimize 
these losses. 145 The buyer who does not cover may find she cannot 
recover the actual consequential damages because she failed to take 
reasonable efforts to avoid them. 146 Here, the lack of an immediately 
apparent benefit cuts against the explanation based on the expectation 
interest. This rule seems designed to measure the loss that could have 
been avoided, not some mysterious gain that actually accrued to the 
buyer as a result of the breach. 
In order to identify the benefit to a buyer from the seller's breach, we 
must consider why a buyer who could avoid or minimize losses with 
reasonable efforts would choose not to pursue those efforts. 147 Nor-
143. See, e.g., Thorne v. White, 103 A.2d 579 (D.C. 1954). 
144. See, e.g., S.J. Groves & Sons v. Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1978) 
(contractor sought damages for delays caused by subcontractor's failure to deliver 
required amounts of concrete in a timely manner). 
145. Cover is the most obvious way for buyers to minimize the loss, but not the 
only way. For convenience, the text often will refer to "cover" rather than the more 
cumbersome phrase "cover or other efforts to avoid or to minimize the loss." 
146. U.C.C. § 2-715 (1995) (buyer may recover consequential damages "which 
could not reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise"). The trial court in S.J. 
Groves had reduced the plaintiff's recovery on this ground, but was reversed on appeal. 
576 F.2d at 530. 
147. Where the buyer does pursue reasonable efforts to minimize the loss, no further 
inquiry is needed. The avoidable consequences doctrine does not require any offset, 
since any damages that could have been avoided by reasonable efforts presumably were 
avoided by the plaintiff's reasonable efforts. (The Restatement does not allow the 
defendant to second-guess the plaintiff's choice of which reasonable measures to pursue; 
as long as the plaintiff acts reasonably, no reduction in damages occurs. RESTATEMENT 
{SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(2) { 1979).) Since the plaintiff did not choose to forego 
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mally, plaintiffs will prefer to avoid losses today rather than to recover 
for the losses after months of negotiation or years of litigation, Thus, 
even a buyer unaware of the avoidable consequences doctrine should 
prefer to prevent or to minimize the loss, 148 An informed buyer would 
take reasonable steps to minimize the loss because she could not count 
on recovering the loss later; the avoidable consequences doctrine would 
deny recovery for losses the buyer could have avoided, Thus, a rational 
buyer generally will prefer to cover and, thus, avoid the loss the breach 
otherwise might cause, 
In some cases, however, the seller's breach may benefit the buyer by 
opening up some new, more valuable opportunity, By breaching, the 
seller frees the buyer from having to use the goods, The buyer saves 
some time and effort that otherwise would have been devoted to the 
performance of the contract. Instead, the buyer can devote her resources 
to other projects, which may prove more profitable than the project in 
which the goods would have been used, 149 The benefit may consist of 
reasonable measures that would have reduced the loss, the expectation interest does not 
hypothesize a benefit from the breach------or, at least, has no basis upon which to set a 
value upon any benefits. 
148. Wonnell notes this as a powerful force motivating employees to seek new 
work. See Wonnell, supra note 31, at 490. While some buyers may have sufficient cash 
flow to await repayment, the time value of money suggests most prudent business people 
will avoid losses rather than count on recovery. 
149. The breach frees resources for any buyer, regardless of unused capacity. If the 
buyer, like the lost volume seller, could have performed under this contract (or covered) 
and pursued the other venture, then the other venture is not a benefit bestowed by the 
breach of the contract. A buyer with unused capacity, however, could pursue cover in 
addition to the other project. Thus, the existence of unused capacity enables the buyer 
to cover, but does not explain why a rational buyer would not cover when faced with 
consequential losses. Thus, a claim that unused capacity allowed the buyer to pursue 
both ventures does not require a different application of the expectation analysis. When 
the buyer with excess capacity chooses not to use it to cover, one cannot easily dismiss 
the idea that she obtained benefits from the breach-such as the benefit of cutting short 
a losing venture. 
If the plaintiff would have lost money on the venture, neither benefit analysis nor the 
avoidable consequences doctrine is necessary to explain the result. The breach did not 
cause consequential losses, but prevented them. In these cases, normal damage rules 
based on the expectation interest should preclude recovery without any reference to the 
avoidable consequences doctrin(}-1ls long as the defendant can establish the losses with 
reasonable certainty. (Restitution may produce a different result. For a persuasive 
argument that restitution should not alter the expectation interest in this situation, see 
Kull, supra note 32.) We could treat the loss prevented as a benefit of the breach. The 
characterization seems quite apt, but one does not need to characterize this fortuity as 
a benefit of the breach in order to reach the appropriate result. Nonetheless, the decision 
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as little as the time it would take a clerk to write a check and a receiving 
department employee to direct the goods to the right place. Consequen-
tial damages seem more likely, however, in cases when the cost of 
dealing with the goods is larger.1so A buyer who plans to resell the 
goods may save the effort or expense of its sales and delivery forc-
es.1st A buyer whose operations must shut down because a critical 
component does not arrive may save the effort or expense of operat-
ing_ 1s2 
As in the case of the nonbreaching seller, we can estimate the value 
the buyer attaches to the benefit by looking at how much she could have 
saved by covering. The gain from devoting resources to other projects 
may be intangible or difficult to identify directly. The alternative uses 
of her resources illuminate the amount of benefit she expects to 
receive1s3 from the use she actually selects.1s4 A buyer who elects 
to devote her resources to transactions other than cover must expect to 
of a buyer not to cover when cover was reasonably available might alert courts to the 
possibility that the project would not have been as fruitful as alleged. Going forward, 
this section assumes that the buyer can establish the existence of consequential losses. 
Only then will the avoidable consequences doctrine be necessary in order to reduce the 
award. 
150. Normally, consequential damages arise when the absence of goods jeopardizes 
some project in which the goods are essential. When no such project exists (that is, 
when goods will be delivered and sit with no further input of effort from the buyer), no 
savings may result, but neither do consequential damages result. The loss consists 
merely of not having the goods, the lost value of the goods themselves. That loss 
generally is measured by the contract/market differential. 
I 5 l. Variable costs--such as delivery if the buyer hires independent carriers rather 
than using employees to deliver goods-may produce direct cash savings. When the 
expense is temporarily fixed, as by annual contracts with the sales and delivery 
personnel, the savings may take the shape of less work for the staff. The most obvious 
benefit of reduced workload is time to devote to other projects. But even without 
additional projects, a lighter workload may produce subtle benefits, such as higher 
morale, a better work environment, or fewer mistakes on remaining projects. 
Some may find these benefits rather speculative or even ethereal. I make no claim 
that the specific benefits identified here have ever motivated a buyer not to cover. I 
claim only that if a buyer decides not to cover when reasonable efforts would minimize 
the loss, she normally has some reason for that decision. If other reasons fail to explain 
the conduct, perhaps benefits similar to those identified here really exist. 
152. Again, the savings may take the form of money (by not paying the employees 
for days not worked) or time and effort (by paying the employees and having their time 
available for other projects). 
153. The amount of benefit actually realized by employing the resources in any 
particular alternative pursuit is irrelevant. The expected benefit at the time the buyer 
decides whether to devote those resources to cover or to another project estimates the 
benefit of the breach. 
154. Cf RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW§ 6.11 (3d ed. 1986) 
(discussing evaluating redundant a homemaker-spouse's services by reference to the 
amount she could have earned at an alternative occupation if she had chosen to pursue 
it instead of remaining in the home). 
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benefit from those transactions. If the buyer could reduce losses by 
cover, she must expect the alternative uses ofresources to produce gains 
large enough to offset the losses she could have avoidedY5 Thus, the 
buyer provides a fair estimate of the value to her of being freed from the 
contract. That value equals the gains she expects from the alternative 
use of her resources. Presumably, if cover (or other measures to 
minimize the loss) will save more money than alternative projects will 
gain, the buyer will devote the energies to cover. Only when the 
alternative projects seem likely to generate a net gain will the buyer 
forego cover and pursue another project instead. 156 
The law could seek to attach a value to these savings directly. The 
U.C.C. allows offsets for "expenses saved in consequence of the ... 
breach." 157 When the savings take the form of time or effort, however, 
the cost to attach a value to these savings-or even to prove that the 
savings occurred--may exceed the benefit of offsetting them in the 
award. 158 The amount of loss that could have been prevented offers 
a much more manageable figure. Evidence about that amount is easier 
to obtain-especially for the defendant, who bears the burden of proof 
under the avoidable consequences doctrine. 159 The amount is mea-
sured in dollars instead of utils. In many cases, the estimation will be 
preferable to direct efforts to measure the value of the breach to the 
buyer. 
Arguably, the benefits discussed here consist of the benefit of not 
covering, not the benefit of the breach. If the benefit of not covering 
155. This statement assumes that buyers are rational economic actors. A buyer fails 
to cover, even though she expects cover to save more money than alternative activities 
would gain, presents an enigma. The situation seems so counterintuitive that a 
reasonable lawmaker concerned with measuring benefits realistically could adopt rules 
based on the assumption that it does not occur at all. To some extent, assuming that the 
buyer's actions accurately indicate her subjective value would accomplish this result. 
See supra text accompanying notes 45-57. This Article addresses intentional 
externalization of costs shortly. See infra notes I 89-90. 
156. The word "only" here may claim too much. As noted below, a buyer may 
decide not to cover for several reasons other than the desire to pursue a different project. 
See infra text accompanying notes 161-204. I do not intend the word "only" to reject 
those other possibilities. However, when choosing between two projects ( cover and an 
alternative), a rational buyer will choose the alternative only when the expected gain 
from the alternative exceeds the expected gain from cover (or other mitigation efforts). 
157. U.C.C. § 2-712, -713 (1995). 
158. See supra note 66. 
159. See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9. 
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consisted only of the time saved by not calling other suppliers, that 
might be true. But cover, when effective, puts the buyer in almost the 
same situation regarding performance that she would have faced if the 
seller had delivered. To prevent consequential damages, the buyer must 
proceed to use the substitute goods in the same manner she would have 
used the original goods. Thus, the decision not to cover implicates the 
value of the resources that would have been employed to utilize the 
substitute goods, not merely the resources that would have been 
employed to obtain the substitute goods. 160 The former clearly 
represent benefits of the breach. The latter are not benefits of the 
breach, but rather incidental damages, recoverable in the damage award. 
As a result, they should net out of the buyer's calculation, being no net 
loss whether she covers or pursues other opportunities. 161 Thus, the 
decision to pursue other opportunities rather than cover reflects the 
benefits of the breach (the resources needed to use the goods once 
delivered), not the benefits of avoiding cover. 
Not all buyers long for sellers to breach so that they can abandon their 
original projects in favor of new, more profitable projects. Often buyers 
will be perfectly happy with their original projects and will be rather 
upset with the seller for making those projects harder to pursue. In these 
circumstances, however, buyers seem almost certain to make reasonable 
efforts to prevent consequential damages by obtaining the goods 
elsewhere or otherwise salvaging the project. Buyers have no incentive 
to allow acceptable projects to die when reasonable efforts can save 
them and no better alternatives exist. 162 
In cases where the breach offers no benefits, we would expect to find 
that the buyer has undertaken reasonable efforts to cover or otherwise 
minimize the loss. Where she has not made reasonable efforts to 
160. Where nondelivery has no consequences other than loss of the benefit of the 
goods, this entire discussion does not come into play because the avoidable consequences 
doctrine does not affect the recovery. 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 80-86. 
162. For this reason, we would expect very few cases to employ the avoidable 
consequences doctrine to reduce the consequential damages available to buyers of goods. 
Contract damages generally undercompensate successful plaintiffs. See Wonnell, supra 
note 31, at 482; Stewart Macaulay, The Reliance Interest and the World Outside the Law 
Schools' Doors, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 247, 250-53; Kelly, supra note 6, at 1811. Epstein's 
analysis suggests that undercompensatory damages will lead most contract plaintiffs to 
take any reasonable opportunity to avoid the loss rather than accept an inadequate award. 
See Epstein, supra note 66. On one hand, this implies that the avoidable consequences 
doctrine applies only rarely, making its abolition rather insignificant even if normal 
damage rules did not produce the same result. More significantly, however, the 
incentive to minimize losses suggests that when buyers do not take reasonable efforts to 
minimize the loss, they must have some reason for that decision---and the damage award 
seems an unlikely motivation. 
230 
[VOL. 33: 175, 1996] Contract Remedies 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
minimize the loss, an inference that the buyer benefitted from the breach 
seems sufficiently plausible for the law to offset the damage award by 
the nearest estimate of that benefit----the amount of the loss that could 
have been avoided by reasonable efforts. A buyer might try to explain 
that failure in a way that negates the inference that she chose to make 
better use of her resources. The most plausible explanations deserve 
attention. If the explanations undermine the inference that the buyer 
benefitted from the breach in the amount of the avoidable loss, then 
perhaps the presumption should be rebuttable in particular cases. The 
discussion below concludes that the plausible explanations do not require 
subjective inquiries into the buyer's motivations. 
Where the buyer attempts to explain the decision not to cover, the 
buyer still has received benefits from the breach. The buyer's resources 
(that would have been consumed by using the goods) have been freed 
for disposition at her will. The ability to deploy those resources to other 
endeavors is a benefit to the buyer, much as the ability to decide how to 
spend one's time was a benefit to the employee. 163 Where the breach-
ing seller offers direct proof of the amount of the benefit, the U.C.C. 
may take that into account. Absent direct evidence, however, inferences 
about the value of the benefit may be impossible to draw. 164 Thus, the 
court will lack sufficient basis to subtract any particular amount from the 
award. Interestingly, the benefit analysis finds it difficult to assess the 
amount of the benefit in precisely those cases where the avoidable 
consequences doctrine does not require a reduction in damages. 
For example, a buyer may decide not to cover because cover is 
163. The buyer might have chosen to abandon the original project even after 
performance by the seller. That decision would entail not only the cost of paying for 
the goods, but of storing them, insuring them, or otherwise dealing with them until they 
could be resold or the original project could be resumed. The benefit of breach at least 
equals those saved costs. The expectation interest, however, provides a more direct 
reason for denying consequential damages in any case where the buyer would have 
abandoned the project even if the seller performed: the breach did not cause any 
consequential damages. Any profits lost on the original project would have been lost 
anyway, since the buyer would have shifted resources in another direction even if the 
seller had delivered. The text considers the situation where the fixed costs of paying for 
and storing the goods would have persuaded the buyer to proceed with the original 
project despite a preference to shift to another project that, but for those fixed costs, 
would have produced greater return for the buyer. Under those situations, the ability to 
choose the alternative project really does result from the breach, not from the buyer's 
ability to redirect resources independent of seller's conduct. 
164. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
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impossible. Under these circumstances, the avoidable consequences 
doctrine requires no reduction in the award. The plaintiff literally could 
not prevent the loss by cover because she could not cover. In this case, 
benefit analysis also requires no subtraction. While the plaintiff has 
freed resources, we cannot estimate their value. The decision not to 
cover tells us nothing about their value to the plaintiff. Since zero losses 
could have been avoided by cover, we can infer only that the plaintiff 
values those resources at least at zero. 
Similarly, if cover is possible but will not avoid the consequential 
losses (say, because timing was critical and the loss cannot now be 
avoided), neither theory requires a reduction in the award. The plaintiff 
could not have avoided the loss, so the avoidable consequences doctrine 
subtracts nothing. Benefit analysis suggests only that the buyer valued 
the freed resources at least at zero, offering no basis for subtracting more 
than zero. 
The preceding paragraphs do not undercut the basic inference 
proposed here because they do not address the basic question: why 
would someone who could prevent losses with reasonable efforts choose 
not to take those efforts? Rather, the situations above reflect circum-
stances where the buyer could not prevent the loss with reasonable 
efforts. In each of these situations, we understand why the buyer might 
choose not to minimize the loss without hypothesizing some benefit 
from the breach. To find a case that the normal damage rules treat 
differently from the avoidable consequences doctrine cases, however, we 
must explain why a plaintiff who could minimize the loss would choose 
not to do so when no benefit accrued from the decision not to cover. 
Three plausible explanations merit discussion. First, a buyer might 
find efforts to avoid the loss unduly burdensome. In this situation, the 
avoidable consequences doctrine will not reduce the loss despite the 
failure to mitigate165-but the expectation analysis might. 166 Second, 
165. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350 (1979) (undue risk, burden, 
or humiliation not required in order to avoid the loss). The U.C.C., which governs the 
sale of goods, employs the phrase "could not reasonably be prevented by cover or 
otherwise." U.C.C. § 2-715 (1995). The comments provide no elaboration on what 
makes particular efforts reasonable or unreasonable. It seems fair to infer that if efforts 
to reduce the loss involve "undue burden," a court would determine that those efforts 
were not reasonable within the meaning of the U.C.C.----that is, that the loss could not 
reasonably have been prevented, but could only have been prevented by extraordinary 
or unreasonable efforts. The decision not to compensate the buyer for unduly large 
expenses to effect cover supports the inference that the code does not require buyers to 
incur unduly large expenses as a condition for recovering consequential damages. The 
definition of buyer's incidental damages uses a form of the word "reasonable" three 
times in its single sentence. Id. § 2-715(1) (the most directly pertinent limitation limits 
recovery to "commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection 
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a buyer might decide not to cover ( or to take other measures to minimize 
consequential damages) if she did not realize that consequential damages 
would follow if she failed to cover. Under these circumstances, we 
cannot assume the buyer expected to benefit from other, more profitable 
projects. 167 Rather, the buyer simply underestimated the importance 
of mitigation efforts. Third, a buyer might decide not to cover if she 
hoped that decision would increase the damages she could collect from 
the breaching seller. 168 Acting either out of ignorance of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine or in the hope that the judicial system might 
apply it imperfectly, the buyer might seek to externalize costs rather than 
prevent them. 
a. Extraordinary Efforts 
The avoidable consequences doctrine does not prevent recovery of 
losses that could have been avoided only by unreasonable efforts. 169 
Benefit analysis must work to explain this result. Arguably, the benefit 
of freed resources exists. Abandoning the project suggests that the buyer 
values the freed resources more than she values the losses they could 
prevent. But where the losses could be prevented only by exceptional 
effort-such as by diverting resources from other important projects into 
the mitigation effort-then perhaps the inference has less to do with the 
value the buyer attaches to the resources freed by the breach and more 
to do with the value the buyer attaches to the additional resources 
with effecting cover"). 
166. This possibility, too, does not really explain why a party who could minimize 
the loss with reasonable effort would refuse to do so. Undue burden implicates the 
reasonableness of the effort. As long as the estimate of the value of the benefit includes 
only those losses that the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort, benefit 
analysis will match the avoidable consequences doctrine. The discussion below, like the 
preceding section for employees, attempts to explain why the normal damage rules 
would limit the estimate of the value of the benefit to the amount of the loss avoidable 
by reasonable effort. 
167. Like cases where cover would be futile, the buyer here believes mitigation 
efforts will save zero because she does not realize that damages will result unless she 
takes efforts to prevent them. Thus, the only inference we can draw about her subjective 
valuation of the benefit of the breach is that it at least equals zero. 
168. Wonnell labels this the extortion value of a contract. See Wonnell, supra note 
31, at 490-91, 494. 
169. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350 (1979). 
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necessary to accomplish the mitigation. 170 
The analysis here does not differ greatly from the discussion of the 
employment context, though the specific facts that make loss reduction 
unreasonable differ in this context. 171 As a result, a reasonable 
lawmaker concerned with benefits might choose a different rule for sales 
of goods than for employment contracts. Specifically, a reasonable 
lawmaker might choose to infer that the buyer valued the resources freed 
by the breach at least as much as she valued the amount of loss the 
buyer could have prevented by extraordinary efforts, as long as the buyer 
can recover the cost of those extraordinary efforts from the breaching 
seller. If, however, the lawmaker prefers not to allow recovery for 
extraordinary costs, the decision not to avoid the loss justifies only the 
more limited inference that the buyer values the resources freed by the 
breach more than the amount of loss she could have avoided by 
reasonable efforts (those for which she can recover). 172 Thus, the 
scope of the inference depends on the scope of incidental damages the 
law allows the plaintiff to recover. 
A reasonable lawmaker might choose to limit recoverable incidental 
damages by a reasonableness standard. A reasonableness limit can 
protect the foreseeability cap on damages. 173 At the time of contract 
170. These two sets of resources are cumulative, not alternative. If the buyer 
diverts resources in order to cover, the breach will not free resources. Any resources 
that would have been used to deal with the original goods still must be used to deal with 
the substitute goods. The resources necessary to effectuate cover add to the total 
resources devoted to the project, offset only when (and it) damages have been recovered 
from the breaching seller. Similarly, when cover goods differ from the original goods 
in some significant detail-including details extrinsic to the goods themselves, such as 
the delivery date----the resources necessary for the buyer to complete the project may be 
greater than they would have been if the original goods had arrived as promised. Even 
when cover requires no significant effort, the loss may be avoidable only by significant 
diversion of resources committed to other equally important projects. 
171. For example, a typical buyer facing consequential damages may have better 
access to capital markets than the typical discharged employee looking for work. 
172. The transaction cost problem noted earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 
80-86, precludes the inference that the plaintiff values the benefit more than the loss she 
could avoid, unless the transaction costs are recoverable. The analysis applies regardless 
of whether the costs are the incidental costs to effect cover, increased costs for the 
original project caused by the breach (as, for example, overtime to complete the project 
on time despite delays caused by the breach), or costs that initially affect other projects, 
but that would not have been incurred but for the seller's breach. (The last category 
frequently will consist of opportunity costs of effecting cover, such as losses on other 
projects caused by diverting resources to cover.) A rational buyer will need to consider 
all of these costs in deciding whether to minimize the loss, so a rational lawmaker must 
consider all of these costs in deciding what to infer from the buyer's decision not to 
minimize the loss. 
173. See Wonnell, supra note 31, at 490. Of course, foreseeability itself might 
deserve reexamination, but that project lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
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formation, and perhaps even at the time of breach, a seller may not 
foresee that the buyer will incur unreasonably large expenses in an effort 
to mitigate the loss. More important, an inquiry into the recoverability 
of unreasonably large expenses will require substantial amounts of 
judicial resources, perhaps more than the result justifies.174 For 
instance, if the law retains any concern for moral hazard-the plaintiff 
who intentionally allows losses to mount because she expects to recover 
them from the defendant--abolishing the reasonableness cap will require 
at least an inquiry into the good faith of the plaintiff in expending more 
than a reasonable amount. 175 In addition, allowing recovery for losses 
the defendant caused to other projects (by forcing diversion of the 
resources the plaintiff could devote to those projects) threatens to expand 
the scope of the litigation. Instead of ( or in addition to) demonstrating 
profits lost on the project to which the defendant's performance related, 
the inquiry will focus on some other project. 176 Generally, the law 
seeks to avoid creating sideshows. 177 Yet in order to ascertain the 
174. See Epstein, supra note 66. 
175. This Article seeks to justify the existing rule without too much emphasis on 
factors extraneous to the benefit analysis. Moral hazard is so intimately related to 
traditional explanations of the avoidable consequences doctrine (such as the effort to 
discourage waste) that its inclusion here threatens to undermine the independence of 
benefit analysis. Yet it would be a very strange law that allowed the plaintiff to recover 
any amount she claims to have spent in an effort to reduce the loss without some inquiry 
into whether she actually made the expense and, if so, whether it actually related to 
minimizing the loss in some way. The expectation interest, uninfluenced by issues of 
waste or moral hazard, would inquire whether the plaintiff would have incurred the 
expense if the contract had been performed. (In a case of obvious moral hazard, the 
answer might be, "No, I incurred that expense only because I thought the defendant 
would be required to reimburse me for it as part of the damages for breach.") 
Reasonableness obviates the inquiry into subjective individual motivations and shortcuts 
the inquiry into whether the breach caused the expenditure. 
176. The other project will arise instead of the first when the diversion avoids all 
losses in the directly affected project but allegedly caused losses to the other project. 
The other project will arise in addition to the first when the diversion did not avoid all 
of the losses to the first project--either because the efforts failed or because they merely 
reduced the losses. In those situations, the losses to both projects-or if diversion 
affected more than one other project, all of the affected projects--would be recoverable. 
177. One reason the Federal Rules of Evidence reject many assertions of past 
conduct is to prevent diverting attention from the allegations of wrongdoing that 
allegedly caused the harm at issue in the specific case into the general character of the 
alleged wrongdoer or the truth of the allegations of other misconduct unrelated to the 
harm. FED. R. Evm. 404 & cmt. Other projects allegedly harmed by the breach are not 
a sideshow in quite the same sense. If the allegations are true, the breach at issue 
caused the harm, deserving compensation. Nonetheless, a lawmaker concerned with 
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appropriate offset against damages, the law might need to examine the 
plaintiff's entire business operation, not merely the projects directly 
affected by the defendant's breach. 
Even if transaction costs are recoverable, a reasonable lawmaker might 
prefer not to infer that a plaintiff values the benefits of the breach more 
than the amount of avoidable loss to the extent that minimizing the loss 
requires exceptional efforts. The buyer cannot recover the cost of 
effectuating cover (or other mitigation measures) immediately. When 
she does recover them, the loss of use of those resources may be 
compensated at the legal prejudgment interest rate. 178 If she otherwise 
could employ her resources to generate profits that exceed the prejudg-
ment interest rate, a reasonable buyer might choose not to shift them out 
of a more productive use into a less productive use. The buyer's 
analysis will be more complex: the buyer must decide whether the loss 
that she could avoid (on the project where seller breached) exceeds the 
losses affecting the other productive use (from which she must draw 
resources to accomplish mitigation) minus the portion of that loss that 
she can recover (as incidental expenses and prejudgment interest) and 
minus the value of the resources freed by the breach. 179 The introduc-
tion of these other elements into the computation removes any confident 
conclusions about the value to the buyer of the freed resources. While 
a buyer who does not make reasonable efforts to minimize the loss must 
have valued the benefit of the breach more than she valued the amount 
reasonably efficient operation of the judicial system might seek to achieve the proper 
level of compensation at the least cost. Opening the damage inquiry to evidence of harm 
to other projects in order to permit the jury to award unreasonably large incidental 
expenses, only to offset the recovery by the amount of harm those unreasonable expenses 
avoided (or could have avoided), seems difficult to justify-particularly when neither the 
expenses nor the harm avoided will be actual. The avoidable consequences doctrine 
reduces awards when the plaintiff did not make efforts to avoid the loss. Therefore, the 
jury will need to reduce the award by the amount it believes the plaintiff could have 
avoided. First, the jury would need to assess some unreasonably costly measures the 
defendant argues the plaintiff should have taken to minimize the loss. Then, jurors 
would need to reduce the offset by the amount that it concludes the plaintiff would have 
spent (or lost) if the plaintiff had taken those hypothetical measures, including any losses 
to other projects that might have been affected. If the entire inquiry seems a little 
speculative, perhaps that is sufficient indication that a reasonable lawmaker would prefer 
to limit recoveries to reasonable incidental expenses. 
178. If the resources fall within the provisions permitting prejudgment interest at 
all, the court will calculate the loss of use at the prejudgment interest rate. This seems 
likely when the resources consist of money used to buy other goods. Where the 
resources consist of time or other resources, courts may balk at calling the amounts 
"liquidated" or "ascertainable" within the meaning of doctrines limiting the availability 
of prejudgment interest. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. 
179. The computation would be even more complex if the buyer might claim the 
losses on the other project as consequential damages---a rather unlikely possibility in 
light of foreseeability doctrine. 
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of loss she could have avoided by reasonable effort, a buyer who fails 
to make unreasonably large efforts, even if compensable, may not have 
valued the benefit as much as the total amount of the loss that could 
have been avoided by resort to extraordinary efforts. 
The normal approach to damages can clarify this result. If the seller 
had performed the contract, the buyer could have pursued both projects, 
not just one, with the resources available.180 Normal damage rules 
must seek to restore the financial equivalent of that position. The breach 
forced the buyer to commit additional resources to accomplish that 
result. Where such resources are reasonably available to the buyer----say, 
through the capital markets or unused capacity-presumably courts will 
find it reasonable to expect the plaintiff to devote them to avoiding the 
loss. 181 Sometimes, however, resources necessary to minimize the loss 
will exceed the resources available to the plaintiff without sacrificing one 
of the projects. Since normal damage rules require courts to restore the 
benefit of both projects to the plaintiff, the decision is not whether to 
secure to plaintiff the benefit of both projects, but how to do so. The 
law faces a choice: it may refuse to reduce the recovery by amounts 
that plaintiff could have avoided only by sacrificing other projects, thus 
permitting the plaintiff to continue with the project that has been flowing 
smoothly and confining the losses to the project the breaching party has 
jeopardized; or the law may compensate for the losses imposed on the 
180. Where this is not true, the seller can avoid paying consequential damages by 
showing that the plaintiff could not have completed the project even if the seller had 
performed. Since the expectation interest does not allow plaintiffs to achieve a position 
better than the one they would have achieved if the defendant had performed, the court 
will deny recovery of the damages independently of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
181. This may not accurately describe the case law. Some cases hint that the 
avoidable consequences doctrine will not require the plaintiff to pay more than a trivial 
amount to minimize the loss. See Unverzagt v. Young Builders, 215 So. 2d 823, 827 
(La. 1968) ( questioning whether $ 1000 "is such a nominal sum which a nondefaulting 
party should be required to expend to mitigate damages" and noting no precedent 
requiring expenditure of more than $200); Schneidt v. Absey Motors, 248 N.W.2d 792 
(N.D. 1976) ($1000 not a "trifling sum"). The cases seem to focus on the size of the 
expense rather than the reasonable availability of resources to meet the expense. The 
cases cited may simply misread the legal encyclopedias ( on which a surprising number 
of cases rely as authority for details concerning the avoidable consequences doctrine). 
See 15 AM. JUR. Damages§ 27 (1938) (plaintiff"is bound to protect himself if he can 
do so with reasonable exertion or trifling expense"). Subsequent editions qualified this 
proposition, stating that "trifling" may vary with the amount of the consequential losses 
that can be prevented and with the availability of funds to the plaintiff. See 22 AM. JUR. 
2D Damages§ 501 (1988); 25 C.J.S. Damages§ 33 (1966). 
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other portions of the buyer's business as a consequence of the breach. 
Courts, via the foreseeability doctrine, effectively choose the former 
alternative. Since the defendant arguably could not foresee that breach 
would lead a plaintiff to make extraordinary efforts to minimize the loss, 
resulting in consequential losses to other projects, courts probably will 
reject damages for those remote losses.182 Thus, when a plaintiff 
decides not to make extra efforts to minimize the loss, the expectation 
interest requires compensation for the full loss incurred. Courts can 
accomplish this by assessing the value of the benefit at the amount of 
loss that the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort, without 
regard to whether extraordinary efforts could have prevented even more 
of the loss. 
b. Unforeseen Losses 
The second possibility-the buyer who does not expect consequential 
losses------poses less difficulty. Consequential losses the buyer did not 
expect probably cannot be recovered regardless of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. The plaintiff cannot recover unforeseeable 
consequential damages. 183 In fact, the consequential losses must be 
foreseeable to the defendant at the time she enters the contract. If the 
plaintiff could not foresee the consequences at the time of breach, it 
seems implausible to conclude that "the seller at the time of contracting 
had reason to know" of them. 184 Thus, neither theory needs to explain 
182. In some cases the defendant might pay less damage if the court did not employ 
the foreseeability doctrine in this way. Assume the plaintiff accurately decides that she 
will suffer less loss by sacrificing another project in order to minimize the loss to the 
project the defendant's breach jeopardized. If the law precludes recovery of losses to 
the other project as unforeseeable, then the plaintiff may not take that action. If she 
recovers losses to the project defendant jeopardized (as well she might, since those direct 
losses are more likely to be foreseeable), she recovers more than she would have without 
the foreseeability bar. Nonetheless, opening lawsuits up to arguments about which 
project defendant actually harmed probably would consume more in litigation costs than 
it would save in these unusual situations. See Epstein, supra note 66. The opportunity 
for strategic behavior by plaintiffs, such as trying to link the worst project to a remote 
breach by the defendant, also urges caution. 
183. U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (1995). 
184. Id. The language of§ 2-715 permits one quibble that might challenge the 
conclusion here. It requires that the seller have reason to know of the buyer's "general 
or particular requirements and needs," not necessarily that she know that these needs will 
produce losses in the event of breach. Id. Theoretically, then, a seller could know of 
the buyer's needs even in a case where the buyer, at the time of breach, did not realize 
that those needs would involve losses unless she covered. That situation seems unlikely 
to arise in reality. In addition, it seems quite at odds with foreseeability as generally 
understood. Notice of the needs should permit the seller to recognize the importance of 
performance and take an appropriate level of precaution to ensure performance in 
accordance with those needs. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven Shavell, Information 
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these circumstances. While courts plausibly could invoke the avoidable 
consequences doctrine instead of foreseeability doctrine in this situation, 
mitigation is merely cumulative and unnecessary in order to achieve the 
result. Similarly, the foreseeability doctrine will produce this result even 
if expectation analysis fails to posit a benefit in these cases. 185 
Nothing in this Article will make unforeseeable consequential losses 
recoverable. 
This problem may conceal another possible objection. If the buyer 
underestimates the amount of consequential losses that the breach will 
cause, her decision to forgo mitigation reflects a benefit that exceeds the 
underestimate, not a benefit that exceeds the actual amount of conse-
quential losses that would have been prevented by cover. By using the 
loss avoidable by reasonable effort to estimate the value of the benefit 
to the buyer, this approach may assume too large a value for the benefit. 
The objection has already been discussed in connection with the seller's 
remedies. 186 Normal damage rules seem justified in conclusively 
presuming that the buyer's behavior accurately reflects the subjective 
value of the benefit. The buyer seems the best person to foresee and 
estimate the value of the project jeopardized by the seller's breach. 
Ordinarily we would expect any mistakes to be fairly small. 187 When 
and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 
7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 284,285 (1991). Arguably, that requires that the seller 
actually foresee the magnitude of the loss the buyer may suffer (at least within a 
reasonable range), since the amount of precaution reasonably necessary may vary with 
the amount of loss precaution will prevent. For example, White and Summers urge that 
even a defendant who can foresee (generally) that breach might cause the plaintiff to 
lose profits on resale might not be liable for "extra profits" plaintiff could have earned 
on an "unusually lucrative resale contract ... unless it had reason to know of that 
contract." JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT s. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ I 0-4 n.21 (3d ed. 1988). In situations where the defendant realistically should have 
realized the nature of the consequential losses the plaintiff would suffer, courts may not 
strictly require notice of the amount of the loss. Realistically, though, foreseeability 
requirements, however phrased, seem likely to prevent recovery of damages that the 
plaintiff herself could not foresee at the time of breach. 
185. Expectation analysis could resort to the presumption that the buyer did foresee 
consequences that she should have foreseen, in effect assuming a benefit equal to the 
losses she (objectively) could have avoided even though she (subjectively) did not 
foresee the loss and therefore did not make a subjective decision to retain the benefit of 
breach rather than minimizing the losses. The advantages of avoiding subjective inquiry 
in this context have been detailed elsewhere. See supra text accompanying notes 45-57. 
186. See supra note 63. 
187. If foreseeability limits the plaintiff to the amount of loss the defendant 
reasonably could foresee, then the plaintiff may not recover for these losses regardless 
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the buyer's mistake causes the presumption to reduce the value by more 
than the benefit, perhaps the buyer should bear the consequence of her 
mistake. That allocation of the burden of the error seems particularly 
important considering the possibility that buyers might intentionally seek 
to impose higher losses on the seller. If courts allow buyers who 
eschew reasonable mitigation efforts to excuse their decision based on 
their own poor judgment about the amount of loss they anticipated, they 
create an opportunity for buyers to externalize losses that should have 
been avoided in the first place. Taking into account the possibility of 
strategic behavior by litigants, a reasonable lawmaker would seem 
perfectly justified in adopting a rule ( estimating the benefit at the amount 
of loss that could have been avoided) rather than requiring independent 
inquiry into the size of the buyer's (subjective) expected benefit in each 
case. 188 
c. Moral Hazard 
The last possibility-the plaintiff intentionally allowing the loss to 
increase-borders on the irrational. No matter which rationale one 
prefers, the law clearly rejects recovery of damages the plaintiff could 
have avoided by reasonable efforts. Thus, a rational buyer has little 
incentive to allow damages to mount in the hope that doing so would 
exact a larger toll from the breaching party. A buyer unaware of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine might act in this way out of igno-
rance.189 A buyer aware of the doctrine must also hope that a jury will 
err and award more damages than she deserves. 190 In either event, the 
of the existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine or the benefits of the breach. 
In fact, the plaintiff would not raise this issue, since doing so virtually would concede 
the foreseeability defense. Since U.C.C. § 2-715 does not explicitly require that the 
amount of the loss be foreseeable, the discussion cannot rest on this point. U.C.C. § 2-
715 (1995). 
I 88. Dobbs argues that remedial rules often employ such generalizations. See 
DOBBS, supra note I 0, § 1.2, at 5. He identifies such generalizations at work in the 
benefits rule as applied to contract cases and notes the close similarities between this 
application and the avoidable consequences doctrine. Id. § 3.6, at 183. Thus, in 
tolerating this kind of general rule, this approach does not deviate from existing practice. 
189. Both ignorance and a desire to externalize the cost seem necessary to explain 
this behavior. A buyer unaware of the avoidable consequences doctrine nonetheless 
would cover or otherwise minimize the loss unless she had some reason to prefer 
incurring the loss and seeking to shift it to the defendant in litigation. That reason must 
overcome the time value of money (less any recoverable interest that our ignorant buyer 
expects to recover), the cost of litigation (including attorneys' fees, unless our ignorant 
buyer also believes those will be recoverable), and the possibility of an imperfect result 
to litigation ( either victory for the defendant or undercompensation of the loss). 
190. A buyer might externalize losses if the finder of fact either underestimates the 
amount of damages that could have been avoided by reasonable efforts or erroneously 
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decision not to avoid the loss does not seem to reflect a benefit to the 
vindictive buyer as a result of the breach. Rather, these possibilities 
challenge the assumption that the value of the benefit equals the amount 
that the buyer could have saved by covering. 
Again, a reasonable lawmaker concerned with benefits justifiably may 
resort to the presumption that the plaintiff's objective behavior reflects 
the subjective value of the benefit to her. Neither ignorance nor 
willfulness challenges the existence of the benefit. In each case, the 
buyer does not devote the time and effort necessary to cover or 
otherwise to avoid the loss. 191 In each case, the buyer saves the time 
and effort of completing work on the project for which the goods were 
ordered. 192 The expectation interest requires some accounting for those 
benefits. The buyer's motivation, at most, undercuts the inference 
regarding the amount of the benefit, not the existence of the benefit. 
The presumption seems a reasonable method of accounting for the 
benefit, even in this context. 193 The presumption may overestimate the 
value of the benefit in these cases, but that possibility does not 
necessarily require rejection of the presumption if it reaches appropriate 
results in most situations. 194 
The buyer who chooses to allow avoidable losses to occur may receive 
a different sort of benefit, the value of which exceeds the losses she 
could have avoided. The buyer seems to anticipate a r,sychological 
benefit of exacting vengeance from the breaching seller. 95 Although 
concludes that mitigation would have required unreasonable efforts. Even where the 
facts are close, the game seems irrational, since attorneys' fees are not recoverable in 
most contract cases. 
191. The buyer might go through the motions of attempting to cover in an effort to 
increase the chance that a factfinder will decide those efforts were reasonable and, 
therefore, award full damages without reduction for avoidable consequences. It seems 
unlikely that a buyer intent on not covering would devote the same energy to the search 
that she would devote if she really wanted to cover. 
192. Those savings accrue to the buyer because she does not cover. They exist 
regardless of the buyer's motivation for not covering. 
193. Plaintiffs do not present a sympathetic case by alleging that they were too 
ignorant or too vindictive for the presumption to apply to them. 
194. As an empirical matter, perhaps cases involving moral hazard outnumber cases 
in which the presumption of benefits produces appropriate results. I am disinclined to 
assume that this is true. 
195. The benefit discussed here is not actual vengeance, but the anticipated 
vengeance. The buyer has not chosen vengeance at the price of bearing the loss; the 
vengeance exists only if she does not bear the loss. But the possibility of vengeance 
seems worth the cost of the possibility of bearing the loss. The mere prospect of 
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not taking reasonable action to minimize the loss, the buyer expects (or 
hopes) that the damage award against the seller will cover the full loss 
anyway. The buyer who acts with an awareness of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine must anticipate some glee from exacting 
vengeance. She would not risk bearing the loss herself unless the 
benefit of externalizing it, multiplied by the probability of externalizing 
it, exceeded the avoidable portion of the loss, multiplied by the 
probability of bearing that cost herself. 196 Buyers who choose not to 
avoid the loss must attach great value to vengeance. 197 A presumption 
that the benefit exceeds the cost avoided seems acceptable in this 
context. 198 
vengeance benefits the buyer in a way (and to an extent) for which the buyer seems 
willing to pay (by accepting the risk of incurring avoidable losses). 
196. Lest the language be unclear, let me attempt a formula. The buyer may decide 
not to avoid the loss, despite reasonable means to avoid the loss, if V, x p >Lax (l-p). 
Where p is the probability that the factfinder will decide not to reduce the buyer's 
recovery under the avoidable consequences doctrine, v. represents the value to the buyer 
of hurting the breaching seller, and La represents the loss that the buyer could have 
avoided by reasonable efforts. Perhaps the formula should include, either within La or 
as a separate factor, the litigation cost necessary to succeed. At least part of that cost 
may be inevitable if the buyer would need to sue the seller in order to recover the 
unavoidable portion of the damages. Without the mitigation issue, the litigation costs 
might be lower, either because the lower claim would settle earlier or because the 
expense of litigation increases slightly with each additional issue that requires legal 
research or testimony from witnesses. At least the incremental cost seems chargeable 
within L., since the buyer could have avoided those fees by successful cover. 
197. If the buyer expects a 50-50 chance of persuading the factfinder not to reduce 
the recovery under the avoidable consequences doctrine, then we know the value of the 
benefit (the joy of hurting the seller) exceeds the cost she will bear if she does not 
succeed in shifting the loss. If the buyer expects less than a 50% chance to shift the 
loss, then the psychological benefit must exceed the loss she may bear by an even 
greater margin to make up for the relatively small chance of shifting the loss. If the 
buyer believes she probably can shift the loss to the seller, then we cannot conclude the 
benefit exceeds the avoidable loss. But a buyer aware of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine seems unlikely to expect to shift the loss to the seller more than half of the 
time. Again, unless our reasonable lawmaker wants finders of fact to accept and 
evaluate virtually unverifiable evidence of the buyer's perceived likelihood that the jury 
would reduce the award based on the avoidable consequences doctrine, the law cannot 
separate those cases where the buyer received an actual psychological benefit exceeding 
the loss from those where she did not. 
198. I have avoided suggesting that other policy goals might urge the same result 
in order to keep the benefit theory independent (to the extent possible) of concerns for 
minimizing wasteful conduct and other motivations traditionally associated with the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. These policies might play a secondary role with 
respect to the choice between a presumption and individualized factfinding without 
jeopardizing that independence. If that seems plausible, the argument on all three issues 
in this section becomes much easier. The law might prefer not to encourage laziness, 
ignorance, or vindictiveness by allowing persons with such motives an opportunity to 
rebut a presumption that applies generally to plaintiffs who do not suffer these character 
traits (or flaws). Because reliance on these policies might pollute the benefit analysis, 
the text will continue to avoid those explanations. 
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The psychological benefit postulated here does not fit into the model 
perfectly. The opportunity for vengeance does not resemble the usual 
benefit of the breach. Yes, but for the breach, the buyer would not have 
an opportunity for vengeance. But by the same token, but for the 
breach, the buyer would not have a taste for vengeance (against the 
seller, at least). Vengeance would not be a benefit at all. This is not 
like a buyer who, ex ante, might have pursued either of two ventures, 
each with a potential benefit, and now finds herself with an opportunity 
to pursue the road not taken initially. This is a new taste, created by the 
breach. It seems odd to use as a benefit fulfillment of a taste that the 
breach created, even though the breach simultaneously created the 
opportunity to pursue that taste. 
On the other hand, the buyer's joy in anticipating large damages 
against the seller would not exist if the contract had been performed. 
Thus, to allow the buyer to retain this glee without any offset in the 
damage award would leave the buyer better off than if the contract had 
been performed. In effect, this analysis asks that we take into account 
all benefits, not just those benefits that fit the normal commercial 
mold. 199 This resembles a proposition rejected in the tort context: that 
we should offset actual pecuniary losses by calculating incommensurable 
nonpecuniary benefits.200 The likelihood of excessive offset seems 
199. The same reasoning might suggest that the law should compensate for all costs, 
including psychological costs arising ftom the breach. See Pettit, supra note 6, at 419-20 
& n.9 (concluding that measurement problems preclude awards for disappointment). In 
some cases, contract law will compensate for emotional distress. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979) (denying recovery unless the breach caused 
bodily injury or was "of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a 
particularly likely result"). The foreseeability standard in this section is both looser and 
stricter than the normal foreseeability rule: looser in that it seems to involve what the 
breacher can foresee at the time of the breach, since the characteristics of the breach 
allow recovery for emotional distress, but see DOBBS, supra note 9, § 12.3 (suggesting 
that foreseeability restricts emotional distress because the defendant's promise did not 
include a guaranty against distress); stricter in that emotional distress must seem 
particularly likely, which may demand more than just "a probable result." See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1979). The limitation to serious 
emotional distress seems likely to prevent claims for mere disappointment. The degree 
to which this type of recovery may expand in the future has recently been addressed 
elsewhere. Douglas J. Whaley, Paying for the Agony: The Recovery of Emotional 
Distress Damages in Contract Actions, 26 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 935 (1992). 
200. When the law expressly takes benefits into account, it normally refuses to mix 
pecuniary and nonpecuniary components of the harm and the benefit. Thus, the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts subtracts benefits only if they affect the same interest as 
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controlled in this context. Instead of asking the jury to assess how much 
distress an individual suffered or how much glee she felt in the abstract, 
we simply assume the glee equalled or exceeded an objectively 
observable quantity: the amount of loss the plaintiff could have avoided 
by reasonable efforts.201 
The buyer unaware of the doctrine poses a different problem. She 
does not realize that she risks suffering this loss herself. 202 Thus, the 
assertion that the psychological benefit offsets the loss falters. But the 
law encounters difficulty treating the ignorant buyer differently from the 
malicious buyer. In part the problem is evidentiary. Courts cannot 
distinguish the ignorant from the malicious with any ease.203 Thus, 
different treatment may permit the malicious to pretend to be merely 
ignorant in order to take advantage of different treatment.204 Public 
policy points the same direction. The law does not want to encourage 
ignorance by rewarding it. Thus, a rule presuming that the ignorant 
received benefits like the malicious might encourage informed behavior. 
Opening the door to individualized evaluation of benefits--here or in 
other contexts--poses serious dangers. Objective measures avoid absurd 
results. For instance, a buyer who retained $70,000 of the purchase 
price could not be allowed to claim she valued the money at less than 
$70,000 (despite evidence that the marginal utility of money may vary 
among people). Nor could a seller who retained property demonstrably 
worth $70,000 be allowed to make such a claim. Even if either party 
the interest harmed. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 920 (1977). "Interests" may 
not divide pecuniary from nonpecuniary harms, see Alexander M. Capron, Tort Liability 
in Genetic Counselling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 638-39 & n.91 (1979), though that 
seems the better reading of the Restatement provisions. See Kelly, supra note 53, at 521 
& n.73; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 cmt. b, illus. 4-6 (1977). This can 
prevent intangible and incalculable benefits (such as emotional benefits) from obliterating 
substantial and certain pecuniary losses. 
20 I. The door to measuring distress might better be left uncracked. Yet the two 
contexts differ sufficiently to permit the different applications urged here. 
202. In effect, her ignorance of the avoidable consequences doctrine leads her to 
expect to recover the avoidable losses I 00% of the time, perhaps the most plausible 
example of a person who might estimate the chance of shifting the loss at greater than 
50%. 
203. See supra note 47. 
204. Perhaps if the law develops a perfect method of finding facts, including facts 
regarding a party's subjective state of mind, this concern will disappear. Those with 
absolute faith in the jury systelfr--Or those willing to pretend such faith because they 
share the prejudices juries are likely to exhibit----may prefer to open these issues to the 
jury. Today, the avoidable consequences doctrine does not present these issues, since 
it imposes a duty on the plaintiff to minimize the loss-----a duty ignorance does not 
excuse. The expectation interest can perpetuate that result via the presumption urged 
here, which establishes the thesis of this Article. Whether the courts should open the 
issue of intent up to factfinding after they accept this thesis, I will leave for others to 
discuss when that day comes. 
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showed they traded the money or property for a stick of chewing gum 
(or any other thing worth much less than $70,000), the subsequent 
conduct of the party does not change the value of the benefit actually 
bestowed by the breach. Demonstrating that the other party could have 
reduced the loss by $70,000 if she had engaged in reasonable conduct 
requires the same treatment. Prospectively, viewed at the time of the 
breach, the plaintiff gained an opportunity not previously available to use 
resources (undelivered goods, services, property, money, productive 
capacity, or the like) in alternative ways to offset the loss. What she 
actually does with those resources is irrelevant. At the time of the 
breach, they have value. That value belongs to the plaintiff; the breach 
relinquished the defendant's claim upon the resources. That plaintiff's 
mistakes might lead her to underutilize those resources is not legally 
significant. It resembles any other decision by a party to pay too much 
( or to ask too little) for one's property. 
In each case, a reasonable lawmaker concerned with accounting for the 
benefits seems justified in employing an objective rather than a 
subjective analysis. When asking why the buyer would decide not to 
take reasonable measures that would have minimized the loss, the law 
reasonably can presume that the decision reflects some benefit the buyer 
valued more highly than the loss she incurred by not covering, or 
otherwise minimizing, the harm from the breach. While that presump-
tion does not perfectly explain every individual's subjective reaction, it 
explains the most plausible cases quite adequately and can justify its 
deviation in the exceptional cases. 
3. Summary 
The avoidable consequences doctrine duplicates the results the 
expectation interest would require if courts consciously addressed the 
benefits that flow from breach of contract. Thus, courts could refocus 
their attention from concern for the losses the plaintiff could have 
avoided to the benefits the plaintiff actually received. Those benefits 
often may require indirect measurement by reference to the losses that 
could have been avoided. In addition, courts may need to adopt 
pnisumptions that the plaintiff acted reasonably in order to avoid 
entanglement in unmanageable subjective valuations. The expectation 
interest does not require courts to open the door for plaintiffs to pretend 
their subjective value differed from the value their conduct implies. 
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Rather than encourage vindictive plaintiffs to hope for erroneous 
judgments or manipulative plaintiffs to seek post hoc rationalizations for 
their wasteful conduct, courts can encourage plaintiffs to become 
informed and to act rationally to minimize waste by employing a 
conclusive presumption that breach benefits the plaintiff in at least the 
amount that the plaintiff could have avoided losing with reasonable 
effort. 
This brief survey of contractual contexts cannot encompass all of the 
different ways contracts might be breached and avoidable consequences 
might be raised as a defense.205 But in each of the contexts discussed, 
the general principles sketched at the outset have similar and analogous 
applications. That result should not surprise anyone. Wonnell has 
demonstrated quite convincingly that the same fundamental principles 
govern all contracts.206 The generality of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine may exceed Wonnell 's claim, since the avoidable consequences 
doctrine also applies to noncontractual actions. While one may find 
cases that do not conform neatly to the paradigms offered here, the range 
of cases explainable by the expectation interest suggests a realistic 
generality to its ability to duplicate the results produced by the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. In fact, the generality may extend beyond the 
realm of contract law and into tort law--but that requires a different 
article. 
II. THE INDEPENDENCE OF BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
The analysis in Part I depends on the inference that the amount of loss 
the plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable effort approximates the 
value of the benefits the plaintiff received as a result of the breach. That 
inference, in tum, depends on the conclusion that a plaintiff who could 
avoid losses by reasonable effort would do so absent some benefit she 
valued more highly. That conclusion, however, may depend on the 
existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine, creating a chicken/egg 
problem. If the benefit analysis proposed here must assume the 
existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine in order to explain how 
that doctrine actually estimates the benefits of breach, then benefit 
analysis lacks any independent significance. This section explores the 
independence of benefit analysis. 
To demonstrate the problem, imagine a world in which the avoidable 
consequences doctrine does not exist. Assume that the law awards 
205. Additional illustrations could be presented, but would simply serve to lengthen 
an already ponderous article. 
206. Wonnell, supra note 31, at 493-94. 
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plaintiffs in contract cases their expectation interest-including incidental 
damages and an offset for any losses actually avoided--but does not 
offset any amount for losses that the plaintiff could have avoided but did 
not avoid. 
In this world, the plaintiff's failure to avoid losses does not imply that 
she valued a benefit of the breach more than the reasonably avoidable 
loss. The plaintiff will receive her full expectation regardless of whether 
she actually avoids the loss. If she does not avoid the loss, she receives 
payment in full from the defendant. If she does avoid part of the loss, 
she receives the same total amount, but less of it comes from the 
defendant.207 As a result, if the benefit of the breach exceeds zero, the 
plaintiff will refrain from avoiding the loss. For example, a seller of 
goods might decide to keep the goods rather than resell them as long as 
she valued them more than zero. Even a $1 value would leave the 
plaintiff better off than if she resold the goods, since she can keep the 
$1 if she does not resell, but will lose it (via a lower damage award) if 
she does resell. Similarly, even if a discharged employee attached 
virtually no value to leisure, any positive value would induce the 
employee to refrain from substitute work. If she takes substitute work, 
she receives her expected pay (part from new employment, part from 
damages) plus zero leisure; if she remains idle, she receives her expected 
pay (entirely from damages) plus a small value of leisure.208 
The argument does not attack the existence of a benefit. The decision 
not to minimize the loss demonstrates that the plaintiff did value the 
benefit more than zero. Thus, courts applying the expectation interest 
logically should seek a means to evaluate that benefit and offset it 
against the recovery. But the inference that the plaintiff values the 
benefit as much as or more than the amount of loss she could have 
avoided no longer follows. It might be true, but one cannot demonstrate 
its truth in any particular case without independent evidence. Without 
this inference, the courts arguably could not generate the avoidable 
consequences doctrine as a means of estimating the benefits of breach. 
Instead, the court would need to examine evidence of the value of the 
207. Wonnell refers to this as a 100% tax on the savings. Id. He also points out 
that various exceptions to the avoidable consequences doctrine can create the same 
incentives under existing law. Id. at 494-95. 
208. The need to eat every day, rather than in the long run, may preclude employees 
from actually pursuing this option. See id. at 494-96. 
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benefit or, if such evidence was not available, ignore the benefit for 
failure of proof. 
The inference that the benefit equals the amount of avoidable loss 
remains valid in a world that applies the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. If courts offset the award by the amount of the loss the 
plaintiff could have avoided, the plaintiff will not recover her full 
expectation unless she makes reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. 
In that situation, she will not refrain from reasonable efforts unless the 
advantage of refraining (the benefit she expects from not continuing to 
perform) exceeds the amount of loss she can avoid----a point discussed 
in agonizing detail above. Thus, at least initially, the inference appears 
to depend on the prior existence of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
The benefit analysis proposed here would retain some importance even 
if we ultimately concluded that it depends on the prior existence of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. At the very least, this Article 
identifies an additional, previously unrecognized function that the 
avoidable consequences doctrine performs. In the future, discussion 
about how to apply the avoidable consequences doctrine would need to 
consider not only the purpose of preventing waste, but also the purpose 
of offsetting any benefit of the breach. In addition, the analysis here 
reconciles the avoidable consequences doctrine to the expectation 
interest. Instead of seeing the avoidable consequences doctrine as an 
exception to expectation recoveries, we can recognize how the two 
doctrines work hand in hand to produce the position the plaintiff would 
have occupied if the defendant had performed. In short, our understand-
ing of the law and its workings improves once we recognize this subtle 
role the avoidable consequences doctrine plays in contract remedies. 
As the title of this Article implies, however, I hope to establish a more 
ambitious claim: that we could dispense with the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine. This section will approach that task in two ways. First, the 
inference at issue here is self-justifying. Once the law proclaims that the 
award will be offset by avoidable losses, the inference arises. The law 
can dispense with the original reason for offsetting avoidable losses 
without undercutting the inference, as long as the law continues to offset 
avoidable losses against the recovery. Thus, whatever the historical 
origin of the decision to offset the award by avoidable losses, the law 
could dispense with the avoidable consequences doctrine and ground the 
offset entirely on the benefits. 
Perhaps more satisfying, this Article also will argue that the common 
law could have developed the offset of avoidable losses even if it never 
developed the avoidable consequences doctrine. This conclusion 
eliminates the chicken/egg problem, arguing that the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine logically need not precede the inference regarding the 
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value of the benefit. In order to establish this point, the Article will 
introduce a new wrinkle to the expectation interest: the natural harm 
caused by the breach. Natural harm seeks to distinguish those losses 
caused by the breach from those caused by the combination of the 
breach and the availability of a damage remedy. Losses the plaintiff 
would not have suffered if the law provided no remedy seem an artifact 
of the legal system rather than a loss defendants must compensate. A 
common-law court might choose to implement the expectation interest 
in a manner designed to remedy the natural harm caused by the breach, 
without remedying the part of the harm created by reliance on the 
availability of damages. If so, the court could have generated the offset 
for benefits, as measured by the amount of avoidable loss, even if the 
court ignored concerns for minimizing waste. The chicken/egg dilemma 
may disappear once courts recognize the artificial set of incentives 
introduced by the availability of damages. 
A. The Superfluous Avoidable Consequences Doctrine 
The chicken/egg problem identified above implies that the courts could 
not have created an offset for the amount ofreasonably avoidable losses 
without referring to concerns for minimizing waste or other principles 
underlying the avoidable consequences doctrine. Going forward, 
however, the law could dispense with all concern for waste without 
changing the offset for avoidable losses. The existence of the offset has 
created circumstances that justify the inference that the plaintiff must 
value the benefit more than the amount of loss she could avoid by 
reasonable effort. Because courts do subtract the amount of avoidable 
loss, the plaintiff who chooses not to take reasonable measures that 
would reduce the loss must value some benefit of breach more than the 
amount of avoidable loss. As long as the law continues to subtract the 
amount of avoidable loss, the inference continues to hold. Thus, the law 
could dispense with all reference to the avoidable consequences doctrine 
without changing any case results. By changing the explanation for the 
offset, but continuing to measure the offset in the same way, the law can 
implement the lessons of benefit analysis and dispense with the concept 
of avoidable consequences. 
Two objections to this explanation immediately arise. First, it smacks 
of ipse dixit. The inference (that the amount of avoidable loss equals 
the benefit of the breach) works because we subtract the avoidable losses 
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from recovery; we do not subtract the avoidable loss because the 
inference works. The argument appears to suggest that the law should 
impose an offset that lacks any prior justification209 simply in order to 
justify an inference that it otherwise could not make. Second, saying we 
can dispense with the rationale for the avoidable consequences doctrine 
does not establish that we should dispense with it. Since minimizing 
waste has some value to society, there seems no intrinsic benefit to 
dispensing with that rationale for the offset. 
The full response to the second objection must await Part III. The law 
might not be any worse off if it subtracted avoidable losses in order to 
discourage waste than if it subtracted avoidable losses in order to 
account for benefits of the breach. The effort to establish the indepen-
dence of benefit analysis is not born of antipathy to the goal of 
minimizing waste. But Part III will suggest that existing rationales for 
the avoidable consequences doctrine leave the doctrine in an uncomfort-
able position. They fail to explain some very useful assertions about the 
doctrine. Specifically, existing rationales do not explain why the 
plaintiff does not have a duty to minimize the loss or why the doctrine 
is not simply a manifestation of contributory negligence.210 
The expectation interest can explain these assertions about the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. If benefit analysis remains parasitic 
upon the avoidable consequences doctrine, however, benefit analysis 
seems to take a back seat to the primary rationale for the doctrine. 
Benefit analysis, instead of offering a powerful explanation of the law, 
offers an interesting side effect that may or may not deserve consider-
ation when deciding how to apply the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
Explanations of the doctrine based only on the secondary rationale may 
not have sufficient power to displace the concepts of duty and contribu-
tory negligence. 
Benefit analysis seems more likely to generate improvements in the 
application of the avoidable consequences doctrine if it can explain the 
doctrine independently, without falling back on the justifications that 
have tied the doctrine so closely to contributory negligence. If normal 
damage rules can generate the offset without reference to the avoidable 
consequences doctrine or its underlying rationale, then benefit analysis 
can claim an equal footing with the existing rationales for the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. Thus, this section seeks to establish that we can 
dispense with further reference to the avoidable consequences doctrine, 
209. The avoidable consequences doctrine has other justifications, but I can hardly 
rely on those justifications in explaining why we can dispense with them. 
210. Commentators offer explanations for these points, but Part III argues that those 
explanations are not persuasive. 
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but not necessarily that we should do so. Once that has been accom-
plished, we can assess whether benefit analysis can improve the 
application of the avoidable consequences doctrine without fear that the 
weakness of the proposition will undercut its usefulness. 
The first objection-that the inference is ipse dixit-reflects intellectu-
al uneasiness more than logical concern. The inference is the effect of 
the offset, not its cause. We can infer that the benefit equals the amount 
of the avoidable loss only because we decree an offset in damage 
recoveries; the decree provides parties the incentive to minimize the loss, 
upon which we base the inference that the failure to mitigate must reflect 
a benefit. Since the offset must exist (apparently for other reasons) 
before the inference becomes valid, it seems odd to tum the table---to 
treat the effect ( the inference) as the reason ( or cause) for its own 
continued existence, even if we dispense with the original cause or 
reason. 
The phenomenon is familiar in the law. Doctrines often outlive their 
original purpose. Punitive damages once served to compensate for 
emotional distress, which was not compensable at the time.211 That 
rationale no longer applies. Yet punitive damages persist. The law has 
discovered other uses for them. Perhaps, however, punitive damages 
survive because they serve a new underlying purpose, not merely 
because the law declares that they survive. 
A closer analogy arises in the doctrine of consideration. Consideration 
originated based on just this kind of self-fulfilling declaration. At one 
time the law refused to enforce promises exchanged for other promises 
until one party had performed, at least in part. Until one party had 
begun to perform, the other party had not received anything in exchange 
for the promise. In other words, no consideration existed until the party 
had received part of the performance; receiving the promise itself was 
not consideration.212 
If a promise itself has value, of course, then merely giving a promise 
in exchange for another promise may constitute consideration. A 
promise has value if it is enforceable.213 Thus, if a court could decree 
211. See, e.g., Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive 
Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12-20 (1982). 
212. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 1.5, at 15. 
213. A promise can have value even if it is not enforceable. As a moral obligation 
or a chance that the other party will perform despite the absence of legal coercion, 
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the return promise enforceable, then it would be consideration for the 
promise. Each party's promise would be enforceable from the moment 
it was made if the other party's promise were enforceable from the 
moment it was made. The circularity should sound familiar: we could 
subtract the amount of avoidable loss based on the inference that the 
benefit of the breach equals the amount of avoidable loss, an inference 
that is justified if we subtract the amount of the avoidable loss. 
The law surmounted that problem and today declares that a promise 
can be consideration for a promise.214 But how the law got here from 
there remains somewhat cloudy. One suspects a self-fulfilling declara-
tion. Once the court declares that promise-for-promise does satisfy the 
requirement of consideration, then promises have value and, therefore, 
they do satisfy the requirement of consideration. We might express 
some intellectual discomfort with the process by which the law reached 
this point.215 Yet the result presents no problem going forward.216 
An enforceable promise does have value. Something that has value, 
including an enforceable promise, can be consideration for another 
promise. Prospectively, the propositions justify the result, even if they 
might not have justified the result at the time the courts originally 
announced the result. 
The same paradox exists here; the same way out is available. In a 
world that did not offset awards by the amount of avoidable loss, we 
might not infer that the plaintiff valued benefits of breach more than the 
amount of loss she could have avoided.217 But once a court declared 
that it would subtract the amount of avoidable loss from the recovery, 
a rational plaintiff would minimize the loss unless the benefits of the 
breach exceeded the avoidable loss. Thus, the inference would become 
true after the decree, even though it was not true before the decree. 
Going forward from that point, courts could evaluate the benefits of the 
people might attach value to unenforceable promises and even be willing to pay for 
them. That explanation, however, has not been reported as the rationale for moving 
from nudum pactum to promise-for-promise. In a day when consideration needed to be 
adequate in order to justify enforcement, the mere possibility that the other party might 
perform out of personal integrity seems unlikely to have produced the consideration 
courts demanded. 
214. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§§ 71, 75. 
215. Farnsworth notes the circularity of the explanation. FARNSWORTH, supra note 
2, § 1.6, at 17. 
2 I 6. I do not mean to discount concerns that the law should not enforce promises 
until some reliance has occurred. See, e.g., PATRICK s. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL 
OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 1-7 ( I 979). But we have no trouble explaining to our 
students that an enforceable promise has value and, thus, can be consideration for 
another promise even before either promise has been performed. 
217. Part 11.B, infra, argues that we could still draw the inference. 
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breach based on the amount of the avoidable loss. The decree creates 
its own rationale. 
This Article need not urge courts to take a step that would not be 
justified until after they took it. Courts have already taken the first step; 
they already reduce damage awards by the amount of loss that the 
plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable efforts. Thus, the most 
uncomfortable portion of the process--the initial decree without a priori 
justification--has already occurred.218 The inference, thus, is valid. 
Going forward, we can continue to offset awards as a necessary step to 
prevent overcompensation under the expectation interest. We could 
continue to offset awards, even ifwe concluded that there was no public 
policy to discourage waste. The expectation interest, refined to include 
an account for benefits of the breach, would justify the continued 
application of the offset, even if it never could have justified the offset's 
initial application. 
This section hopes to have established that we can dispense with all 
references to the avoidable consequences doctrine without changing the 
outcome of cases now decided under the rubric of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. One could try to squeeze more import out of the 
argument, seeking to establish that the common law would have 
generated this offset independently of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine. Common law courts apparently were willing to take a step that 
lacked advance justification, but that would be justified once taken. 
Such a court could create the offset for avoidable losses based entirely 
on the expectation interest. The next section, however, hopes to 
establish a more persuasive basis for that conclusion--one that does not 
rest on the assumption that a court would be willing to take self-
justifying action. 
B. Generating the Offset Without the Avoidable 
Consequences Doctrine 
This section requires that we step into a hypothetical world in which 
the law has decided to employ the expectation interest as the remedy in 
218. To the extent that the avoidable consequences doctrine has independent 
grounds for its existence, such as discouraging waste, the courts may have had an a 
priori justification for the decree. That eliminates the discomfort associated with that 
first step, but does not alter the validity of the second step. 
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contract cases, but has not yet decided whether to reduce damage awards 
by amounts that plaintiffs could have avoided by reasonable efforts. A 
reasonable lawmaker might first consider whether the decision to employ 
the expectation interest required or, at least, favored the reduction of 
awards by the amount of loss avoidable. 
The concern for benefits of the breach represents one consideration 
that might influence the decision to deny recovery of losses that the 
plaintiff could have avoided by reasonable efforts. Failure to account for 
those benefits (when they exist) would overcompensate the plaintiff, 
leaving her better off than if the defendant had performed the contract. 
As already noted, however, the inference that the plaintiff values the 
benefits of breach at least as much as the amount of avoidable losses 
would not necessarily follow from her decision not to avoid those losses. 
If we posit a lawmaker creating a new system of rules before any 
conduct governed by them has occurreci--,i realistic prospect in creating 
a new civil code----perhaps the lawmaker could simply choose a rule that 
produced the appropriate inference, as suggested in the preceding 
section. Instead, let us consider a common-law judge ruling on the issue 
as a matter of first impression: no one has decided whether to subtract 
avoidable losses because no one has ever decided a case where the 
defendant proved the plaintiff failed to take reasonable action to avoid 
part of the loss. How should the reasonable common-law judge decide 
the case? 
The expectation interest provides a well-defined target for the judge: 
the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had 
performed (her rightful position).219 To state the matter another way, 
the expectation interest requires the court to award the difference 
between the plaintiff's rightful position and the position the plaintiff 
would have occupied if the defendant had breached. The rephrasing 
expresses a previously implicit aspect of the expectation interest. It is 
not sufficient, in awarding damages, to specify the target; one must also 
specify the baseline. Only then can the court measure the distance 
between the two points and calculate an award sufficient to span that 
distance. 
The rephrasing uses a curious construction to identify the baseline: 
"the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had 
breached." The defendant did breach; otherwise the court would not 
219. The "rightful position" is Douglas Laycock's convenient shorthand for the 
position the plaintiff would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred. LAYCOCK, 
supra note 2, at 15. When discussing the expectation interest, the rightful position 
becomes the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed 
the contract--the target we seek to achieve. 
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need to calculate a remedy. Thus, the award arguably can be calculated 
based on the difference between the rightful position and the position the 
plaintiff now occupies. In effect, the position the plaintiff would have 
occupied if the defendant had breached can be equated to the position 
the plaintiff does occupy following the defendant's breach. The actual 
position substitutes for the hypothetical position, lending certainty to the 
factfinding at that end of the spectrum.220 
The expectation interest, however, does not dictate that substitution. 
Expectation dictates the target, not the baseline. Thus, calculations of 
the expectation interest can take into account other variables that might 
make the position the plaintiff now occupies different from the position 
the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had breached. 
Specifically, this section will explore the significance of the position the 
plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had breached and no 
damage recovery was available to the plaintiff. 
"Natural harm" is a phrase that aptly describes the difference between 
the plaintiff's rightful position (the position the plaintiff would have 
occupied if the defendant had performed) and the position she would 
have occupied if the defendant had breached and no damage recovery 
was available to the plaintiff. That difference measures the harm that 
would have occurred in the state of nature, uninfluenced by the existence 
of legal institutions and damage awards. If the plaintiff's actual position 
differs from the position she would have occupied if the breach had 
occurred in this state of nature, our reasonable lawmaker might consider 
whether the difference exists because the law introduced some artificial 
incentive that has exaggerated the amount of harm the plaintiff suffered. 
A reasonable lawmaker might devote some attention to the concept of 
natural harm. The law seeks to remedy the loss caused by the 
breach.221 Losses that would not have resulted from the breach if no 
220. Uncertainty may affect the calculation at the other end, as when the evidence 
does not reveal precisely what would have occurred if the defendant had performed. But 
at least the court can determine with precision the situation that does exist. 
221. While causation is not always mentioned as an element of contract damages, 
it is implicit in the expectation interest. Losses that had causes independent of the 
breach-----that would have occurred even if the defendant had performed--are not 
included in recoveries. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 12. I, at 841. The 
target-the position the plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had per-
formed--will be lower when some losses would have occurred despite the breach. 
Given the origins of contract law in tort law, Id. § 1.6, it should not surprise anyone to 
find that causation plays a role in contract actions. 
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damage award had existed seem somewhat tenuously linked to the 
breach, just as losses that would have resulted even if the defendant had 
performed have little connection to the breach. Even when the plaintiff 
actually did suffer the loss----that is, she actually occupies a position 
worse than the one used to calculate natural harm------the decision to hold 
the defendant liable for the difference between the natural harm and the 
actual harm requires some justification. The lawmaker can award the 
amount of natural harm without much discussion. Any amount in excess 
of natural harm requires more deliberation. 
The natural harm will not include any amounts that the plaintiff could 
have avoided by reasonable efforts. If no damage recovery is available, 
a rational plaintiff will make reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. 
Any losses she does not avoid will fall on her, providing ample incentive 
to minimize losses whenever reasonably possible. 
That incentive will not produce mitigation efforts if the plaintiff 
received benefits from the breach that offset the losses she could have 
avoided. If she valued goods retained more than the market valued 
them, she might retain them rather than minimize her loss by reselling 
to another. If she valued leisure more than the market valued her labor, 
she might not take alternative employment despite the availability of 
other work. If she had other more valuable projects available, she might 
not cover with substitute goods despite her ability to prevent consequen-
tial losses by doing so. But when the loss would not be borne by the 
defendant, she would not refrain from reasonable efforts to minimize the 
loss unless she anticipated some benefit that would offset more of the 
loss. 
Thus, a court focused on natural harm could draw the inference 
proposed in Part I of this Article: that the plaintiff valued the benefits 
of breach at least as much as she valued the amount of loss that she 
could have avoided by reasonable efforts.222 Natural harm excludes 
222. Transaction costs might intercede here. A plaintiff who could not obtain a 
remedy would not choose to avoid the loss if the benefit of breach equalled the amount 
of loss avoided minus the cost to avoid the loss. Thus, the law can only infer that the 
plaintiff valued the benefit as much as the net amount of avoidable loss. Without a 
damage remedy, transaction costs will not drop out of the equation. Yet this still 
matches the result the avoidable consequences doctrine produces. Even if a plaintiff 
does not actually incur incidental costs in an effort to minimize the loss, the law will 
subtract the amount of loss she could have avoided minus the cost to avoid that loss. 
See DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 271. Dobbs suggests that this application is not 
firmly established. One can imagine reasons the law might want to allow recovery of 
incidental damages that the plaintiff did incur, but to penalize plaintiffs who did not 
attempt to minimize the loss by denying recovery (or offset) for the costs they would 
have incurred if they had made reasonable efforts. Nothing in the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine, however, suggests a punitive purpose. The doctrine limits the damage award 
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The plaintiff might urge a different result in one of two ways. First, 
the plaintiff might object to the concept of natural harm, urging that the 
actual harm provides the proper baseline for measuring damages. 
Second, the plaintiff might attempt to explain reasons that she would not 
have minimized the harm even if no remedy was available. Neither 
prospect seems particularly likely to succeed-except to the extent that 
the latter prospect persuades a court that the plaintiff did in fact take 
reasonable measures to minimize the loss.223 
The argument in favor of actual harm as opposed to natural harm must 
first establish that actual harm differs from natural harm. Actual harm 
has some initial appeal. A plaintiff left worse off than if the contract 
had been performed seems relatively more deserving than a breaching 
defendant. But the law cannot easily assume an award of natural harm 
would leave the plaintiff worse off than if the contract had been 
performed. If the plaintiff really did receive benefits that exceeded the 
avoidable losses, actual harm equals (or may even be less than) natural 
harm. Thus, the mere fact that the plaintiff has not avoided losses that 
she could have avoided by reasonable efforts does not establish an actual 
harm different from natural harm. Sympathy for the injured victim 
seems premature until we can assess the extent of the injury.224 
against the defendant to the amount that would have been assessed if the plaintiff had 
made reasonable efforts to minimize the loss. The cost of those efforts would have been 
included in the target damage award. The avoidable consequences doctrine provides no 
reason to award a plaintiff less than she would have received if she had made reasonable 
efforts. 
223. In effect, this transforms the second argument into reasons that the measures 
she could have taken to minimize the loss were unreasonably risky, burdensome, or 
humiliating. When the plaintiffs explanation takes this form, it does not really reject 
the inference, but the application of the inference to the facts of a given case. The court 
could still infer that the failure to take reasonable efforts revealed a benefit of the 
breach. By explaining the unreasonableness of the efforts under discussion, the plaintiff 
avoids the conclusion without challenging the rationale for the inference. 
224. One might argue that uncertainty should be resolved against the breaching 
defendant. See Bigelow v. RKO Pictures, 327 U.S. 251 (1946). Even Bigelow, 
however, conceded that the fact of damage must be certain in order to support recovery. 
Earlier doctrine insisted that damages must be certain "both in their nature and in respect 
to the cause from which they proceed." See SEDGWICK, supra note 10, at 23. While 
it is clear that the natural harm proceeds from the defendant's breach, that is not as 
certain for any additional harms claimed. The certainty doctrine exists largely to compel 
the plaintiff to overcome uncertainty before the court allows recovery. Modem 
application, while somewhat more generous in formulating a requirement of reasonable 
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Efforts to demonstrate that actual harm exceeds natural harm edge into 
the second category of arguments. Each argument the plaintiff raises to 
demonstrate that she did not receive a benefit faces an immediate 
inquiry: "Why, then, didn't you take reasonable efforts to reduce the 
harm?" Substantive arguments that the goods, leisure, or alternative 
projects lacked value may never be conclusive until an explanation of 
the failure to reduce the loss occurs.225 
Explanations for the decision not to reduce the loss, however, seem 
rather difficult to devise. The obvious choice is moral hazard: the 
plaintiff may claim that she did not minimize the loss because she 
expected the defendant to pay without her having to minimize the loss. 
That argument, however, steps slightly outside the hypothetical. We 
posited this case as one of first impression: no court has yet decided 
whether to compensate for losses incurred when the plaintiff could have 
avoided them by reasonable efforts. Thus, the plaintiff had no justifica-
tion for believing that she could recover these losses. This makes the 
plaintiff's explanation unlikely, in the sense that few plaintiffs seem 
likely to have made a conscious choice not to minimize the loss based 
on a projection that they would recover the full amount in the damage 
award. But the argument is not impossible to credit; a plaintiff may 
have made this mistake. The mistake does differentiate natural harm 
from actual harm: the plaintiff would not have made this mistake in a 
world where no damage recovery was possible.226 
Other mistakes might explain the same result. The plaintiff may have 
mistakenly believed that reasonable efforts would not have minimized 
certainty, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1979), hardly justifies 
reversing the obligation to overcome uncertainty. 
225. The defendant seems ill-positioned to present evidence that the plaintiff really 
did attach substantial value to goods, leisure, or alternative projects. These values (and 
the alternative projects themselves) seem peculiarly within the knowledge of the plaintiff. 
Thus, the suspicion that we simply cannot discover the real benefit remains to undermine 
the argument that no such benefits exist. 
226. The explanation might go further: the mistake would be entirely reasonable 
if the background assumptions in the community or the business included the assumption 
that the breaching party would pay the entire loss, including losses the plaintiff could 
have avoided. That the law had not considered the issue before is not necessarily an 
indication that the issue had not been considered and resolved in numerous dealings 
among people. A common-law court faced with evidence of conventional practice in the 
community would seem likely to embody that practice in the discovered law. Perhaps 
the common law's reluctance to ask landowners to seek new tenants following a breach 
was not based on the unique nature of interests in land, but an underlying assumption 
that breaching parties should pay the full actual loss, moral hazard notwithstanding. 
While I have not researched the business mores of the period when the avoidable 
consequences doctrine originated, I have some doubt about the realism of this 
assumption. The law's reluctance to apply the same rule to non-land cases suggests a 
unique reason, rather than one of general applicability. 
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the loss---that efforts would have been futile or that efforts would have 
required unreasonably large expenses. 
A reasonable lawmaker deciding the issue as a matter of first 
impression, however, might choose to infer that benefits explain the 
difference between natural harm and actual ( or apparent) harm. The 
court faces two decisions: first, it must decide whether the plaintiff 
really made such a mistake or, alternatively, whether the plaintiff 
actually received a benefit and now seeks enrichment (rather than 
compensation) from the damage award; second, it must decide what 
legal effect to give the mistake-whether actual harm in excess of 
natural harm deserves compensation when caused by the plaintiff's own 
mistake. 
Attacking the second threatens to lapse into fault arguments. Since the 
plaintiff's own failure to minimize the loss proximately caused those 
losses, the plaintiff (not the defendant) should bear them. Relying on 
fault to choose the baseline, however, comes perilously close to tort 
concepts, such as contributory negligence and the duty to minimize the 
loss. If possible, this Article would rather explain the offset without 
relying on those principles. 
This Article has discussed the alternative explanation before.227 A 
common-law court might prefer not to inquire into the reality of the 
mistake. The mistaken plaintiff does not rebut the existence of benefits. 
The breach relinquished the defendant's claim on the plaintiff's 
resources, which the plaintiff could have used to reduce the loss. (If no 
loss was avoidable, the issue of whether to offset the recovery does not 
arise.) Thus, at the time of the breach the plaintiff received resources 
she could have exchanged for a dollar value: the amount of avoidable 
loss. A reasonable lawmaker could (and probably should) assess the 
value of that benefit based on what the plaintiff could have received for 
it, not necessarily what she actually received for it.228 The mistaken 
plaintiff claims that she did not realize the value of the benefits she 
possessed. But at the moment of breach she possessed that value. To 
allow her to recover damages as if she could not have exchanged those 
227. See supra Part I.C. 
228. This judgment is reflected in existing law. When a seller does not resell after 
buyer's breach, damages are offset by the market value of the goods at the time of the 
breach. U.C.C. § 2-708 (I 995). An actual resale is irrelevant, unless reasonable. Id. 
§ 2-706 ("made in good faith and a commercially reasonable manner"). A seller 
recovers based on objective market conditions, not subjective mistakes about the value. 
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resources for value would unjustly enrich her--not only in the cases 
where she actually did (or still can) dispose of the assets for value, but 
also in the cases where she did not and cannot realize the value any 
longer. Plaintiff may decide to dispose of her assets by letting them 
deteriorate; that is a prerogative of ownership. She cannot claim that she 
never had the value when she, through inaction, exercised that preroga-
tive in a way that did not exchange it for a monetary equivalent. The 
issue is not fault, but timing. The breach bestowed a benefit which, at 
the time of breach, had value. The plaintiff would be unjustly enriched 
to recover damages (without offset) and retain the asset. That property 
values declined thereafter, making the asset less valuable, is a risk that 
falls on the owner, not the person who relinquished ownership. 
Concern for the plaintiff injured if the presumption proves false may 
not command much weight---particularly if the court considers the 
implications for the decision going forward. 229 Once the court an-
nounced the decision, people would adjust to the law by minimizing 
losses when reasonably possible. Natural harm will, in fact, equal actual 
harm for parties aware of the rule. Thus, even if the rule might involve 
an injustice in the one case now before the court, the rule might achieve 
better results in future cases than a rule that compelled an inquiry into 
the bona fides of the plaintiff's decision not to minimize the loss in 
order to separate cases of actual harm from cases of extortion. 
None of this purports to identify the historical origins of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. This Article seeks to direct attention to a role 
that doctrine has played rather than to the reasons it came into being. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine serves a valuable function in 
preventing awards from enriching the plaintiff in cases where breach 
creates benefits. That function is sufficient grounds for continuing to 
offset awards by the amount of avoidable losses in the future, even if the 
law changes its mind entirely about the importance of minimizing waste 
or combatting moral hazard. This Section argues further that the role of 
preventing enrichment could have generated an offset for avoidable 
losses even if the law had not created the avoidable consequences 
doctrine for other reasons. Having established the independence of the 
benefit rationale, this Article will proceed to discuss the advantages of 
viewing the avoidable consequences doctrine as a corollary of the 
expectation interest rather than as an exception to it. 
229. Of course, the rule might easily have been announced in a case where the court 
strongly believed no injustice would result in the first place. Once announced, even in 
a form limited to cases where unjust enrichment seemed likely, the result could influence 
behavior by plaintiffs and by other courts until it evolved into a conclusive presumption. 
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III. Advantages of Rethinking Avoidable Consequences 
The preceding sections offer more than an interesting intellectual 
exercise. The legal basis for the avoidable consequences doctrine has 
some practical significance. That significance does not necessarily take 
the form of different results in cases. Indeed, the effort above has been 
directed largely at explaining how the two approaches produce similar 
or even identical results. Measuring benefit by reference to the amount 
of avoidable loss arguably should not change the result of any case that 
now subtracts the amount of the avoidable loss. Nonetheless, recogniz-
ing the avoidable consequences doctrine as a corollary of the expectation 
interest can alter case outcomes by clarifying how and when the 
avoidable consequences doctrine should apply to cases. Perhaps it is 
unnecessary to recharacterize the avoidable consequences doctrine in 
order to reach the best results in the cases discussed below. Courts 
might manage to avoid these mistakes by thinking through the implica-
tions of the avoidable consequences doctrine as it exists. Yet the reasons 
these results seem wrong are much clearer and more persuasive in light 
of the analysis above. 
Reconceptualizing the avoidable consequences doctrine also has some 
significance for legal theory-not only the theory of academics, but also 
theory at the level practitioners apply it.230 The theory presented here 
permits us to simplify discussions of damages. By deriving remedies 
from a single fundamental principle, rather than requiring a separate 
doctrine to present the exception, the law dispenses with unnecessary 
complication.231 Clarifying the harmony between the expectation 
interest and the avoidable consequences doctrine can eliminate the 
perceived conflict between them and obviate efforts to resolve that 
conflict. Thus, argument in actual cases can focus more clearly on the 
230. Few practitioners go to court with arguments based on the work of H.L.A. 
Hart, Robert Nozick, or John Rawls. Yet, in my experience, practitioners do present 
arguments to the court based on the rationale for and purpose of particular doctrines. 
And they do evaluate the consistency of rationales with the results their opponents 
propose. 
231. In this way, Ockham 's razor may cut in favor of benefit analysis. See supra 
note 74, for a definition of Ockham 's razor. The advantage, however, may be slight. 
The proposed approach requires the same reference to the amount of loss that reasonably 
could have been avoided. Thus, in practical effect, all the same calculations must be 
done whether we derive them from a general principle or a specific one. 
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facts that make an offset useful or important in that case. 
Part A will discuss both types of advantages---theoretical consistency 
and case outcomes----in a single context. The avoidable consequences 
doctrine, as now discussed, borders on the doctrine of contributory 
negligence. In fact, the avoidable consequences doctrine looks like 
nothing more than contributory negligence as applied to contract cases. 
Even the language we use to discuss avoidable consequences---the duty 
to mitigate damages----relies on the tort concept of duty and is reinforced 
by the reasonableness standard employed to determine when that duty 
has been breached. Scholars have rejected both the characterization as 
contributory negligence and the language of duty. But the reasons they 
provide are not very persuasive. Moreover, their conclusions do not 
prevent courts from treating the avoidable consequences doctrine as if 
it embodies the principles of duty and contributory negligence. As a 
result, courts have refused to apply the doctrine in cases where the 
avoidable consequences doctrine seems perfectly appropriate. Part A 
will try to demonstrate that viewing the avoidable consequences doctrine 
as a corollary of the expectation interest can clarify the error. By 
explaining the doctrine without recourse to duty or contributory 
negligence, the approach may prevent courts from rejecting the doctrine 
in cases where the plaintiff appears to owe no duty to the defendant. 
The same type of advantage may arise whenever courts must work 
through intricate applications of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
This Article will conclude with one example of the perplexing problems 
courts might confront: the problem of discharged employees who find 
substitute work for more pay. When an employee could have earned 
higher compensation,232 the employee is better off following the 
breach. Whether the court should reduce the damages the employer 
must pay requires some careful analysis. The language of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine does not really help courts resolve the difficult 
question of how to treat this surplus. The expectation interest, on the 
other hand, defines the critical inquiry rather clearly. Thus, 
recharacterizing the avoidable consequences doctrine in a manner 
consistent with the expectation interest permits the courts to focus on the 
issue in a productive manner that is unavailable if the avoidable 
consequences doctrine is seen as an exception to the general rule. 
232. I use compensation rather than pay to allow for differences in benefit packages. 
A job with higher take-home pay may not actually provide more compensation if 
reductions in insurance and other benefits exceed the increase in pay. 
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A. The Avoidable Consequences Doctrine as 
Contributory Negligence 
The similarities between the avoidable consequences doctrine and 
contributory negligence have been recognized for most of this century, 
if not longer. 233 Two similarities deserve attention here and should 
suffice to illustrate the case for unity between the two doctrines. First, 
the avoidable consequences doctrine, like contributory negligence, 
determines which of two parties should bear a loss when each of them 
committed a wrong that caused the loss, at least in a "but for" sense. 
Second, each doctrine allocates the entire loss to the plaintiff when each 
party contributed to causing it. Neither doctrine looks to the relative 
fault of the parties in determining which should bear the loss. Rather 
than presume that the reader fully accepts these generalizations, a brief 
discussion of each seems appropriate. 
The doctrines come into play when each party has committed a wrong 
that caused the loss. The wrong involved is negligence, generally 
defined by the standard of reasonableness. The negligence label is 
axiomatic in a finding of contributory negligence. The avoidable 
consequences doctrine imports negligence principles by limiting damages 
only when the plaintiff unreasonably failed to minimize the loss. The 
requirement of unreasonable conduct implies a negligence standard.234 
233. See SEDGWICK, supra note I 0, at 73-74. 
234. The Restatement (Second) of Torts explicitly defines reasonableness under the 
avoidable consequences doctrine by reference to the standards applicable in negligence 
actions. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918 cmt. c (1977). The Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts does not make explicit reference to negligence. Some might argue 
that the phrase "without undue risk, burden, or humiliation" does not exactly equate with 
unreasonable conduct. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(1) (1979). 
The word "undue" suggests at least a negligence standard. It is difficult to imagine a 
risk, burden, or humiliation that could be called undue if an ordinary reasonable person 
under similar circumstances would have accepted that onus in order to minimize the loss. 
To the extent that this language differs from negligence at all, it may require a higher 
degree of fault: undue burden may imply something more than merely an unreasonable 
burden. Also, the words "risk, burden, or humiliation" may limit the types of concerns 
that excuse the failure to minimize the loss: undue risk, burden, or humiliation justify 
a failure to minimize damages, but other reasons for inaction, even if reasonable, do not. 
Again, it is difficult to imagine any explanation that would make the plaintiffs conduct 
reasonable but would not fall within the exception for undue risk, burden, or humiliation. 
Since I cannot illustrate the second possibility, I am inclined to reject that interpretation 
of the language. Once that possibility disappears, the avoidable consequences doctrine 
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Negligence constitutes a wrong. In addition, the plaintiff's negligence 
must have caused the damages, at least in a "but for" sense. The 
contributory negligence label would make no sense if negligence that did 
not cause ( or contribute to causing) the accident precluded recovery.235 
The avoidable consequences doctrine produces the same result. In 
subtracting damages because the plaintiff could have avoided them by 
reasonable precautions, finders of fact necessarily imply that, but for the 
plaintiff's failure to act reasonably, the loss would not have occurred. 
The defendant's wrong also constitutes a "but for" cause of the loss. If 
the defendant's wrong did not cause the loss, the plaintiff could not 
recover damages for that loss anyway.236 Thus, the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine confronts two parties, each of whom committed a 
wrong that caused the loss. 
Labelling a failure to minimize the loss a "wrong" may seem 
anomalous. Arguably, the plaintiff wronged no one but herself. After 
all, the failure to prevent the loss causes her to suffer the loss, at least 
initially. In this, however, the avoidable consequences doctrine again 
resembles contributory negligence. The plaintiff's contributory 
negligence, to the extent it breached a duty to anyone, must have 
breached a duty to herself.237 In each case, however, one must assume 
the existence of the doctrine in order to negate a wrong to the defendant. 
The loss falls on the plaintiff only because these doctrines preclude 
recovery of the losses to which the plaintiff's negligence contributed. 
begins with fault (at least negligence) on the part of the plaintiff. 
Even if the reader credits the second alternative interpretation of§ 350(1), § 350(2) 
quickly clarifies that no reduction in damages occurs if the plaintiff acted reasonably, 
even if unsuccessful. The conclusion that the plaintiff unreasonably failed to minimize 
the loss, even if not explicitly labeled negligence, certainly implies that the plaintiff did 
something wrong. 
235. See, e.g., Martin v. Herzog, 126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920) (dicta); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 (1977). 
236. The causation requirement is well known in tort law. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 430-62 (1977). Causation enters contract remedies more subtly 
through the expectation interest. Contract law seeks to put the plaintiff in the position 
she would have occupied if the defendant had performed. FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, 
§ 12.1, at 840; MURRAY, supra note 2, § 117; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 24, 
§ 14-4. (Contract law does not achieve this result, in large part because of limitations 
on recovery of litigation expenses, especially attorneys' fees. See Wonnell, supra note 
31, at 482; Macaulay, supra note 162, at 250-53.) The goal dictates denying recovery 
for losses that would have occurred even if the defendant had performed. FARNSWORTH, 
supra note 2, at § 12.1. Thus, plaintiff recovers only those damages caused by the 
breach, those that would not have occurred but for the breach. See Kelly, supra note 6, 
at 1801. 
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 463 (1977) (discussing plaintiffs failure 
to take adequate care for her own safety). I leave aside the case where an accident 
injured both parties. Contributory negligence can apply even if the defendant was not 
injured in the accident. 
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Without the avoidable consequences doctrine or contributory negligence, 
the cost of the wrong would fall on the defendant, whose wrong also 
caused the loss. If the plaintiff unreasonably acts (or fails to act) in a 
way that causes monetary harm to the defendant (who foreseeably will 
pay the damage award), the plaintiff arguably wrongs the defendant.238 
Particularly since the avoidable consequences doctrine generally operates 
only after the plaintiff knows about the defendant's wrongful conduct, 
the plaintiff's decision not to prevent some losses could comprise a 
wrong against the defendant.239 The avoidable consequences doctrine 
cannot claim the absence of a duty because the plaintiff wronged only 
herself. Rather, the plaintiff wronged only herself because the avoidable 
consequences doctrine imposes a duty to protect the defendant's interest 
by keeping the loss as small as possible. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine, like contributory negligence, 
makes the plaintiff bear the entire loss for which the parties share 
responsibility. Contributory negligence applies when the accident240 
might have been prevented entirely if one party or the other had acted 
reasonably-say, by defendant driving at a lawful speed or by the 
plaintiff looking both ways before crossing the street. Because each 
party contributed to the entire injury, contributory negligence deals with 
the entire injury. This amounts to barring the action. Because the 
plaintiff's negligence contributed to causing the accident, the plaintiff 
bears the entire loss that resulted from the accident.241 
238. Since the hann to the defendant might consist entirely of a loss of money (the 
need to pay damages), recovery in tort might be precluded by the economic loss 
doctrine. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MN Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 
1985) (en bane), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986). Ifwe characterize the requirement 
of physical injury or property damage as a limitation on the duty to avoid unreasonable 
conduct, perhaps the plaintiff indeed owes no duty to the defendant. Contributory 
negligence, under these circumstances, would need to become either another exception 
to the economic loss doctrine or an extinct limitation on recovery. The avoidable 
consequences doctrine would face the same conundrum in tort law. Because contract 
law allows recovery for purely economic loss, the difficulty is less acute in the context 
most pertinent to this Article. 
239. If contributory negligence consists of actions or inactions taken where the 
defendant's negligence was not foreseeable, a duty to the defendant may be harder to 
explain. 
240. The word "accident" may slant this discussion heavily toward tort, even though 
this Article focuses on the use of the avoidable consequences doctrine in contract law. 
Nonetheless, in discussing contributory negligence, tort language seems the most natural. 
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 467 (1977). Comparative negligence 
differs by distributing responsibility among the parties who contributed to causing it in 
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The avoidable consequences doctrine also imposes on the plaintiff the 
entire loss for which the parties share responsibility, but does so in a 
slightly different factual setting.242 The plaintiff's unreasonable 
conduct did not contribute to the occurrence of the accident, but to the 
losses that resulted from it---and perhaps to only some of those losses. 
Thus, after denying recovery for all of the losses for which the plaintiff 
shares responsibility, some losses may remain attributable solely to the 
defendant's wrong. Nothing in either contributory negligence or the 
avoidable consequences doctrine suggests that the plaintiff should bear 
a loss to which her negligence did not contribute. The portion of the 
loss that the plaintiff could have avoided, however, is entirely unrecover-
able. Although the parties share responsibility for causing that portion 
of the loss, the loss falls entirely on the plaintiff. 
The difference between the situations where the two doctrines apply 
explains the superficial nature of at least one distinction often drawn 
between the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negli-
gence. No one misses the fact that contributory negligence bars 
recovery while the avoidable consequences doctrine merely reduces 
recovery.243 This distinction between the procedural consequences of 
the two doctrines has enormous practical significance. It does not, 
however, carry much theoretical significance. We treat contributory 
negligence as a total bar to recovery out of habit, not out of necessity. 
The law could just as easily treat contributory negligence as an offset. 
Because contributory negligence almost always arises in cases where the 
plaintiff's negligence contributed to the entire injury, the offset usually 
will be total. Thus, it is convenient to treat the doctrine as a bar to 
recovery. But to explain why the avoidable consequences doctrine 
differs from contributory negligence, we must discover a difference in 
their function, not in the labels we normally attach to their procedural 
effects. 
Consider how easily contributory negligence could explain the seat 
belt cases, if only we did not treat it as a bar to recovery. Each party's 
proportion to their fault. Comparative negligence, like contributory negligence, 
ordinarily deals with the accident as a whole rather than addressing discrete portions of 
the injury. 
242. Presumably, the law could apply comparative negligence principles to 
avoidable losses, dividing them among the parties who contributed to causing them. 
Problems such as increased litigation costs, decreased incentive for either party to 
actually prevent the loss, and difficult comparisons between fault for causing the accident 
as opposed to not curing the effects probably justify the complete inattention this idea 
has received. 
243. See. e.g., DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 188; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 918 cmt. a {1977). 
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negligence contributed to some of the injuries (those that could have 
been prevented by wearing the seat belt). Any injuries a seat belt would 
not have prevented are attributable only to the defendant; the plaintiff 
did not contribute to the cause of those injuries. Thus, even if we 
impose upon the plaintiff all of the injuries for which she shares 
responsibility, the defendant remains liable for the unavoidable 
injuries.244 The difficulty with this explanation rests in the mechanical 
habit of treating contributory negligence as a bar to the action because, 
so often, the parties share responsibility for all of the injuries.245 In 
fact, contributory negligence may handle the seat belt cases more easily 
than the avoidable consequences doctrine. The Restatement (Second) of 
Torts limits the avoidable consequences doctrine to loss the plaintiff 
"could have avoided by reasonable effort or expenditure after the 
commission of the tort."246 Seat belts, to be effective, must be fastened 
before the accident.247 As a result, some courts have refused to apply 
the avoidable consequences doctrine to the failure to fasten a seat 
belt.248 The difference again focuses on a procedural rather than 
essential aspect of the two doctrines to determine whether they apply. 
Taken together, the two procedural quirks suggest that the failure to 
fasten a seat belt cannot affect a damage award--no matter how 
unreasonable the conduct and no matter how much loss it could have 
244. 1 do not propose this as the fairest result; dividing the jointly caused loss 
among the two contributors might be fairer. But contributory negligence could be 
applied to this type of case wiihout barring recovery. 
245. Alternatively, the last clear chance doctrine may leave responsibility with the 
defendant whenever her negligence comes after the plaintiff's. See, e.g., Shanahan v. 
Patterson, 539 P.2d 1289, 1290 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975). But that doctrine, too, arose in 
reaction to the perceived injustice of treating contributory negligence as a complete bar 
to recovery. It might have less appeal in a case where the plaintiff recovered for injuries 
the defendant alone caused, even if the plaintiff could not recover for injuries to which 
her own unreasonable conduct contributed. 
246. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 918 (1977) (emphasis added). 
247. Where the tort involves defects in the plaintiffs car, such as product liability 
or negligent repair, perhaps the tort also occurs before the accident--and before the 
plaintiff should have fastened the safety belt. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts, however, might prefer an interpretation that the tort occurs when the injury 
occurs----the interpretation usually used for statute of limitation purposes and for 
explaining why plaintiffs cannot recover nominal damages where defendants' negligence 
causes no actual harm. That would accord with the idea that the plaintiff must minimize 
the loss once she knows about the losses, but need not worry about minimizing losses 
that might never occur in the first place. 
248. See, e.g., Clarkson v. Wright, 483 N.E.2d 268 (Ill. 1985). 
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prevented. 249 
Perhaps more revealing is the fact that the avoidable consequences 
doctrine can bar the entire recovery. In a case where a plaintiff can 
immediately and costlessly prevent the entire harm that the defendant's 
wrong otherwise might cause,250 the avoidable consequences doctrine 
arguably permits no recovery of damages.251 In such a case, the 
difference between contributory negligence and avoidable consequences 
disappears------unless we locate a difference more explanatory than the 
superficial description of the consequences each doctrine produces. 
When the avoidable consequences doctrine bars recovery, it works 
exactly like contributory negligence in all aspects, right down to the 
effects. If we have no better explanation for why contributory negli-
gence and the avoidable consequences doctrine differ, we must call the 
avoidable consequences doctrine contributory negligence in this case. 
The minute we look beneath the surface, we confront the similarity of 
the doctrines, not the differences: each allocates the entire loss to the 
plaintiff when both parties' negligence contributed to the loss.252 
Other explanations offered to distinguish the avoidable consequences 
doctrine from contributory negligence focus on equally superficial 
249. The possibility of comparative negligence remains open, but faces difficulties 
of its own. Comparative negligence differs from both the avoidable consequences 
doctrine and contributory negligence by allocating losses on the basis of fault. DOBBS, 
supra note 9, § 3.9, at 275. The avoidable consequences doctrine (and, as applied in the 
text, contributory negligence) deals with discrete components of damage, allocating 
losses entirely to one party or the other. For comparative negligence to work properly, 
it would need to allocate the entire loss that a seat belt would not have prevented to the 
defendant, then allocate the avoidable loss on the basis of comparative fault between the 
two parties. The calculation could become more complex still if the defendant alleged 
additional conduct by the plaintiff that contributed to the occurrence of the accident 
itself. 
250. A plaintiff sometimes can obtain a substitute contract on terms identical to 
those provided in the contract with a defendant. Tort cases may be harder to 
hypothesize, especially if they involve physical injury. In a fraud case, perhaps the 
plaintiff learns of the fraudulent misrepresentation before the market and can sell the 
stock in a faceless transaction at a gain sufficient to cover all transaction costs. 
251. We can quibble about the role of nominal damages here, but nominal damages 
have never been limited by the principle that we will not leave the plaintiff better off 
than if the defendant had performed. The law keeps them small to keep its deviation 
from the principle to a minimum. 
252. Some scholars acknowledge the similarities, at least in tort law. See [Student 
Vol.] w. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS§ 65, at 
459 (5th ed. 1984). It is not clear whether all of the authors accept the similarity. The 
distinctions discussed in this section are derived largely from Dobbs's discussion of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine in his treatise on remedies. DOBBS, supra note 10, 
§ 3. 7. The 1984 torts treatise may represent a change in his views since publication of 
the 1973 remedies treatise. Dobbs's remedies treatise nonetheless serves as the best 
compilation of the distinctions commonly drawn between contributory negligence and 
the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
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aspects of the doctrine. For example, one commentator argues that the 
avoidable consequences doctrine must not be the same as contributory 
negligence because the avoidable consequences doctrine applies in 
contract cases and intentional torts, where contributory negligence does 
not apply.253 That, however, is the conclusion, not the rationale. If 
the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence are 
simply two names for the same principle as it applies to different 
situations, then contributory negligence does apply to contract cases, but 
under a different name. Pointing out that the law has changed the 
doctrine's name does not help us determine whether the doctrine itself 
differs or remains the same. 
Similarly, the timing of the plaintiff's negligence does not establish the 
difference between the doctrines. The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
limits the avoidable consequences doctrine to plaintiff's conduct after the 
tort.254 But that simply describes the facts to which the doctrines 
apply, not the workings of the doctrines themselves. The doctrines could 
be identical despite the law's decision to use a different name in the two 
contexts. Moreover, no reason is given for why the doctrines impose a 
pre-tort or post-tort limitation. More recently, Dobbs has recognized that 
the distinction is only "sometimes correct,"255 apparently a bow to seat 
belt cases that apply the avoidable consequences doctrine to a plaintiff's 
unreasonable conduct before the accident.256 Dobbs also recognizes 
that timing of the conduct "does not touch the essence of the difference" 
between comparative negligence and the avoidable consequences 
doctrine.257 
253. DOBBS, supra note IO,§ 3.7, at 187. 
254. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 (1977). 
255. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 275. 
256. For this reason, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts rejects timing as a 
distinguishing feature. That work distinguishes not the doctrines, but the facts to which 
they apply: "[T]he distinction which exists is rather one between damages which are 
capable of assignment to separate causes, and damages which are not." KEETON ET AL., 
supra note 252, § 65, at 459. 
257. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 275. This does not rule out the possibility that 
Dobbs believes the distinction explains the difference between the avoidable consequenc-
es doctrine and contributory negligence. Dobbs's new treatise addresses differences 
between the avoidable consequences doctrine and comparative fault in a much more 
satisfactory fashion. He recognizes the difference between apportioning a loss between 
two parties, each of whom contributed to that loss ( comparative negligence), and 
assigning the entire loss to one party if that party contributed to the loss at all (the 
avoidable consequences doctrine). Id. § 3.9, at 275-76. Dobbs does not address 
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Similar difficulties plague discussion of the duty to mitigate damages. 
Many commentators deny that such a duty exists, but they rely on a 
single reason: since the defendant cannot maintain an action against the 
plaintiff for damages caused by breach, no duty exists.258 Again, the 
argument focuses on the procedures through which we effectuate the 
avoidable consequences doctrine, not the substance of the doctrine itself. 
As a matter of procedure, the law elects to treat the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine as a defense that offsets some of the plaintiff's 
damages. But that election is neither inevitable nor central to the 
workings of the avoidable consequences doctrine.259 
The tenuous link between duty and damages further weakens the 
argument against the existence of a duty to minimize the loss. A duty 
can exist even if no action for damages exists to enforce that duty. 
Perhaps it makes little sense to speak of legal duties if no remedy exists 
by which to vindicate the duty.260 However, the avoidable conse-
differences between the avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence in 
the new edition. 
Dobbs's original treatise also differentiates the avoidable consequences doctrine from 
contributory negligence on the ground that negligence takes on a more subjective 
meaning when dealing with the avoidable consequences doctrine. See DOBBS, supra 
note 10, § 3.7, at 187-88. The Restatement (Second) of Torts declares that the same 
rules govern negligence and the avoidable consequences doctrine. RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 918 cmt. c ( I 977). Nothing in the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts suggests a different approach. Thus, the law on paper recognizes no greater 
subjective component to reasonableness under the avoidable consequences doctrine than 
other objective negligence rules. Dobbs's observation may reflect a difference between 
theory and practice. This Article, however, attempts to explain the theory--the 
justification of or the rationale for the avoidable consequences doctrine. Since the 
American Law Institute does not choose to differentiate the two doctrines on this basis, 
this Article will not consider the implications of this distinction. However, using an 
objective standard in the avoidable consequences doctrine may produce unacceptable 
results in tort cases. This latter concern will be addressed in my forthcoming work, 
Living Without the Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Tort Damages. 
258. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 188; MCCORMICK, supra note 10, 
§ 33, at 128. 
259. An alternative procedure is outlined after the next two paragraphs. 
260. The conclusion is not inevitable. Courts have denied damage remedies to 
children injured by genetic counselling torts even when they have no difficulty 
concluding that the defendant owed a duty to the child as a foreseeable victim of 
careless conduct. See, e.g., Walker v. Mart, 790 P.2d 735, 739 (Ariz. 1990); Pitre v. 
Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (La. 1988). See generally Kelly, supra 
note 53. Horton and Alexander identify a range of ways the law can give force to 
contracts between spouses without necessarily allowing a damage action. See Paul 
Horton & Lawrence Alexander, Freedom of Contract and the Family: A Skeptical 
Reappraisal, in THE AMERICAN FAMILY AND THE STATE 229 (1986). Similarly, even 
though government officials have immunity from suit in some circumstances, we do not 
say they have no duty to act within the law. Victims of their misconduct may not 
receive damages or perhaps even injunctive relief. But the duty to act within the law 
remains a useful concept. Perhaps the last example is inapt, since arguably the duty 
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quences doctrine provides a remedy for the plaintiff's breach (of the duty 
to minimize the loss), but not a remedy in the form of a damage action. 
Rather, the defendant must accept an offset reducing his own liability to 
the plaintiff.261 
The absence of an independent damage action is inevitable, even if we 
recognize a duty. The harm to the defendant exists only if the plaintiff 
shifts the losses caused by the breach to the defendant. Until the 
plaintiff recovers damages from the defendant, the plaintiff's failure to 
minimize the loss has not caused the defendant any harm. Thus, an 
independent damage action by the defendant against the plaintiff makes 
no sense. In effect, denying a cause of action reflects procedural 
concerns for ripeness and compulsory counterclaims more than it reflects 
the absence of a duty to minimize the loss. By limiting the defendant's 
claim that the plaintiff breached a duty to minimize the loss to a defense 
in the plaintiff's suit, the law resolves the two claims in a single action 
rather than dealing with them separately. 
In fact, it takes very little imagination to see the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine as creating a counterclaim for the defendant. The 
plaintiff seeks recovery for the defendant's wrong, which caused all of 
the damages. The defendant counters by pleading that the plaintiff's 
unreasonable conduct caused the damages to be higher than necessary. 
We actually treat that pleading as an affirmative defense, but we could 
treat it as a counterclaim. The court could enter judgment for the 
plaintiff in the full amount of the loss. That done, the plaintiff's breach 
has damaged the defendant by exposing her to a larger judgment than 
necessary. The court then could enter judgment for the defendant on the 
counterclaim, awarding the amount of avoidable losses that the plaintiff 
negligently failed to avoid. 
This procedural revision illustrates the weakness of focusing on the 
remains, but flows to their superiors in the political hierarchy rather than to victims. 
Nonetheless, courts decide the cases on the grounds of immunity, not on the basis that 
no duty exists to these plaintiffs. Duty does not drop out of the picture merely because 
the courts provide no remedy. 
261. The distinction here makes no difference. The defendant's wealth improves 
regardless of whether she pays less or receives more. Starting from the assumption that 
the defendant must pay the plaintiff something (in exchange for what she received or as 
compensation for the wrong she has done), paying less (by reducing the damages 
awarded) is no different from paying more (by not subtracting avoidable consequences) 
but receiving more in exchange (damages for the plaintiff's breach of the duty to 
minimize the loss). 
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procedural embodiment of the doctrine in order to characterize its 
essence. A counterclaim offers no advantages over the existing 
procedures for embodying the avoidable consequences doctrine. It 
would tum a simple, one-step offset into a complex, multi-step process. 
But nothing in the avoidable consequences doctrine would change if the 
procedure changed. In fact, the imaginary procedures may clarify why 
courts insist that a defendant prove the amount of the offset,262 rather 
than forcing the plaintiff to prove it as part of the evidence of dam-
age.261 
The objection to the language of duty falters here. It deals with the 
form of the doctrine, not its substance. Having focused on the method 
by which we employ the avoidable consequences doctrine, the argument 
ignores the essence of the doctrine. That essence requires the plaintiff 
to act reasonably and imposes consequences for the failure to act 
reasonably-a duty by any other name. 
The existing procedures also provide some fairly strong indications 
that plaintiffs really do have a legal duty to minimize the loss. Pattern 
jury instructions reveal near unanimity in telling jurors that the plaintiff 
has a duty to minimize the loss.264 The words of appellate courts and 
legislatures make very little difference if the actual decisionmakers, to 
whom all reviewers must defer, are told to hold the plaintiff to a duty to 
minimize damages. True, the instructions also tell the jurors to subtract 
avoidable losses from the award, not to make a separate award to the 
defendant in that amount. But they reduce the award because the 
plaintiff breached a duty. 
The language chosen for jury instructions may be an imperfect source 
262. See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 272; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 350 cmt. c (1979) (but noting different treatment for cases where basic 
damage calculation already includes mitigation). 
263. This is not the only reason to allocate the burden of proof to the defendant, but 
if the procedures actually followed the counterclaim route, that probably would be a 
sufficient reason. 
264. Pattern jury instructions expound a duty to mitigate damages; they almost 
never call it the avoidable consequences doctrine. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON ST AND ARD 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, SUPERIOR COURT OF L.A. COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL§§ 14.67-.68 (1994); EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY 
PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL§§ 85.13, 86.08 (1987); COMMITTEE ON PATTERN 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES Ass'N, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES) § 15.15 (1993); COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES ASS'N, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL CASES §§ 7.1-.3 (1990). Whether judges risk reversal by 
amending or supplementing these instructions to remove or explain references to the duty 
to mitigate would require investigation far beyond the scope of this paper. Such study 
also seems unlikely to produce any useful information, even if the results proved 
surprising. 
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of the law. It reflects the clearest and briefest way to produce an 
intelligent result from persons untrained in the law. Courts might refer 
to duty not because they think the avoidable consequences doctrine 
entails a duty, but because calling it one communicates effectively with 
the people who must decide the case, producing an appropriate 
outcome.265 The references to duty in numerous judicial opinions also 
may simply represent a comfortable shorthand for a doctrine the 
audience already understands.266 Adding a phrase like "sometimes 
called the duty to mitigate damages"267 may help people who, like me, 
made it through law school without having heard of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. More troubling are the courts who tum this 
around: the duty to miti~ate damages, "also called the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences."2 8 Perhaps, however, Dobbs is correct to 
suggest that no one is likely to be misled.269 
265. Cf Christopher T. Wonnell, Problems in the Application of Political 
Philosophy to Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 123 (1987); Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and 
Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984). 
266. See, e.g., Wartzman v. Hightower Prods., Ltd., 456 A.2d 82, 88 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1983) (section heading: "Duty to Mitigate Damages"); S.J. Groves & Sons v. 
Warner Co., 576 F.2d 524, 528 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1978) (referring to "the general duty to 
mitigate damages" in text, but dropping a footnote stating that "[i]t has been said that 
there is not a duty on the part of a plaintiff to mitigate damages"); Ford Motor Co. v. 
EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982) (referring to the "statutory duty to minimize 
damages"). While SJ. Groves and Ford involve statutes codifying the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, neither the U .C.C. nor Title Vil of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
uses either "duty" or "mitigate" to set forth the doctrine. See U.C.C. § 2-7l5(2)(a) 
(I 995); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) ( 1988). The courts, however, have so internalized the 
notion of a duty to mitigate damages that other language cannot conceal from them the 
nature of the principle at stake. 
References to the duty to mitigate damages seem to outnumber references to the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. A quick survey of Westlaw on August 2, 1993, 
revealed 370 cases in the Al/states database use the phrase "avoidable consequences," 
while 736 use the phrase "duty to mitigate damages." The latter phrase, of course, will 
miss cases that refer to the duty to minimize damages, Dobbs's preferred usage. See 
DOBBS, supra note 10, § 3.7, at 188; DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9, at 380 n.5. It also will 
miss cases that rearrange the words, insert an extra word, or misspell a word. Nearly 
twice as many cases (I ,478) use "duty" and "mitigate" in the same sentence in a 
paragraph that mentions "damages." 
267. See Chastain v. Owens Carolina, Inc., 426 S.E.2d 834, 835 (S.C. Ct. App. 
I 993) ('"so-called duty to mitigate his damages"') (quoting Smalls v. Springs Indus., 
Inc., 388 S.E.2d 808, 810 (S.C. I 990)). 
268. Walker v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 621, 625 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1992); See also Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 912 (Idaho 1993); 
Bernsen v. Big Bend Elec. Coop., 842 P.2d 1047, 1051 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993). 
269. DOBBS, supra note 9, § 3.9 n.5. 
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If the language simply reflected loose talk, it would deserve brief 
notice and comment. Lawyers must use language precisely in order to 
accomplish their clients' ends. Too often when one is tempted to 
assume or to say, "You know what I mean," the other party truly does 
not know what you mean-or, perhaps worse, thinks she does know 
what you mean when that is not what you meant at all.270 Such a 
general lesson could end here, not requiring any further comment, let 
alone a complete re-explanation of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
More troublesome, however, are the indications that the avoidable 
consequences doctrine really is falling into the pattern described here. 
Jeffrey Riffer and Elizabeth Barrowman recently called attention to an 
entire line of cases in which courts have refused to apply the avoidable 
consequences doctrine to federal regulators of failed financial institutions 
when the regulators pursue actions against former officers and direc-
tors.271 The two scholars identify three reasons courts state for not 
applying the doctrine: (I) the regulators owed a duty to the public, but 
owed no duty to the former officers and directors of the institution; (2) 
public policy required protecting deposit insurance funds by maximizing 
recovery by the regulators; and (3) the government had not waived 
sovereign immunity (under the Federal Tort Claims Act or otherwise) for 
claims against regulators by former officers and directors. The first 
rationale explicitly depends upon interpreting the avoidable consequences 
doctrine to include a duty to mitigate damages. The third rationale goes 
further; it applies only if that duty consists of a claim against the 
government for damages.272 The underlying assumptions employed by 
these courts demonstrate the continuing image of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine as a manifestation of contributory negligence. 
These cases have little direct relevance to this Article. They involve 
270. T.S. ELIOT, The Lovesong of J Alfred Pru/rock, in COLLECTED POEMS 1909-
1962 3 (1970). 
271. Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9, at 411. The exact nature of the mitigation 
claims does not appear in the article. At least one footnote suggests the government has 
spent more than necessary to manage the affairs of the failed financial institutions. Id. 
at 412 n.7 (commenting on excessive payments to accounting firms employed by the 
regulators). Often, however, the mitigation claims relate to government decisions 
regarding the sale of various assets of the institution. See, e.g., FDIC v. Stanley, 770 
F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. Ind. 1991) (alleging unreasonable loan collection practices by the 
FDIC after it seized the bank). 
272. The second rationale seems equally satisfied by applying the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, thus giving the regulators an incentive to be frugal, rather than 
excusing their wastefulness by assessing unnecessarily large damages against others. 
The policy rationale, however, reflects considerations outside the avoidable consequences 
doctrine that arguably justify ignoring it. Those policies lie outside the scope of this 
Article. The other two rationales purport to interpret the proper application of the 
avoidable consequences doctrine, presenting issues directly relevant here. 
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claims for statutory violations and breach of fiduciary duty, not breach 
of contract. They invoke public policies specific to the regulation of 
banks that may not affect the application of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine in other contexts. 
Courts deciding these cases, however, have not limited their pro-
nouncements to the context involved. They hold that the applicable state 
law rests the avoidable consequences doctrine on the existence of a duty 
to mitigate.273 The implication that the avoidable consequences 
doctrine rests on the existence of duty in all cases threatens a broader 
impact than the relatively limited range of banking cases described by 
Riffer and Barrowman. 
Refusing to apply the avoidable consequences doctrine in cases where 
the plaintiff owed no independent duty to the defendant could nearly 
obliterate the avoidable consequences doctrine. Since plaintiffs often do 
not owe defendants a duty, the avoidable consequences doctrine could 
disappear in a significant number of cases. The danger seems greatest 
in tort cases, where the victim commonly owes no duty to the wrongdoer 
who injures her--unless the duty arises because of the injury.274 
Contract cases may not present the same difficulty: each party to a 
contract owes duties to the other, though some may already have been 
performed. The duty of good faith and fair dealing inherent in every 
contract may support a duty to minimize the loss--if that duty extends 
beyond the breach. Material breach of a contract, however, generally 
excuses remaining duties the nonbreaching party owed to the other. 
Thus, courts may find it difficult to identify a duty that remains 
following the breach.275 Absent some fiduciary relationship, only 
273. See, e.g., RTC v. Greenwood, 798 F. Supp. 1391 (D. Minn. I 992) (distinguish-
ing FDIC v. Ashley, 749 F. Supp. I 065 (D. Kan. 1990), on the ground that it applied 
Kansas law, which, unlike Minnesota, did not rest the avoidable consequences doctrine 
on a duty to minimize the loss); RTC v. Kerr, 804 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D. Ark. 1992). 
274. If the injury itself imposes duties upon the victim, it is hard to distinguish the 
federal regulators. The government and the guaranty fund, as victims, would seem to 
come within the same duty. 
275. Section 237 of the Restatement makes a party's duties under a contract 
conditional on the absence of any "uncured material failure" to perform by the other 
party. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979). A condition is defined 
as an event that must occur before performance becomes due. Id. § 224. Thus, no 
performance by the plaintiff is due following an uncured material breach. The language 
is general, suggesting no exception for either the duty to act in good faith or a duty to 
minimize the loss by reasonable means. To my knowledge, no court has ever excused 
the plaintiff's failure to take reasonable measures to minimize the loss on the ground that 
275 
precedent seems likely to keep the avoidable consequences doctrine alive 
if courts begin to reject it where they cannot find an independent duty 
that the victim owed to the wrongdoer.276 
These dire consequences seem as unlikely as they are extreme. The 
cases misapplying277 duty language have been quite limited to 
date.278 Nonetheless, the avoidable consequences doctrine works quite 
well when we do not conceive of it as a duty to minimize the loss or as 
a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff's negligence contributed to 
causing the loss. The problem with the conventional wisdom lies in its 
weak support, not the conclusions themselves.279 Rather than discard 
the conclusions, perhaps we should strive for better reasoning----a better 
theoretical basis upon which to rest the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
The expectation analysis of the avoidable consequences doctrine 
provides a theoretical basis that explains existing pronouncements about 
the avoidable consequences doctrine---at least in contract cases, and 
probably in a broad array of cases involving property rights. If the 
avoidable consequences doctrine accounts for the benefits a plaintiff 
received as a result of the breach, then no duty to minimize damages 
the plaintiff no longer owed a duty to the defendant following the defendant's material 
breach. Yet that suggests that the avoidable consequences doctrine is not born of a 
duty---0r, at least, not a duty under the contract. Thus, the duty to minimize the loss 
either arises because of the injury (as suggested for tort) or does not exist at all. 
276. This may not be entirely bad. My thoughts on the avoidable consequences 
doctrine in tort cases require lengthy explanation that will not conveniently fit within this 
Article. Rest assured (or, perhaps, tremble with fear at the prospect) that an article 
setting forth those views will appear shortly. Michael B. Kelly, Living Without the 
Avoidable Consequences Doctrine in Tort Remedies (forthcoming 1997). 
277. To the extent that the existing dogma surrounding the avoidable consequences 
doctrine remains tied to tort concepts, arguably the courts applying tort principles 
actually have the better view of how to apply the duty to mitigate damages. They have 
seen through the veneer of scholarly disavowal to the essence of negligence doctrine 
lying at the roots of the duty to mitigate. But this does not suggest that they have 
produced the better result. 
278. The cases primarily involve actions by regulators of financial institutions 
against former officers and directors. Policy arguments unique to this relationship or to 
the recent savings and loan crisis may explain or even justify decisions not to apply the 
avoidable consequences doctrine. But see Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9, at 419-34 
(rejecting policy arguments relied on by the courts deciding these cases). 
279. Riffer and Barrowman amass an impressive array of authority to support the 
conclusion that the avoidable consequences doctrine does not involve a duty to mitigate 
damages. Riffer & Barrowman, supra note 9, at 411. After reading that compilation, 
however, one is left with two impressions: (I) that the authorities offer very little 
justification for the conclusion, relying almost exclusively on the consequences of the 
defense (as an offset rather than a damage award); and (2) that the authorities nowhere 
provide an explanation of what the avoidable consequences doctrine is, contenting 
themselves with the conclusion that it is not a duty to mitigate. Given the rather shallow 
attacks on the use of "duty" to describe the avoidable consequences doctrine, perhaps 
the persistence of the terminology is understandable. 
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arises. We offset the recovery not because the plaintiff should obtain 
benefits by entering a substitute contract, but because she has obtained 
benefits by receiving the opportunity to enter into a substitute contract. 
We truly do not care whether the employee gets another job or the seller 
finds a new buyer. They may take their benefit as leisure or goods 
instead of money for the resale of their time or wares. As long as the 
law awards them the amount of the loss they could not have avoided by 
reasonable efforts, it has placed them in the position they would have 
occupied if the defendant had performed the contract. The recovery is 
smaller not because they could have received more, but because they did 
receive more.280 Thus, the expectation interest urges that we discard 
all reference to a "duty" to minimize the loss. 
In addition, the theory proposed here severs the link between the 
avoidable consequences doctrine and contributory negligence. The law 
subtracts losses as a necessary component of restoring the position the 
plaintiff would have occupied if the defendant had performed, not as a 
means of allocating to the plaintiff losses to which her own fault 
contributed. In fact, the benefit analysis suggests that the failure to 
minimize the loss did not produce a net loss at all, since the benefits at 
least offset the avoidable portion of the loss. The two doctrines still 
produce the same results, but for entirely different reasons. Concern for 
the plaintiff's fault disappears; concern for the plaintiff's benefits takes 
its place. 
The approach suggested here permits us to set aside tort language. 
This Article re-explains the avoidable consequences doctrine in a way 
that does not depend on tort concepts. To the extent that scholarly 
proclamations denying a duty to mitigate have a very thin acceptance 
because they do not explain the existence of the doctrine in any other 
280. To some extent, these statements overlook the objectifying presumptions 
proposed in the earlier portions of this article. See supra Part I. Some individuals may 
not have received as much as the law has assumed they received because they did not 
know about the law, they miscalculated (either the effect of the law or the market value 
of their benefit), or they did not act in a rational manner. These relatively rare 
exceptions undermine the unqualified statements in the text without undermining the 
desirability of reformulating the explanation of the avoidable consequences doctrine. 
After all, the avoidable consequences doctrine itself imposes the ultimate objectifying 
presumption by denying recovery to anyone who reasonably could have avoided the loss. 
The objectifying presumptions suggested here do not exclude anyone who could have 
recovered under the avoidable consequences doctrine as now formulated. Rather, they 
bring the new rationale into line with the existing practice. 
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way, this Article can fill that void. If conceptualized as a manifestation 
of the expectation interest, the avoidable consequences doctrine needs no 
reference to tort concepts to explain its existence. Provided courts 
accept this new rationale, perhaps fewer cases will misapply the 
avoidable consequences doctrine in the future. 
B. Improved Judicial Focus: Substitute Employment for More Pay 
The expectation interest may offer some subtle assistance to courts 
applying the avoidable consequences doctrine. If the avoidable 
consequences doctrine primarily seeks to re-create the position the 
plaintiff would have occupied but for the breach, courts may find easier 
approaches to some intricate questions that can arise under the avoidable 
consequences doctrine. The advantage need not stem from focusing on 
the benefits of the breach, though that focus also may help. Rather, 
some advantage comes from discarding the notion that the avoidable 
consequences doctrine seeks to vary the position the person would have 
occupied but for the wrong. By recognizing the fundamental harmony, 
or perhaps unison, between the expectation interest and the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, courts may approach some problems in more 
useful ways. This section explores one such intricate situation. 
When a discharged employee finds new work ( or could have new 
found work) at a higher salary than she received from the breaching 
employer, the court must decide how to treat the surplus.281 When the 
employee promptly finds a better job, courts have little difficulty 
concluding that the plaintiff can recover only nominal damages.282 
The employee resembles a seller who finds a buyer willing to pay more 
than the contract price for the goods. She is better off after the breach 
than she would have been if the buyer (or employer) had performed. In 
281. When the plaintiff actually earns higher wages, the problem involves avoided 
consequences rather than avoidable consequences. Even then, however, courts must 
decide whether surplus earnings after the employee takes new work should be applied 
to offset the damages for the weeks before the employee found the new job. The same 
problem can arise if the employer argues that the employee could have found work at 
a higher rate of pay if she had conducted a reasonable job search. The two situations 
deserve identical treatment; the amount that was earned, like the amount that could have 
been earned, is a proxy for the value of returning the employee's time to her. The 
Article will continue to discuss actual earnings because cases exist addressing that 
situation. Apparently, very few employers who discharge employees later contend that 
the employees were so good that they could have earned more in a new job. Perhaps 
employers seek to maintain a consistent litigation posture, contending the employee was 
so bad that they had to fire her. Perhaps employers simply do not want to state publicly 
that they underpaid the employee. In any event, cases exemplifying employees who earn 
more following discharge are rare. 
282. See, e.g., Coble v. School Dist., 116 A.2d 113 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1955). 
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such cases, the most remarkable fact is that the employees would sue at 
al1_2s1 
A better substitute job presents an enigma when the wages cover only 
part of the contract period, perhaps beginning a few weeks after 
discharge or ending before the original contract term would have 
expired. Consider, for example, the following situation: an employer 
discharges an employee earning $2000 per month, two months before 
her contract would have expired. The employee spends one month out 
of work diligently looking for a new job. She finds a better job and 
earns $2500 in the remaining month before her original contract would 
have expired. 
283. One case involved a doctor denied entry to a medical residency program. 
While his actual earnings greatly exceeded the pay he would have received in the 
program, he sought compensation for consequential damages----the lost income over his 
life from being deprived of the education and training he would have received in the 
program. In effect, the plaintiff sought damages as a buyer of education, while the 
defendant preferred to characterize the contract as employment. These different 
expectations explain why a plaintiff benefitted in terms of salary might nonetheless sue 
for damages. 
Another line of cases arises from an exception to the avoidable consequences doctrine 
for public officials. Some states treat pay collected by public officials as an incident of 
office rather than as compensation for the services, even suggesting that a public 
official's entitlement to a salary does not "'partake of the nature of contracts, nor have 
... the remotest affinity thereto."' Coble, I 16 A.2d at 116 (quoting Commonwealth v. 
Bacon, 6 Serg. & Rawle 322, 323 (1820)). Teachers have sued despite finding better 
work elsewhere, apparently hoping to take advantage of this exception. The Coble court 
refused to apply this exception to public employees (like teachers) as distinguished from 
public officials (such as the mayor involved in Bacon)-<lespite a statute stating "there 
shall be no abatement of salary or compensation" in such cases. 116 A.2d at 115. A 
similar distinction in statutory language prevented a superintendent of schools from 
taking advantage of the exception for public officials. Mullen v. Board of Educ., 195 
A.2d 195, 199-200 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (no mitigation applied when 
legislature used the word "compensation" instead of the word "salary"). 
The entire exception for public officials, if it has any merit at all, depends on policies 
quite alien to the avoidable consequences doctrine as now formulated. One might 
construct explanations based on the expectation interest, but only with unusual 
assumptions, such as that elected officials become entitled to the salary for the full year 
by virtue of election, regardless of their service in office. (This virtually treats the salary 
as a prize for winning the election.) The theory proposed here might require an 
additional assumption: that public officials remain entitled to earn additional income 
from outside sources during their term. This may reflect public office as conceived in 
earlier times---and may remain plausible in some areas. The exception and its reasoning, 
however, probably merit reexamination in light of changes since Bacon was decided in 
1820. This Article will not provide that re-examination; it will focus on results dictated 
by the avoidable consequences doctrine, rather than statutory exceptions that do not 
purport to pursue the same purposes. 
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On one hand, the higher wages represent the fruits of an employee's 
labor. She, not the breaching employer, generated the surplus and 
deserves to enjoy it. Courts can produce this result by awarding the 
employee $2000 salary for the month she was out of work (plus other 
elements of damages, if any), but cutting off liability when she found the 
new job.284 By recovering $2000, the employee in effect earns $4500 
for the two-month period, instead of the $4000 she would have received 
if she had remained employed. 
On the other hand, this puts the employee in a better position than if 
the employer had performed. Allowing the employee to receive $4500 
for a time when she had been promised only $4000 may deviate from 
the expectation interest. The employee probably would not have 
received that surplus if the contract had been performed.285 The 
employer, having never promised to pay this much, arguably should not 
be compelled to pay damages that increase her total compensation to this 
level. 
The desirability of these two approaches may vary with the example 
chosen. People who prefer to allow the employee to retain the surplus 
may lean toward the first option. Changing the example, however, may 
produce a different reaction. Suppose that the employee immediately 
found a better job, but lost it (for innocent reasons not attributable to the 
fault of any party) after one month. An approach that cut off liability 
when the employee took a better job would produce zero recovery. 
Thus, the employer would pay nothing, even though the employee would 
have received $4000 in the two-month period instead of $2500. The 
second approach, however, continues to provide a $1500 recovery in 
damages, leaving the party in the position she would have occupied but 
for the breach. 
Courts could approach the choice mechanically, as an issue of the 
proper time frame to consider. The court could consider the remainder 
of the contract period as a single unit or as several distinct pay 
periods.286 An award for the two-month period (taken as a whole) 
284. See. e.g., Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N.W.2d 585 (Wis. 1968). 
285. The word "probably" leaves open the possibility that she could have found and 
taken the new job while continuing to work for the first employer, then persuaded the 
first employer to release her from her promise to work the last month. 
286. Dicta suggest that the entire period consists of a whole. See Mullen, 195 A.2d 
at 197 ( characterizing the issue as a choice between "whether 'compensation' referred 
to in the statute means full salary during the period of illegal dismissal before the right 
to reinstatement accrued to appellant, or such salary reduced by the wages he received 
in his [better job] during that period"). Interestingly, the court affirmed a decision that 
employed neither of these approaches, but cut off damages when the plaintiff received 
a better job, thus not reducing the damages by the surplus earnings he subsequently 
received. Id. at 200. The court apparently did not recognize the difference between 
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would give the employer the benefit of the improved job. The employee 
should have received $4000 for that period, but actually received only 
$2500. She should recover the remaining $1500 from the employer, but 
no more.287 An award calculated for each month individually produces 
a different result. For the first month, the employee deserved $2000, but 
received nothing. For that period, the employer must pay $2000. For 
the second month, the employee expected $2000, but actually received 
at least that much, leaving no balance for the employer to pay.288 
The avoidable consequences doctrine as generally formulated does not 
dictate either result. More important, it does not provide courts with an 
analytical framework in which to consider the appropriate result. The 
avoidable consequences doctrine might treat the issue by considering the 
extent of the duty to mitigate damages owed by the employee. 
Alternatively, courts could resort to the purpose of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine, considering which result would provide the best 
incentive to minimize waste. Yet under either approach, either result 
seems plausible. 
As noted earlier, the prevailing view of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine closely resembles a counterclaim for contributory negli-
gence.289 Viewed as a duty to reduce the consequences the former 
these two results. 
287. For an age discrimination case calculating back pay for the entire period, see 
Kolb v. Goldring, Inc., 694 F.2d 869 (5th Cir. 1982). The employee was out of work 
only two months before finding a job that began at $22,000/year (the same salary he 
earned before discharge, but without bonuses) and eventually rose to $34,500/year, more 
than the raises the court found realistic from the former employer (maximum 
$28,000/year, plus benefits). Id. at 871. The court found a jury verdict of $45,000 
excessive. Id. at 874. The court, however, avoided allocating the surplus earnings to 
the employer by cutting off liability on the date when the plaintiffs new salary exceeded 
the old salary. Id. The court then calculated total earnings at the old job and total 
actual earnings at the new one for the entire period (about three years). Id. at 871-75. 
288. See EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518, 526 (E.D. Wash. 
I 982). This approach arguably allows the court to avoid the problem posed in the 
preceding paragraph. It may not matter whether the month of better employment comes 
before or after the month of unemployment. Each month consists of a whole, for which 
an award is calculated separately. The approach does not require a carryover (either 
backward or forward) from one month to the next. Using monthly units to facilitate 
calculation is fairly common. To my knowledge, no court has addressed arguments 
about the propriety of periodic calculations in a case where it would affect the award. 
289. See supra Part II.A. 
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contract partner will suffer because of the breach,290 the doctrine seems 
to require the court to award any surplus to the breaching employer.291 
But to some extent, that appearance depends on the scope of the duty to 
mitigate damages. We could limit the duty to an obligation to seek and 
to accept alternative employment.292 Presumably, the employee fulfills 
that duty when she begins work at the higher paying job. The duty to 
the employer then ceases, as does the duty of the employer to the 
employee.293 Alternatively, however, the duty could continue for the 
290. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 131 {I 981) (treating the avoidable 
consequences doctrine as a duty that survives the contract). This Article has suggested 
a similar analogy, at least in connection with employment contracts. See supra text 
accompanying notes 101-05. At times the duty will apply only during the term that 
would have been covered by the original contract (as in the example of employment for 
a specified term). At times the duty may extend beyond the original contract term (such 
as a duty not to compete or a duty to resell goods reasonably, which generally arises 
only after the original contract has ended, whether by its terms or by one party's material 
breach). 
291. The employee unreasonably failed to minimize the loss if she refused a job that 
would have paid more money. Therefore, the amount that the employee could have 
earned must be subtracted from the employee's claim. 
292. See supra text accompanying note 103. 
293. See Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N. W.2d 585 (Wis. 1968). The same result may 
apply to employment discrimination actions, but perhaps for different reasons. 
Discrimination cases often involve employment that had no set duration, but could have 
continued for the life of both parties. In that setting, some cut-off date for continued 
liability seems necessary unless the employer becomes the guarantor of lifelong 
employment for all employees who suffer discrimination. The Supreme Court expressed 
concern for the duration of back pay liability, especially given the prolonged nature of 
many employment discrimination proceedings. See Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 
219 ( 1982). In response, some courts stop damages when the employee obtains 
"comparable" employment elsewhere. See Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 638 F. 
Supp. 224, 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); State Dep't of Correction v. Finley, 575 N.E.2d 1026, 
1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (dicta). Employment at a higher salary seems likely to 
qualify as comparable employment under most circumstances. Even when the job is 
quite different, the employee seems unlikely to claim it was not comparable if that will 
mean reducing the amounts the employer owed for any earlier period. See Sims, 638 F. 
Supp. at 230. (If the job is not considered comparable, the court must subtract the 
earnings as interim earnings. Since the employee now earns more per month than she 
earned at the original job, damages diminish as long as the employee continues to earn 
the higher wages. Of course, an employee who lost the comparable job might not prefer 
a cut-off date. See, e.g., Finley, 575 N.E.2d at 1028.) When the employee, given a 
choice, almost certainly would have relinquished the old job for the new, the requirement 
of comparable employment seems satisfied. In fact, one suspects that comparable 
employment might include some jobs not quite as good as the original job. See Ford 
Motor Co., 458 U.S. at 231-32 (worker forfeits back pay ifhe refuses ajob substantially 
equivalent to the one he was denied). 
Cases involving breach of contract for a definite period provide their own duration 
term. The employee arguably deserves wages until the contract expires, regardless of 
how often she may find and lose other employment in the interim. Thus, the decision 
to cut off damages in Smith v. Beloit Corp. must rely on a different rationale, one more 
closely (if implicitly) attuned to the argument in the text. 162 N.W.2d 585. 
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entire term of the breached contract. The courts so hold when the 
employee takes a lower paying job; the employer's obligation to make 
up the difference continues.294 Similarly, the employee may demand 
that the employer continue paying wages if the substitute job ends before 
the original contract period expires.295 The employee retains a recipro-
cal duty to make reasonable efforts to keep the substitute job or to find 
another if she loses the first substitute job.296 The duties imposed by 
the avoidable consequences doctrine have no inherent cut-off date prior 
to the conclusion of the breached contract. These continuing duties 
suggest that the employee continues to serve the employer, but in a 
remote capacity. As such, any surplus from the employee's labor should 
inure to the employer (by decreasing the amount of damages she must 
pay), just as surplus from the employee's labor in working for the 
employer inured to the benefit of the employer. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine offers no suggestion on this 
rather detailed, practical issue. The doctrine dictates that the employee 
act reasonably, but does not delineate the duty any further. In fact, 
scholarly discussions of the avoidable consequences doctrine reject the 
notion of duty altogether.297 In addition, the avoidable consequences 
doctrine exists at a level of generality that does not relate to the specifics 
posed here. No one discusses whether courts should assess reasonable-
ness on a monthly or weekly basis. Such computational issues generally 
are entrusted to juries, operating under the most general instructions. 298 
294. See, e.g., EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 418 (E.D. Wash. 
1982); cf Cleveland Indoor Soccer Co. v. Haaskivi, 605 N.E.2d 1315 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1992). 
295. For example, no one suggested that the employer's liability ended when the 
employee found temporary employment at a better wage in Paragon Hotel Corp. v. 
Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (tort of retaliatory discharge for filing 
a worker's compensation claim). Nor did temporary work at the same salary end the 
employer's liability under Title VII in Sims v. Mme. Paulette Dry Cleaners, 638 F. Supp. 
224 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). While breach of contract may involve a less severe wrong than 
tortious discharge or employment discrimination, the avoidable consequences doctrine 
does not provide any internal rationale for treating the cases differently. 
296. Brady v, Thurston Motor Lines, Inc., 753 F,2d 1269 (4th Cir. 1985); Sims, 638 
F. Supp. at 229 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219,231 & n.15 (1982)). 
297. See supra note IO and accompanying text. 
298. The pattern jury instructions dealing with mitigation of damages--they almost 
never call it the avoidable consequences doctrine----present the issue at the most general 
level, apparently leaving counsel to explain how the general principles will apply in any 
given case. See, e.g., COMMITTEE ON STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL, SUPERIOR 
COURT OF L.A. COUNTY, CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL§§ 14.67-.68 (1994); 
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As a result, decisions seem more likely to follow either the court's 
intuitions or mechanical decisions that conceal their consequences. 
The generality of jury instructions may strike some as an objection to 
the entire project. What difference does it make how the law character-
izes or particularizes the avoidable consequences doctrine if the decisions 
ultimately come from juries who have not been instructed in these details 
of the law? The objection, however, overlooks several important points 
at which courts and, more particularly, lawyers must focus on the 
appropriate measure of damages without the shield of an uninstructed 
jury. In the first place, many cases are decided without a jury.299 In 
those cases, the judge must apply the avoidable consequences doctrine 
on her own, answering all the detailed questions posed here. Her 
EDWARD J. DEVITT ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL 
§§ 85.13, 86.08 (I 987); COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES 
Ass'N, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JuRY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL CASES)§ 15.15 (1993); 
COMMITTEE ON PATTERN JuRY INSTRUCTIONS, DISTRICT JUDGES Ass'N, ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL CASES§§ 7.\-.3 (1990). Sitting judges 
may particularize the pattern instructions to lay out the workings of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine in more detail, as appropriate to the case at hand. The risk of 
reversible error may lead judges to stick with instructions that already have been 
approved rather than attempt to innovate. 
299. Even when parties might prefer a jury trial, they cannot always obtain one. 
Until recently, Title VII cases involved bench trials because the relief available had been 
categorized as equitable. See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 
1125 (5th Cir. 1969); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. 
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); see also Great American Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 375 & n.19 (1979). Cases arising under the labor laws may 
begin before the National Labor Relations Board. See FLORIAN BARTOSIC & ROGER C. 
HARTLEY, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR § 3.02 (2d ed. 1986). Cases 
involving state employees also may begin with administrative agencies. Two cases cited 
earlier in this section began with state administrative decisions, subject to judicial review 
but not trial de novo. See State Dep't of Correction v. Finley, 575 N.E.2d I 026 (Ind. 
Ct. App. 1991); Mullen v. Board of Educ., 195 A.2d 195 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1963). 
Some employment contracts place cases before arbitrators--particularly union 
contracts, which commonly include guarantees of continued employment ( until the 
employee gives cause for discharge). Arbitrators are not bound to follow judicial 
doctrines (such as the avoidable consequences doctrine) at all, let alone apply them in 
the way the common-law courts might prefer. Cf Lentine v. Fundaro, 278 N.E.2d 633, 
636 (N.Y. 1972) (quoting Exercycle Corp. v. Maratta, 174 N.E.2d 463,466 (N.Y. 1961)) 
("Arbitrators may do justice. It has been said that, short of 'complete irrationality,' 
'they may fashion the law to fit the facts before them.'"). But see Garrity v. Lyle 
Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 795 (N. Y. I 976) (rejecting arbitrator's decision to award 
punitive damages as against public policy). Nonetheless, to the extent the avoidable 
consequences doctrine identifies an important factor involved in shaping a just result, 
arbitrators may seek out scholarly or judicial input concerning the best way to apply 
it--Or, guided by skilled advocates, they may create similar results independently, 
leading rather than following. 
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decisions, like those of a jury, will be subject to review on appeal.300 
The appellate court, in order to discern whether the jury reached a 
verdict supported by the evidence, may need to decide how the 
avoidable consequences doctrine should be applied. Applying it the 
wrong way may produce a verdict that the court must reverse as outside 
the range of verdicts permissible under the evidence. In jury trials, 
lawyers must know how to argue before the jury. No matter how 
general the instructions, the jurors may need to perform some very 
specific calculations.301 The attorney must help them understand what 
they should do------and perhaps even persuade them to employ one 
approach as opposed to another. Naturally, efforts to limit what the 
opposing lawyer may accomplish can arise via motions in limine (to 
exclude evidence of higher paying jobs), motions to strike, motions for 
partial summary judgment on mitigation issues, and similar motions or 
evidentiary objections that shape the evidence and the argument the jury 
hears. Calculating the settlement value of a case also involves some 
prediction of what a jury will do, prediction that must begin with 
knowledge of what the jury can and cannot consider. In short, lawyers 
and judges cannot ignore the details involved in the workings of legal 
doctrines, even when juries may apply them quite loosely. While some 
decisions may be made with only the most general guidance, other 
aspects of law and lawyering require attention to minute detail. 
The expectation interest suggests a different framework for analyzing 
this problem. It asks, quite simply, what would have happened if the 
breach had not occurred. That inquiry might produce either result, 
depending on the facts of a given case. But the inquiry identifies the 
pertinent facts and the outcome appropriate in each case. Consider three 
possible scenarios: 
1. The employee might have been able to locate a new, higher 
300. United States v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1958), presents a fairly 
insightful look at the amount of detail appellate courts may expect of trial courts when 
they decide damage issues without a jury. Jury cases also may offer the court a fairly 
clear view of the amount awarded for lost earnings, either because the trial court 
submitted special interrogatories to the jury, see Paragon Hotel Corp. v. Ramirez, 783 
S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), or because earnings constituted the only legitimate 
element of damages in the case. See Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N.W.2d 585, 569 (Wis. 
1968). 
301. Sometimes the jury may not perform any calculations, but instead reach a nice 
round number that sounds about right. But one does the jury an injustice to assume that 
they never pay attention to detail in discussing damage issues. 
285 
paying job while continuing to work for the original employer and 
to reach an accord with the employer permitting her to resign early 
in order to take the better job. 302 
2. The employee might have been unable to locate the new, higher 
paying job while working for the original employer.303 
3. The employee might have located the new job while working for 
the original employer, but might have refused the job.304 
The first possibility supports a cut-off date when the employee began 
the new job. But for the breach, the employee would have earned her 
normal salary for the period before she located the substitute job, but 
would have earned the higher salary thereafter. Similarly, the employee 
would have no recourse to resume work for the employer if the 
substitute job disappeared.305 As a result, the employee, not the 
employer, deserves the benefit of the surplus generated by the new job. 
Even if the employee did not take the higher paying job (but should 
have, if she had acted reasonably) the employer would have paid the 
employee until the new job materialized and cannot claim a reduction in 
damages below that amount.306 
302. The employer, whose breach indicates some willingness to dispense with the 
employee's services, seems likely to have jumped at the chance to replace the employee 
early. While some employers might seize an opportunity to extort concessions from the 
employee desperate to leave, those situations seem likely to be relatively rare. When 
they occur, they implicate the third scenario listed here. 
303. This seems likely if she located the job only because she had her days free as 
a result of the employer's breach. 
304. While this possibility may seem remote, several possible motivations might 
produce this result, including loyalty to her employer, a sense of moral obligation to 
fulfill her contractual promises, or a preference to minimize change in her life. While 
differences in the terms and conditions of employment also might explain the decision, 
they introduce new variables that complicate the analysis. For now, assume that the jobs 
involved are identical in all respects except salary. 
305. This scenario posits that both parties were willing to terminate the original 
contract in light of the employee's new offer. That termination would have ended any 
claim the employee had against the employer on the date she left, leaving her at risk if 
the new job proved temporary. An employee might not have given up a secure job (one 
for a guaranteed term) even for a higher paying job that lacked such security. That 
possibility, however, falls within the third scenario rather than this one. 
306. Because the employee continued working for the employer until discharge, we 
fairly can presume that she would have continued past discharge at least until the better 
offer came along. Perhaps we must revise the assessment of the benefit of leisure 
upward once the employee rejects ( or unreasonably fails to discover) a job that would 
pay her $2500/month (all other things being equal). Unwillingness to work for $2500 
implies unwillingness to work for $2000, perhaps even suggesting that she would have 
quit after the first month. (The alternative assumption-bad faith by the employ-
ee-----does nothing to improve her claim to a second month of pay.) Nonetheless, the 
discussion of benefits here offers no basis to estimate the value of leisure until the date 
upon which the employee could have obtained a new job. Thus, unless we conclude that 
she could have earned at least $2000 in the first month (but unreasonably did not), 
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The second possibility makes the opportunity to earn more money a 
benefit of the breach. But for the breach, the employee would have not 
have located the higher paying job. Allowing her to receive $4500 for 
the two-month period puts her in a better position than she could have 
occupied if the employer had performed. Thus, the entire $2500 earned 
should offset the recovery. She would, however, have earned her full 
salary for the remainder of the contract term---regardless of when the 
better job would have begun or how long it would have lasted. Thus, 
no cut-off date for damages (short of the duration term in the contract) 
will end the employer's liability. The same result applies to the 
employee who unreasonably fails to take the better job. 
The third possibility duplicates the second in all significant respects, 
but arguably requires different language. The opportunity to earn the 
higher salary is not a benefit of the breach; the employee could have 
found the job while employed. Nonetheless, the earnings are a benefit 
of the breach, because the employee would have turned down the job 
and earned only her original salary if the employer had performed the 
contract. Thus, the entire $2500 should offset the recovery. 307 
nothing suggests she would have left work with the employer in the first month because 
she preferred leisure to employment. 
307. The employee who refuses the job for $2500 after discharge poses an enigma: 
a person who valued her leisure less than the $2000 for which she would have sold it 
to the original employer, but more than the $2500 for which she refused to sell it to the 
prospective new employer. The decision to value her leisure at $2500 remains 
appropriate. Whatever the rationale that might permit a person presently employed to 
reject a better offer, it does not inherently apply to an unemployed person faced with the 
same offer. The decision to reject the offer while employed suggests that the employee 
did not prefer either $2500 or leisure over $2000 plus loyalty, $2000 plus honor, or 
$2000 plus stability. (From another point of view, we must subtract the psychic cost of 
disloyalty, oathbreaking, or disruption from the value of leisure or alternative wages to 
the employee who remains on the job instead of quitting, either to play or to work 
elsewhere.) The discharged employee has no similar factors. She owes no loyalty to 
the breaching former employer. No loyalty to the unemployment office compels her to 
continue to draw benefits rather than take a job. She is not honor bound to remain 
unemployed rather than break her commitment to either the unemployment office or the 
breaching former employer. Returning to work does more to restore stability to her life 
than to destroy it, if we may use the status quo ante as her preferred starting point for 
inertia. Even differences in the conditions of employment, which may have made a 
decision to stay with the original employer reasonable, do not justify rejecting the job 
once discharged by the original employer unless the differences make the new job 
unduly burdensome, risky, or humiliating. While other motivations could have been 
proposed in note 304, supra, they should allow similar distinctions here between the 
employed person and the discharged employee. Thus, the decision unreasonably to 
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In each case, the inquiry focuses on the position the employee would 
have occupied if the employer had performed the contract as promised. 
The expectation interest itself, not some limitation on the expectation 
interest, drives the result. Because the facts of each case may vary, the 
expectation interest does not dictate a rule specifying a particular 
result. 308 
The expectation interest thus leads us to the appropriate inquiries and 
provides relatively clear guidance once the factual matters have been 
determined. By comparing the position the plaintiff would have 
occupied but for the breach with the position she now occupies, 
including the benefit of any leisure, the court can resolve matters without 
recourse to a mechanical (and arbitrary) decision regarding the appropri-
ate time periods into which to divide the period of unemployment. The 
court need not even resort to the indeterminate policies behind the 
avoidable consequences doctrine in order to achieve appropriate results. 
In this way, recourse to general damage principles may help clarify the 
issues courts confront when considering difficult questions concerning 
the proper application of the avoidable consequences doctrine to less 
common fact patterns. 
CONCLUSION 
Judges, lawyers, and scholars may benefit from revising the way we 
think and speak about the avoidable consequences doctrine. While 
principles of contributory negligence and causation may explain the 
origins of the doctrine, those principles will not necessarily provide the 
best guide to resolving cases. For this entire century, and perhaps 
longer, courts and the academy have concurred in the view that the 
avoidable consequences doctrine differs from contributory negligence 
reject (or not to seek) a job at $2500/month should give rise to the nonnal inference that 
the plaintiff valued a month of leisure more than she valued $2500. 
308. This Article frequently has proposed objective rules to replace subjective 
inquiries into the employee's actual preferences. This may seem like a suitable place 
to propose another objective rule to eliminate the third possibility--that the employee 
would have refused the higher paying job for subjective reasons if she had received the 
offer while still working for the employer. But an objective rule will not distinguish 
between the first two scenarios, which do not vary with the subjective preferences of the 
employee, but with the ability of the employee to locate the higher paying job while still 
employed by the employer. To the extent that the ability to search for a new job while 
perfonning another job varies with the subjective abilities of the employee, an 
objectifying assumption may be appropriate. We should ask whether the employee could 
have located the better job if she had used reasonable efforts while still employed by the 
employer. But the definition of reasonable efforts seems likely to vary from person to 
person to a degree that the objectifying assumption may contribute very little in this 
context. 
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and does not give rise to a duty to minimize the loss------though the degree 
to which those conclusions have been internalized varies significantly. 
Unfortunately, our devotion to these conclusions has preceded any 
coherent explanation of how the avoidable consequences doctrine can 
exist independently of a duty to minimize the loss. Thus, we continue 
to manifest contributory negligence principles in the avoidable conse-
quences doctrine, even as we pay lip service to their irrelevance. 
This Article proposes that the expectation interest can explain the 
avoidable consequences doctrine in contract damages without any 
reference to contributory negligence or to duty. In fact, we can live 
without the avoidable consequences doctrine. The expectation interest, 
when properly applied, can achieve the same result without any reference 
to the avoidable consequences doctrine. If we recognize that a plaintiff's 
decision about whether to avoid the loss turns on the relative merits of 
using resources to avoid the loss or using them in some other manner, 
then the choice not to minimize the loss evinces benefits that damage 
recoveries must take into account. The size of the benefits, though often 
difficult to measure directly, can be inferred from the decision not to 
avoid the loss. The plaintiff must expect the benefits of using resources 
in other ways at least to equal the benefit of minimizing the losses 
caused by the breach. Thus, we have reasonable evidence that the net 
loss suffered by the plaintiff does not exceed the full loss minus the 
portion of the loss that she could have avoided by reasonable efforts. 
The avoidable consequences doctrine, by reducing damages in this 
amount, accomplishes a result that the expectation interest would require 
in any event. 
Recharacterizing the avoidable consequences doctrine as an incident 
of the expectation interest does not require substantial modifications in 
the way we apply the avoidable consequences doctrine. The existing 
rules capture the essential requirements of the expectation interest quite 
effectively. Recognizing the nature of the avoidable consequences 
doctrine, however, may help courts decide when to apply it. Exceptions 
to, or refinements of, the avoidable consequences doctrine require 
justification not in terms of duty, but in terms of benefits or by reference 
to the situation that would have occurred if the contract had been 
performed. Similarly, problems at the margin of the avoidable 
consequences doctrine may receive clearer resolution if courts consider 
the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if the wrong had not 
occurred. 
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Subtracting avoidable losses does not compromise the goal of full 
compensation for losses actually suffered. Rather, it helps us accurately 
assess the losses actually suffered in cases where some of those losses 
would be exaggerated by neglecting the benefits of breach. The 
avoidable consequences doctrine is not an exception to the rightful 
position, but a corollary of it. We can implement the rightful position 
fully if we acknowledge the need to subtract avoidable losses in our 
efforts to avoid overcompensation. 
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